Editing Infiltration tactics (section)

=== France ===
[[File:Capture of Neuville St, Vaast, 9 May - 9 June 1915.jpg|thumb|Mix of new and old French tactics help capture [[Neuville-Saint-Vaast]], but with heavy casualties, 9 May – 9 June 1915, as part of the [[Second Battle of Artois]]]]
New French tactics that included an initial step for infiltration were published by the [[Grand Quartier Général (1914–1919)|''Grand Quartier Général'']] (GQG, French General Headquarters) on 16 April 1915, in ''But et conditions d’une action offensive d’ensemble'' (''Goal and Conditions for a General Offensive Action''), its widely circulated version being ''Note 5779''. It states that the first waves of infantry should penetrate as far as possible and leave enemy strongpoints to be dealt with by follow-up ''nettoyeurs de tranchée'' (trench cleaner) waves. The note covers weapons and close-combat tactics for the trench cleaners, but the tactics and weapons of preceding waves are unchanged, and there is little mention of any additional support for the now-detached advanced waves. The note contains annexes covering different subjects, including artillery, infantry defense, and infantry attacks. For attacks, Note 5779 continued to promote the pre-war French doctrine of ''la percée'' (the breakthrough), where an offensive is driven by a grand, single plan with continuous waves of reserves targeting the operation's distant and static objectives. It does not cover methods of adapting to local success or setbacks, nor the small-unit initiative, coordination and additional training this would require. The tactics were employed with some success on the opening day of the [[Second Battle of Artois]], 9 May 1915, by the French XXXIII Corps; they advanced {{convert|4.5|km|mi}} in the first hour and a half of the attack but were unable to reinforce and consolidate to hold onto all these gains against German counterattacks. The battle was costly and inconclusive, taking a heavy toll in French troops and [[matériel]]. Later French infantry tactics moved away from the costly ''la percée'' towards a more practical ''grignotage'' (literally ''nibbling'', taking in small bits) doctrine, which employed a series of smaller and more methodical operations with limited objectives; each of these were still planned at headquarters, rather than from immediate local initiative. Note 5779 also describes an early form of [[rolling barrage]] in its artillery annex; this was employed with success and continued to be developed by the French as well as by most other nations throughout the war.<ref>[http://historyspot.org.uk/podcasts/military-history/second-battle-artois-may-1915-new-turning-point Kraus Podcast] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131217224536/http://historyspot.org.uk/podcasts/military-history/second-battle-artois-may-1915-new-turning-point |date=2013-12-17 }}. Kraus, ''Early trench tactics in the French Army'', pp. 23–32.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Strohn |first=Matthias |title=The Battle of the Somme (Companion) |year=2016 |publisher=Osprey |isbn=978-1-4728-1556-9 |pages=204–207}}</ref><ref name="Warfare 1914-1918">{{cite web |last=Philpott |first=William |title=Warfare 1914–1918 |url=https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/warfare_1914-1918 |website=1914–1918 Online, International Encyclopedia of the First World War |access-date=2 November 2017}}</ref>

In August 1915, a young French infantry officer, Captain {{Interlanguage link|André Laffargue|fr}}, put forward additional ideas in a pamphlet titled ''Étude sur l’attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre'' (''Study of the Attack in the Current Period of the War'').<ref>[http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csir_13/csir_13.asp CSI Report No. 13: Tactical responses to concentrated artillery: Introduction] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110602111844/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csir_13/csir_13.asp |date=2011-06-02 }} (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth).</ref> Laffargue based his proposals in particular on his experiences in the initially successful but ultimately disappointing results of employing the tactics of Note 5779 at the Second Battle of Artois; he commanded a company of the 153rd Infantry Regiment, attacking immediately south of [[Neuville-Saint-Vaast]] on 9 May 1915. Laffargue was left wounded on the German front line but his regiment advanced another {{convert|1.5|km|mi}}, only to be held up by two German machine guns. Laffargue's pamphlet focused primarily on the small-unit perspective, calling for mobile [[firepower]] to deal with local resistance such as machine guns, advocating that the first waves of an attack advance through the intervals or gaps between centres of resistance, which should be temporarily neutralised on the edges by fire or heavy smoke. The points of resistance would then be encircled and dealt with by successive waves. This promotes coordinating local forces to deal with local resistance as it is encountered, an important second step in infiltration tactics. Laffargue suggests that had these methods been followed the attack could have resulted in a complete breakthrough of the German defences and the capture of [[Vimy Ridge]].

The French Army published Laffargue's pamphlet in 1915 and the following year a commercial edition found wide circulation, but as informational rather than being officially adopted by the French military.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Laffargue|first1=André|title=Étude sur l'attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre: Impressions et réflexions d'un commandant de compagnie|date=1916|publisher=Plon-Nourrit et Cie.|location=Paris, France|language=fr|trans-title=Study on the attack in the present period of the war: Impressions and reflections of a company commander}}</ref> The British translated and published Laffargue's pamphlet in December 1915 and, like others, continued to make frequent use of wave attacks.<ref>[http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/war/List-of-SS-Pamphlets.doc CDS 333 "A Study of the Attack in the Present Phase of War: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander"] (December 1915). Microsoft Word.</ref> The US ''Infantry Journal'' published a translation in 1916.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Laffargue|first1=André|title=Study on the attack in the present period of the war: Impressions and reflections of a company commander|journal=Infantry Journal|date=1916|volume=13|issue=2|pages=101–138|url=https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924066174388;view=1up;seq=110}}</ref>

In contrast to the infiltration tactics then under development in the German army, the tactics of Note 5779 and as expanded by Laffargue remained firmly wedded to the use of the [[human wave attack|attack by waves]], despite the high casualties which could ensue. Laffargue maintained that the psychological support of the attack in line was necessary to enable men to advance against heavy fire.<ref>Jones, [http://simonjoneshistorian.wordpress.com/2014/03/05/infiltration-by-close-order-andre-laffargue-and-the-attack-of-9-may-1915/ "Infiltration by Close Order"]</ref>

In 1916, captured copies of Laffargue's pamphlet were translated and distributed by the German army. How much this may have influenced German infiltration tactics is not known; such influence has been dismissed by Gudmundsson.<ref>Gudmundsson, ''Stormtroop Tactics'', pp. 193–196.</ref> The Germans had started developing their own infiltration tactics in the spring of 1915, months before Laffargue's pamphlet was even published.<ref>Samuels, Martin ''Doctrine and Dogma'', passim</ref><ref>Samuels, Martin ''Command or Control?'', passim</ref><ref>Stormtroop Tactics, Appendix C and passim</ref><ref>Samuels, Martin ''Doctrine and Dogma'', 55</ref>