Editing Linda Zagzebski (section)

=== Epistemology ===
Zagzebski is a pioneer in the field of [[virtue epistemology]].{{sfn|Turri|Alfano|Greco|2019}} In ''Virtues of the Mind'' (1996), she sets out to solve certain problems in modern epistemology by developing an [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] version of [[virtue theory]], and in the course of this project she lays out a general analysis of virtue. In ''Divine Motivation Theory'' (2004) she deals extensively with problems in the relationship between reason, faith, and ethics.

She has done work on questions of [[epistemic value]] including the "espresso machine" thought experiment (a predecessor to the [[swamping problem]]) as a counter to [[reliabilism]].{{sfnm |1a1=Pritchard |1y=2007 |2a1=Pritchard |2a2=Turri |2a3=Carter |2y=2018}}

In her book, ''Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief'' (2012), she defends a strong sense of epistemic authority including authority in moral and religious beliefs, and argues that belief on authority is a requirement of intellectual autonomy. This book arose out of her 2010 Wilde lectures at Oxford.

In the paper titled ''The Inescapability of Gettier Problems'',<ref name="Zagzebski_1994" /> Zagzebski argued that any modification of the last condition given in the [[Gettier problem#Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)|Plato's definition of knowledge]] as justified true belief (JTB) unavoidably shall be reconducted to the unsolved case of the Gettier problem. This result is also true and valuable for any additional condition applied to the JTB.<ref name="Zagzebski_1994">{{cite journal|first=Linda|last1=Zagzebski|url=https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/44/174/65/1563539?redirectedFrom=PDF|title=The Inescapability of Gettier Problems|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|volume =44|issue =174|date=January 1, 1994|pages= 65–73|doi=10.2307/2220147|oclc=5497630095|issn=	0031-8094|publisher=Oxford University Press|jstor=2220147|s2cid=170535616 }}</ref>

In 1996, Zagzebski defined knowledge as a "state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue", where the word 'true' can be omitted.<ref name="Zagzebski_1996_135,271">{{cite book|first1=Linda|last1=Trinkaus Zagzebski|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w-YC4foOSBwC&pg=PA271|pages=271, 137|title=Virtues of the mind : an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year= 1996|location=New York, NY|oclc=33899952|doi=|access-date=May 30, 2021|isbn=9780521578264|series=Cambridge studies in philosophy}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|first1=Priyedarshi|last1=Jetli|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JETKWT|title=Knowledge without Truth|doi=|journal=Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy|location=Seoul|volume=53|pages=97–103|date=August 2008|oclc=	7006655335|via=researchgate.net]}}</ref>

According to the Aristotelian [[virtue theory#Phronesis and Eudaimonia|virtue theory]], she defined virtue as a "deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end."<ref name="Zagzebski_1996_135,271" /> Denying [[innatism]], she believes virtue is disposition plus ability<ref name="zhang.me">{{cite web|url=https://anthony-zhang.me/University-Notes/PHIL350/PHIL350.html|title=Lecture notes by Anthony Zhang|year=2015|archive-url=https://archive.today/20151127165228/https://anthony-zhang.me/University-Notes/PHIL350/PHIL350.html|archive-date=November 27, 2015|url-status=live|access-date=May 30, 2021}}</ref> and the universal human capability of achieving a good life and happiness.<ref name="khazaei_2013">{{cite journal|author=zahra khazaei|url=https://www.academia.edu/19334361|title=Epistemic Virtue from the Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski|journal=Religious Inquiries|volume=2|issue=4|year=2013|pages=24, 37|access-date=May 30, 2021}}</ref> Moral and intellectual virtues can't be separated<ref name="khazaei_2013" /> and, more particularly, knowledge is obtained from practicing intellectual virtues like responsibility, fairness, and courage.<ref name="zhang.me" /> True belief -in the forms of propositional knowledge and of cognitive contact with reality- are gained by a right disposition of the intellect to desire truth, and a good practice which sews the intellectual virtues on the personhood, like a new habit of the body.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Dru|last1=Johnson |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2-UfEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251|title=Knowledge by Ritual: A Biblical Prolegomenon to Sacramental Theology|page=271|publisher=Penn State Press|date=February 18, 2016|isbn=9781575064321|oclc=	928023842|series=Journal of Theological Interpretation Supplements|volume=13|access-date=May 30, 2021}}</ref> People who are rightly motivated to know the truth are also capable to develop specific skills, build up and assess the reliability of personal and well-formed procedures, rather than doing the same for good belief-forming processes shared between peers.<ref>{{cite book |author=Chun Wei Choo|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l-3nCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA96|title=The Inquiring Organization: How Organizations Acquire Knowledge and Seek Information|chapter=5 - Epistemic virtues and vices|page=96|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2016|isbn=9780199782031|oclc=	988102850}}</ref>