Editing James Jesus Angleton (section)

==Central Intelligence Agency==
{{more citations needed section|date=November 2013}}
Upon his return to Washington after World War II, Angleton was employed by the various successor organizations to the OSS and eventually became one of the founding officers of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in 1947.<ref name="EncColdWar" /><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |title=James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_019.PDF |journal=Studies in Intelligence |volume= |issue=4 |pages=39–55}}</ref>

In May 1949, he was made head of Staff A of the [[Office of Special Operations]], where he was responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence and liaising with counterpart intelligence organizations in foreign countries.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}}

Beginning in 1951, Angleton was responsible for "the Israel desk" as liaison with [[Israel]]'s [[Mossad]] and [[Shin Bet]] agencies.<ref name=":0" /> Angleton retained an active interest in Israeli intelligence and maintained connections there throughout his career, believing that émigrés to Israel from the [[Soviet Union]] and [[Warsaw Pact]] nations could be a valuable source of information on their countries of origin. He also believed that Israeli foreign intelligence services could be used for proxy operations in third countries. For instance, Shin Bet was crucial in obtaining a transcript of [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s [[On the Personality Cult and its Consequences|1956 speech]] to the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] [[20th Congress of the CPSU|Congress]] that denounced [[Joseph Stalin]].<ref>''Haaretz'', 11/3/2006</ref>  Author Samuel Katz has claimed that Angleton directed CIA assistance to the [[Israel and weapons of mass destruction|Israeli nuclear weapons program]].<ref>See Samuel Katz, ''Soldier Spies'', 1992.</ref>
[[File:JimEngeltonAmit1966 (retouched).jpg|thumb|Angleton (right) with head of [[Mossad]] Global Operations [[Meir Amit]] (1966).]]
As head of Staff A, Angleton worked particularly closely with Kim Philby, the apparent future head of [[MI6]], who was also in Washington.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Gladwell |first=Malcolm |date=2014-07-20 |title=The Hazards of Mistrust |language=en-US |magazine=The New Yorker |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/28/philby |access-date=2023-09-05 |issn=0028-792X}}</ref> The Israeli intelligence officer [[Teddy Kollek]] claimed years later that in 1950 he warned Angleton that Philby had been a Soviet agent in the 30s.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Morley |first=Jefferson |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EwCXDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA50 |title=The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton |date=2017-10-24 |publisher=St. Martin's Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-250-13910-8 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Martin |first=David C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PmaCDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT76 |title=Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception, and the Secrets that Destroyed Two of the Cold War's Most Important Agents |date=2018-09-15 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-5107-2219-4 |language=en}}</ref> In 1951, Philby's colleagues [[Guy Burgess]] and [[Donald Maclean (spy)|Donald Maclean]] defected to [[Moscow]]. Philby was expelled from Washington, suspected of having tipped them off based on decoded Soviet communications from the [[Venona project]]. Philby was confirmed to be a Soviet mole but eluded those sent to arrest him. He defected to Moscow in 1963. Philby called Angleton "a brilliant opponent" and a "fascinating" friend who seemed to be "catching on" before his defection. CIA employee [[William King Harvey]], a former [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agent, had voiced his suspicions regarding Philby and others Angleton suspected were Soviet agents.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vogel |first=Steve |date=2019-11-10 |title=The Hick From Indiana Who Nailed Master Spy Kim Philby |language=en |work=The Daily Beast |url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-hick-from-indiana-who-nailed-master-spy-kim-philby |access-date=2023-09-13}}</ref>

In 1953, [[Allen Dulles]] became [[Director of Central Intelligence]]. He soon named Angleton chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, in which position Angleton served  for the remainder of his career.<ref name="EncColdWar" /> Dulles also assigned Angleton responsibility for coordination with allied intelligence services.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}}

As chief of Counterintelligence, Angleton oversaw a ring of informants organized by [[Jay Lovestone]], a trade union leader and former head of the Communist Party of the United States. It was informally called the "Lovestone Empire". Lovestone worked with foreign unions and used covert funds to establish a global system of anti-communist union organizers.<ref>Ted Morgan, ''A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster'', New York: Random House, 1999.</ref>

During the [[Vietnam War]] and Soviet-American [[détente]], Angleton remained convinced of the necessity of the war. During this period, Angleton's counter-intelligence staff undertook a most comprehensive domestic covert surveillance project (called [[Operation CHAOS]]) under the direction of President [[Lyndon Johnson]]. The prevailing belief at the time was that the anti-war and civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s had foreign funding and support. None was found by them, although the Soviet Union did [[Soviet influence on the peace movement|influence the movements]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) |url=http://archive.org/details/CIA-International-Connection-Peace-Groups |title=International Connections of U.S. Peace Groups |date=1967-11-15 |language=English}}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=October 2023}}

Angleton also believed that the strategic calculations underlying the [[1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China|resumption of relations]] with [[People's Republic of China|China]] were flawed based on a deceptive KGB staging of the Sino-Soviet split. He went so far as to speculate that [[Henry Kissinger]] might be under KGB influence.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Heer |first=Jeet |date=9 July 2010 |title=Espionage is sublime onscreen, but hardly ever changes history |url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/espionage-is-sublime-onscreen-but-hardly-ever-changes-history/article1635023/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303195559/https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/espionage-is-sublime-onscreen-but-hardly-ever-changes-history/article1635023/ |archive-date=3 March 2016 |website=The Globe and Mail}}</ref>

===Suspicion of infiltration===
Angleton held a general belief that all secret intelligence agencies should be assumed to be penetrated by others, or at least that a reasonable chief of counterintelligence should assume so.{{citation needed|date=August 2015}} Angleton's view was influenced by his direct experience with the manipulation of German intelligence during World War II, the [[Cambridge Five]], and the success of American infiltration efforts in the Third World. In particular, Angleton's close association with Philby heightened Angleton's suspicions and led him to double-check "potential problems".{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}} Angleton's position in the CIA and his close relationship with Director [[Richard Helms]] in particular expanded his influence, and as it grew, the CIA split between Angletonians and anti-Angletonians.{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}} This conflict rose in particular regard to [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] and [[Yuri Nosenko]], who defected from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1961 and 1964, respectively.

Golitsyn defected via [[Helsinki]] on December 15, 1961. He and his family flew with a CIA escort to Sweden and then to the United States, where he was interviewed by Angleton personally.<ref>{{cite web |author=<!--Not stated--> |title=NARA Record Number: 104-10169-10125 |url=https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=23302#relPageId=7 |access-date=28 June 2021 |website=Mary Ferrell Foundation |publisher= }}</ref><ref name="Mitrokhin2">[[Christopher Andrew (historian)|Christopher Andrew]] and [[Vasili Mitrokhin]] (2000). ''The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West.'' Gardners Books. {{ISBN|0-14-028487-7}}.</ref> Golitsyn limited his initial debriefing to a review of photographs to identify KGB officers and refused to discuss KGB strategy. After Golitsyn raised the possibility of serious infiltration with MI5 in a subsequent debriefing, MI5 shared the concern with Angleton. He responded by asking Helms to allow him to take responsibility for Golitsyn and his further debriefing. Golitsyn ultimately informed on many famous Soviet agents, including the [[Cambridge Five]], which led to their apprehension.<ref name="Mitrokhin2" /> Angleton identified Golitsyn as "the most valuable defector ever to reach the West".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Herron |first1=Caroline Rand |last2=Wright |first2=Michael |date=2 February 1986 |title=THE NATION; A K.G.B. Defector Who May Not Be |url=https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50710FE3B5C0C718CDDAB0894DE484D81&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organizations/K/KGB |via=NYTimes.com}}</ref><ref name="Nosenko2">[[Walter Pincus]], ''[[The Washington Post]]'', August 27, 2008, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082603493.html Yuri I. Nosenko, 81; KGB Agent Who Defected to the U.S.]</ref>

However, other allegations Golitsyn made, including that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [[Harold Wilson]] was a Soviet agent and that the [[Sino-Soviet split]] was a "charade," were ultimately found to be false.<ref name="Mitrokhin2" />  Golitsyn also claimed that a mole who had been stationed in West Germany, was of Slavic descent, had a last name that might end in "sky" and definitely began with a "K", and operated under the KGB codename "[[Sasha (espionage)|Sasha]]".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=U.S. Central Intelligence Agency |date=2013 |title=James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_019.PDF |journal=Studies in Intelligence |volume=55 |issue=4 |pages=45}}</ref> Angleton believed this claim, with the result that anyone who approximated this description fell under his suspicion.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ignatius |first=David |date=March 8, 1992 |title=Desperately Seeking Sasha |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1992/03/08/desperately-seeking-sasha/01e18014-0b4f-437d-aa21-4443079cda0c/ |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref>

Angleton became increasingly convinced that the CIA was compromised by the KGB.<ref name="BeardenRisen2003">{{cite book |last1=Bearden |first1=Milton |url=https://archive.org/details/mainenemyinsides00bear |title=The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB |last2=Risen |first2=James |date=2003 |publisher=Random House Publishing Group |isbn=978-1588363060 |page=[https://archive.org/details/mainenemyinsides00bear/page/38 38] |access-date=15 November 2013 |url-access=registration}}</ref> Golitsyn convinced Angleton that the KGB had reorganized in 1958 and 1959 to consist mostly of a shell, incorporating only those agents whom the CIA and the FBI were recruiting, directed by a small cabal of puppet masters who doubled those agents to manipulate their Western counterparts. Although Golitsyn was a questionable source, Angleton accepted significant information obtained from his debriefing by the CIA.<ref name=":2" />

In 1964, Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer based in [[Geneva]], insisted he needed to defect to the United States because his role as a double agent had been discovered, and he was being recalled to Moscow.<ref name=":1">[[Tom Mangold|Mangold, Tom]]. ''Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. {{ISBN|0-671-66273-2}}.</ref> Nosenko was allowed to defect, although the CIA was unable to verify a KGB recall order. Golitsyn had said from the beginning that the KGB would try to plant defectors in an effort to discredit him. Under great duress, Nosenko failed two highly questionable [[Polygraph|lie detector]] tests but passed a third test monitored by several Agency departments.<ref>[[Gerald Posner|Posner, Gerald]], ''Case Closed'' (New York:Random House, 1993, pgs. 40–42)</ref> Judging his claim (as well as additional claims regarding [[Lee Harvey Oswald]]) to be improbable, Angleton permitted David Murphy, head of the Soviet Russia Division, to hold Nosenko in solitary confinement for over three years. This confinement included 16 months in a small attic with no windows, furniture, heat or air conditioning. Human contact was completely banned. Nosenko was given a shower once a week and had no television, reading material, radio, exercise, or toothbrush. Interrogations were frequent and intensive. Nosenko spent an additional four months in a ten-foot by ten-foot concrete bunker in [[Camp Peary]].<ref name="Nosenko2" /> He was told that this condition would continue for 25 years unless he confessed to being a Soviet spy.<ref>Posner, p.39</ref> Nosenko did not appear to have shaken Angleton's faith in Golitsyn, although Helms and [[J. Edgar Hoover]] thought otherwise. Hoover's objections are said to have been so vehement as to severely curtail counterintelligence cooperation between the FBI and CIA for the remainder of Hoover's service as FBI director. Nosenko was found to be a legitimate defector, a lieutenant colonel. He became a consultant to the CIA.<ref name="Nosenko2" /> Golitsyn, who had defected years before, was unable to provide concrete support for his views of the KGB.

Angleton came into increasing conflict with the rest of the Agency, particularly the [[Directorate of Operations (CIA)|Directorate of Operations]], over the efficacy of their intelligence-gathering efforts. He questioned this without explaining his broader views on KGB strategy and organization.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}}

In his 2022 book, ''Uncovering Popov's Mole'', researcher [[John M. Newman]] argues that Bruce Solie of the Office of Security was very probably the mole and that he misled Angleton, his protégé, into believing the traitor was in the Soviet Russia Division.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Newman |first=John M. |title=Uncovering Popov's Mole: The Assassination of President Kennedy |pages=44–49 |year=2022 |isbn=979-8355050771 |language=EN}}</ref>

=== Suspicion of foreign leaders ===
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Angleton privately accused various foreign leaders of being Soviet spies. He twice informed the [[Royal Canadian Mounted Police]] that he believed [[Prime Minister of Canada|Prime Minister]] [[Lester B. Pearson|Lester Pearson]] and his successor [[Pierre Trudeau]] were agents of the Soviet Union. Angleton accused Swedish [[Prime Minister of Sweden|Prime Minister]] [[Olof Palme]], [[West Germany|West German]] [[Chancellor of Germany (Federal Republic)|Chancellor]] [[Willy Brandt]], and British Prime Minister [[Harold Wilson]] of being assets for the Soviet Union.<ref name=":1" />

Australian journalist Brian Toohey claimed that Angleton considered Australian Prime Minister [[Gough Whitlam]] a "serious threat" to the US. Angleton was concerned after the Commonwealth police [[1973 Murphy raids|raided]] [[Australian Security Intelligence Organisation|ASIO]] headquarters in Melbourne in 1973 at the direction of [[Attorney general#Australia|Attorney General]] [[Lionel Murphy]]. In 1974, Angleton sought to instigate the removal of Whitlam from office by having CIA station chief in Canberra, John Walker, ask [[Peter Barbour]], then head of ASIO, to make a false declaration that Whitlam had lied about the raid in Parliament. Barbour refused to make the statement.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Snow |first1=Deborah |title=Tantalising secrets of Australia's intelligence world revealed |url=https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/tantalising-secrets-of-australia-s-intelligence-world-revealed-20190826-p52ku9.html |access-date=1 October 2019 |publisher=The Age |date=31 August 2019}}</ref>

===Church Committee and resignation===
In 1973, [[William Colby]] was named Director of Central Intelligence by [[Richard Nixon]]. Colby reorganized the CIA in an effort to curb Angleton's influence and weaken the Counterintelligence branch, beginning by stripping him of control over the Israel desk. Colby demanded Angleton's resignation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Johnson |first=Loch K. |date=2013 |title=James Angleton and the Church Committee |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924366 |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=132 |doi=10.1162/JCWS_a_00397 |jstor=26924366 |s2cid=57571672 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Angleton came to public attention when the [[Church Committee]] (formally the [[Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities]]) probed the CIA for information on domestic surveillance, specifically the operation known as [[HTLINGUAL|HT Lingual]], as well as assassination plots and the [[Assassination of John F. Kennedy|death of John F. Kennedy]].<ref>{{Cite news |author=John M. Crewdson  |date=1975-09-25 |title=C.I.A. Men Opened 3 Senators' Mail and Note to Nixon |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1975/09/25/archives/cia-men-opened-3-senators-mail-and-note-to-nixon-panel-says-aides.html |access-date=2023-09-17 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Green |first=Lloyd |date=2023-05-07 |title=The Last Honest Man: Frank Church and the fight to restrain US power |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/2023/may/07/last-honest-man-frank-church-book-james-risen-review |access-date=2023-09-17 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

In December 1974, [[Seymour Hersh]] published a story in ''[[The New York Times]]'' about domestic counter-intelligence activities against anti-war protesters and other domestic dissidents. Angleton's resignation was announced on Christmas Eve 1974, just as President [[Gerald Ford]] demanded Director Colby report on the allegations and various congressional committees announced that they would launch their own inquiries. Angleton told reporters from [[United Press International]] that he was resigning because "my usefulness has ended" and the CIA was getting involved in "[[police state]] activities".<ref>{{cite news|newspaper=Deseret News|date= 25 December 1974|page= 1A |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=Aul-kAQHnToC&dat=19741225&printsec=frontpage&hl=en|title=President gets report on CIA spying}}</ref> Three of Angleton's senior aides retired within a week after it was made clear that they would be transferred elsewhere in the Agency rather than promoted. The counterintelligence staff was reduced from 300 to 80 people.

In 1975, Angleton was awarded the CIA's [[Distinguished Intelligence Medal]].<ref name="The New York Times; May 12, 1987">{{cite news |last=Engelberg |first=Stephen |date=May 12, 1987 |title=James Angleton, Counterintelligence Figure, Dies|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/12/obituaries/james-angleton-counterintelligence-figure-dies.html |work=The New York Times |access-date=May 8, 2017}}</ref> By this time, Angleton had been quietly rehired by the CIA at his old salary through a secret contract. Until September 1975, "operational issues remained solely the preserve of Angleton".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/oct/19/angleton-return/|title=The mystery of disgraced CIA spymaster James Angleton's "retirement"|website=MuckRock|date=19 October 2017 }}</ref>

=== Aftermath ===
The late 1970s were generally a period of upheaval for the CIA. During [[George H. W. Bush]]'s tenure as Director, President Ford authorized the creation of [[Team B]], a project concluding that the Agency and the intelligence community had seriously underestimated Soviet strategic nuclear strength in [[Central Europe]]. Admiral [[Stansfield Turner]], on his appointment as DCI by President [[Jimmy Carter]] in 1977, used Angleton as an example of the excesses in the Agency that he hoped to curb. He referred to this during his service and in his memoirs.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim250050055 |access-date=2023-09-17 |website=The SHAFR Guide Online|doi=10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim250050055 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Because of their suspicions, Angleton and his staff ultimately impeded the career advancement of numerous CIA employees. Forty employees are said to have been investigated and fourteen were considered serious suspects by Angleton's staff. The CIA paid compensation to three under what Agency employees termed the "Mole Relief Act".<ref>[[Tom Mangold|Mangold, Tom]]. ''[[Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter]]''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. {{ISBN|0-671-66273-2}}. p. 246</ref>

With Golitsyn, Angleton continued to seek out moles. They sought the assistance of [[William F. Buckley, Jr.]] (himself a former CIA asset) to write ''New Lies for Old'', which argued that the Soviet Union planned to fake a collapse to lull its enemies into a false sense of victory, but Buckley refused. In his 1994 book ''[[Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA|Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA]]'', author Mark Riebling claimed that of 194 predictions made in ''New Lies For Old'', 139 had been fulfilled by 1993, nine seemed "clearly wrong", and the other 46 were "not soon [[Falsifiability|falsifiable]]".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Riebling |first=Mark |title=Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA |date=October 18, 1994 |publisher=[[Knopf]] |isbn=978-0679414711 |edition=1st |language=EN}}</ref>