Editing Light fighter (section)

===Concept summary===
[[File:F-5andF-15.JPEG|thumb|A light F-5 in front of a heavy F-15.]]
Superior technology has often been quoted as a strong factor favoring the heavy fighter. The specific argument usually presented is that heavy fighters have superior radar range and longer range BVR missiles that take advantage of that range. This radar range advantage is one of the major reasons for the existence of the modern heavy fighter, but it has not turned out to be a significant advantage in air combat history to date for several reasons. A major reason has been because long range BVR missile shots have often been unusable, and often unreliable when they could be taken. The weight of the larger missiles also reduces performance and range needed to get in position to fire. Due to these factors, between 1958 and 1982 in five wars there were 2,014 missile firings by fighter pilots engaged in air-to-air combat, but there were only four beyond-visual-range kills.<ref>Burton, Chapter 1, Kindle Location 471.</ref>

The more general and often misunderstood argument for more technology that has been historically assumed to favor heavy fighters is not just better radar but better systems support for the fighter pilot in other ways as well. Examples include all weather capability, precise electronic navigation, electronic counter-measures, data-linking for improved information awareness, and automation to lighten pilot workload and keep the pilot focused on tasks essential to combat.<ref>Stevenson, 1993, pp. 120–121, 126–128.</ref>  This was a compelling argument, as the greatest factor in the effectiveness of a fighter plane has always been the pilot. Quoting a prominent reference, "Throughout the history of air combat, a few outstanding fighter pilots, typically less than five percent of the whole, have run up large scores at the expense of their less gifted brethren. The numerical imbalance was such that a large number of high scorers was needed. The quest was on to turn each fighter pilot into an ace, and technology seemed the easiest, and the only way to achieve it. This was the idea underlying the first two American superfighters; the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle.”<ref>Spick, Mike, “Designed for the Kill”, 1995, p. 32.</ref>

While the technology advantage for heavy fighters that better supported the pilot may well have been a valid point in the 1970s (when the F-14 and F-15 first entered service), this advantage has not been maintained over time. Engine performance improvements have improved load carry capability,{{efn|The engine thrust to engine weight of jet engines has much improved over time. The [[General Electric J47]] of 1950s weighed 2,554 lbs and had thrust to weight of 2.34. The [[General Electric J79]] turbojet of the 1960s weighed 3,850 lbs and had thrust to weight ratio of 4.63. The modern [[General Electric F414]]-400 turbofan weighs 2,445 lbs but delivers thrust to weight of 9.0. These huge improvements allow for considerably heavier avionics and weapons loads on more recent light fighters.}} and with more compact electronics, the lightweight fighter has, from the 1980s onwards, had similar pilot enhancing technical features.<ref>Ahlgren, Linner, and Wigert, 2002, pp. 22–40, pp. 94–105.</ref><ref name="Hillaker">{{citation |last=Hillaker |first=Harry |title= Technology and the F-16 Fighting Falcon Jet Fighter|work=The Bridge|date=Spring 2004 |publisher=The National Academy of Engineering |url= https://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/CentennialofAviation/TechnologyandtheF-16FightingFalconJetFighter.aspx}}</ref><ref>Spick, 2000, pp. 30–41.</ref>  The lightweight fighter carries equally effective weapons including BVR missiles, and has similar combat range and persistence. The modern lightweight fighter achieves these competitive features while still maintaining the classic advantages of better surprise, numbers, and maneuverability. Thus, the lightweight fighter natural advantages have remained in force despite the addition of more technology to air combat.<ref name="Hillaker"/>

Due to their lower costs, modern light fighters equip the air forces of many smaller nations. However, as budgets have limits for all nations, the optimum selection of fighter aircraft weight, complexity, and cost is an important strategic issue even for wealthy nations. The budgetary and strategic significance of light fighters is illustrated by the defense investment at stake. As an example where well referenced data is available, though numerous trial and combat references consider the lightweight F-16 to be as good or better on a per plane as the excellent but expensive F-15,<ref>Sprey, 1982, p. 149.</ref><ref>Lockheed Forth Worth Company (press release) http://www.thefreelibrary.com/F-16+TEAMS+DOMINATE+USAF+AIR-TO-AIR+COMPETITION-a015848749, accessed June 27, 2016.</ref> fielding and maintaining a light fighter force based on the F-16 is approximately half the cost of the same number of F-15's. The US Air Force reports the total loaded cost per hour (as of 2013) of operating the F-16C to be ~US$22,500 per hour, while that of the heavy F-15C is $41,900 per hour.<ref name="nation.time.com"/> Numerous authoritative sources report that it takes about 200 to 400 flight hours per year to maintain fighter pilot proficiency.{{efn| The US Air National Guard reports via http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-life.htm that it needs 247 hours per year for minimum necessary proficiency of its F-16C pilots, with an average sortie duration of 1.2 hours. Sprey p. 64 reports 30 sorties per month or nearly 400 hours per year for high combat proficiency. Manes reports 231 to 321 flight hours per year of logged flight time for various USAF and Air National Guard units.}}<ref>Brian Manes, Major, USAF, MS Thesis “Extending USAF F-16 Force Structure”, Air Command and Staff College, 2001, p. 17, downloadable from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/01-079.pdf</ref>

[[Lanchester's laws]] on military superiority suggest that any technical superiority of the heavy fighter on a unit basis will not always translate to winning wars. For example, late in WWII the greatly superior German [[Messerschmitt Me 262]] jet fighter, flown by the finest pilots Germany had left, many of them very high scoring aces with kill counts far in excess of Allied pilots, in its relatively small numbers suffered heavy losses and was unable to fundamentally alter the air war over Germany.<ref>Sprey, 1982, p. 23–25.</ref> Such issues are relevant to future military planning and deployments.<ref>The Rand Corporation, "Air Combat, Past, Present, and Future", 2009, available at https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf</ref>