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German spring offensive
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===Changes in tactics=== The German army had concentrated many of its best troops into stormtrooper units, trained in [[infiltration tactics]] to infiltrate and bypass enemy front line units, leaving these strong points to be "mopped-up" by follow-up troops. The stormtrooper tactic was to attack and disrupt enemy headquarters, [[artillery]] units and supply depots in the rear areas, as well as to occupy territory rapidly.<ref>Simpson 1995, pp. 117–118.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}}<!--All of the Western front armies had evolved like this since early 1915 by obtaining the theory, equipment and training.--> Each major formation "creamed off" its best and fittest soldiers into storm units; several complete divisions were formed from these elite units. This process gave the German army an initial advantage in the attack, but meant that the best formations would suffer disproportionately heavy casualties, while the quality of the remaining formations declined as they were stripped of their best personnel to provide the stormtroops. The Germans also failed to arm their forces with a mobile exploitation force, such as cavalry, to exploit gains quickly. This tactical error meant the infantry had to keep up an exhausting tempo of advance.<ref>Simpson 1995, p. 124.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}} Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the stormtroopers, the following German infantry often made attacks in large traditional waves and suffered heavy casualties.<ref>Simpson 1995, p. 123.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=June 2021}} To enable the initial breakthrough, Lieutenant Colonel [[Georg Bruchmüller]],<ref name="Bruchmüller">[http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/bruchmuller.htm Bruchmüller] biography.</ref> a German artillery officer, developed the ''{{ill|Feuerwalze|de|Feuerwalze (Militär)}}'', (literally: rolling fire, rolling barrage)<ref>(Anon.) (1918) [https://books.google.com/books?id=0nEmAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA417 "Organization of a rolling barrage in the German Army"], ''The Field Artillery Journal'' (U.S. Army), '''8''' : 417–421.</ref> an effective and economical [[creeping barrage]] scheme.<ref>Zabecki, 2006, p 56</ref> There were three phases: first, a brief bombardment on the enemy's command and communications (headquarters, telephone exchanges, etc.); then, destruction of their artillery; lastly an attack upon the enemy front-line infantry defences. Bombardment would always be brief so as to retain surprise. Bruchmüller's tactics were made possible by the vast numbers of heavy guns—with correspondingly plentiful amounts of ammunition for them—which Germany possessed by 1918{{citation needed|date=February 2024}}.
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