Editing Language of thought hypothesis (section)

== Reception ==

The language of thought hypothesis has been both controversial and groundbreaking. Some philosophers reject the LOTH, arguing that our public language ''is'' our mental language—a person who speaks English ''thinks'' in English. But others contend that complex thought is present even in those who do not possess a public language (e.g. babies, [[aphasia|aphasics]], and even higher-order primates), and therefore some form of mentalese must be innate. {{Citation needed|date=October 2011}}

The notion that mental states are causally efficacious diverges from [[behaviorists]] like [[Gilbert Ryle]], who held that there is no break between mental state and behavior (as cause and effect). Rather, Ryle proposed that people act in some way because they are in a disposition to act in that way, that these causal mental states are representational. An objection to this point comes from [[John Searle]] in the form of [[biological naturalism]], a non-representational theory of mind that accepts the causal efficacy of mental states. Searle divides intentional states into low-level brain activity and high-level mental activity. The lower-level, nonrepresentational neurophysiological processes have causal power in intention and behavior rather than some higher-level mental representation.{{Citation needed|date=October 2011}}

[[Tim Crane]], in his book ''The Mechanical Mind'',<ref name="mechanicalmind">{{cite book|last=Crane|first=Tim|title=The mechanical mind : a philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation|year=2005|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=978-0-415-29031-9|url=http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415290319/|edition=2nd, repr.|author-link=Tim Crane|access-date=2013-01-15|archive-date=2015-01-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150104054413/http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415290319/|url-status=dead}}</ref> states that, while he agrees with Fodor, his reason is very different. A logical objection challenges LOTH’s explanation of how sentences in natural languages get their meaning. That is the view that “Snow is white” is TRUE if and only if ''P'' is TRUE in the LOT, where ''P'' means the same thing in LOT as “Snow is white” means in the natural language. Any symbol manipulation is in need of some way of deriving what those symbols mean.<ref name="mechanicalmind"/> If the meaning of sentences is explained regarding sentences in the LOT, then the meaning of sentences in LOT must get their meaning from somewhere else. Thus there seems to be an infinite regress of sentences getting their meaning. Sentences in natural languages get their meaning from their users (speakers, writers).<ref name="mechanicalmind"/> Therefore, sentences in mentalese must get their meaning from the way in which they are used by thinkers and so on ''ad infinitum''. This regress is often called the [[homunculus]] regress.<ref name="mechanicalmind"/>

[[Daniel Dennett]] accepts that homunculi may be explained by other homunculi and denies that this would yield an infinite regress of homunculi. Each explanatory homunculus is “stupider” or more basic than the homunculus it explains, but this regress is not infinite but bottoms out at a basic level that is so simple that it does not need interpretation.<ref name="mechanicalmind"/> John Searle points out that it still follows that the bottom-level homunculi are manipulating some sorts of symbols.

LOTH implies that the mind has some [[tacit knowledge]] of the logical [[rules of inference]] and the linguistic rules of [[syntax]] (sentence structure) and [[semantics]] (concept or word meaning).<ref name="mechanicalmind"/> If LOTH cannot show that the mind knows that it is following the particular set of rules in question, then the mind is not computational because it is not governed by computational rules.<ref name="murataydede">{{Cite book|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/ |title=The Language of Thought Hypothesis |author=Murat Aydede |date=2004-07-27|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref><ref name="mechanicalmind"/> Also, the apparent incompleteness of this set of rules in explaining behavior is pointed out. Many conscious beings behave in ways that are contrary to the rules of logic. Yet this irrational behavior is not accounted for by any rules, showing that there is at least some behavior that does not act by this set of rules.<ref name="mechanicalmind"/>

Another objection within representational theory of mind has to do with the relationship between propositional attitudes and representation. Dennett points out that a chess program can have the attitude of “wanting to get its queen out early,” without having representation or rule that explicitly states this. A multiplication program on a computer computes in the computer language of 1’s and 0’s, yielding representations that do not correspond with any propositional attitude.<ref name="murataydede"/>

[[Susan Schneider (philosopher)|Susan Schneider]] has recently developed a version of LOT that departs from Fodor's approach in numerous ways. In her book, The Language of Thought: a New Philosophical Direction, Schneider argues that Fodor's pessimism about the success of cognitive science is misguided, and she outlines an approach to LOT that integrates LOT with neuroscience. She also stresses that LOT is not wedded to the extreme view that all concepts are innate. She fashions a new theory of mental symbols, and a related two-tiered theory of concepts, in which a concept's nature is determined by its LOT symbol type and its meaning.<ref name=":0">{{cite book|last=Schneider|first=Susan|title=The Language of Thought: a New Direction|date=2011|publisher=MIT Press|location=Boston: Mass|url=https://www.amazon.com/Language-Thought-New-Philosophical-Direction-ebook/dp/B006QTGAC6/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1399489463&sr=1-5&keywords=susan+schneider}}</ref>