Editing Lin Biao (section)

===Chinese Civil War===
After the [[Shanghai massacre of 1927|Kuomintang-Communist split]], Lin's commander, Ye Ting, joined forces with [[He Long]] and participated in the [[Nanchang Uprising]] on 1 August 1927.<ref name="L&D" /><ref>Leung 70</ref> During the campaign Lin worked as a company commander under a regiment led by [[Chen Yi (communist)|Chen Yi]].<ref>Barnouin and Yu 242</ref> Following the failure of the revolt, Lin escaped to the remote Communist base areas, and joined [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Zhu De]] in the [[Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet]] in 1928.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=141}} After joining forces with Mao, Lin became one of Mao's closest supporters.<ref name="MMW140" />

Lin became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet. He commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of [[Peng Dehuai]], who commanded the Third Army Group. According to [[Comintern]] representative [[Otto Braun (communist)|Otto Braun]], Lin was "politically{{nbsp}}... a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased" during this period. After [[Ningdu Conference|Mao was removed from power in 1932]] by his rivals (the [[28 Bolsheviks]]), Lin frequently attended strategic meetings in Mao's name and openly attacked the plans of Mao's enemies.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 253</ref>

Within the Jiangxi Soviet, Lin's First Army Group was the best-equipped and arguably most successful force within the [[Chinese Red Army|Red Army]]. Lin's First Army became known for its mobility, and for its ability to execute successful flanking maneuvers. Between 1930 and 1933, Lin's forces captured twice the number of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined. The successes of Lin's forces are due partially to the division of labour within the Red Army: Lin's forces were more offensive and unorthodox than other groups, allowing Lin to capitalize on other Red Army commanders' successes.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 263</ref>

During the Communists' defense against Chiang's 1933–34 [[Fifth Encirclement Campaign against Jiangxi Soviet|Fifth Encirclement Campaign]], Lin advocated a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, and opposed the positional warfare advocated by Braun and his supporters. Lin believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks. Lin's views generally conformed with the tactics advocated by Mao.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 257–260</ref>

After Chiang's forces successfully occupied several strategic locations within the Jiangxi Soviet, in 1934, Lin was one of the first Red Army commanders to publicly advocate the abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, but he was opposed by most Red Army commanders, especially Braun and Peng Dehuai.<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 264</ref> After the Communists finally resolved to abandon their base, later in 1934, Lin continued his position as one of the most successful commanders in the Red Army during the [[Long March]]. Under the direction of Mao and Zhou, the Red Army finally arrived at the remote Communist base of [[Yan'an]], [[Shaanxi]], in December 1936.

Lin and Peng Dehuai were generally considered the Red Army's best battlefield commanders,<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=141}} and were not rivals during the [[Long March]]. Both of them had supported Mao's rise to ''de facto'' leadership at the [[Zunyi Conference]] in January 1935. Lin may have become privately dissatisfied with Mao's strategy of constant evasion by the end of the Long March, but continued to support Mao publicly.<ref>Salisbury 188</ref>

The American journalist [[Edgar Snow]] met Lin Biao in the Communist base of [[Shaanxi]] in 1936,<ref>Hu Chi-hsi 267</ref> and wrote about Lin in his book, ''[[Red Star Over China]]''. Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng (more than any other individual apart from Mao). Though he said of Lin:

<blockquote>Lin Biao did not present the bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai. He was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome. Peng talked with his men. Lin kept his distance. To many he seemed shy and reserved. There are no stories reflecting warmth and affection for his men. His fellow Red Army commanders respected Lin, but when he spoke, it was all business{{nbsp}}...

The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on the Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems. Peng met the enemy head-on in frontal assaults and fought with such fury that again and again he wiped them out. Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to the Red Army.<ref>Salisbury 191–192</ref>

With Mao Zedong, Lin Biao shared the distinction of being one of the few Red commanders never wounded. Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health.

In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles. It became the most dreaded section of the Red Army. Chiefly due to Lin's extraordinary talent as a tactician, it destroyed, defeated or outmanoeuvered every Government force sent against it and was never broken in battle{{nbsp}}....

Like many able Red commanders, Lin has never been outside China, speaks and reads no language but Chinese. Before the age of 30, however, he has already won recognition beyond Red circles. His articles in the Chinese Reds' military magazines{{nbsp}}... have been republished, studied and criticised in [[Nanking]] (Nanjing) military journals, and also in Japan and Soviet Russia.<ref>Snow 135</ref>
</blockquote>  Within a year of Snow's reporting, Lin was seriously wounded.<ref name="MMW141">Mackerras, McMillen, and Watson 141</ref> A Red Army soldier shot him by mistake.<ref name=":Chatwin" />{{Rp|page=33}}

Lin and Mao generally had a close personal relationship,<ref>Snow 84</ref> but some accounts claim that Lin sometimes made disparaging comments about Mao in private, and that Lin's support of Mao was largely for the pursuit of power.<ref>Chang and Halliday 504</ref> After arriving in Yan'an, Lin became the principal of the newly founded [[Counter-Japanese University|Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University]]. In 1937, Lin married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower".<ref>Lee 170–171</ref>