Editing MBT-70 (section)

=== Development of the MBT-70 ===
In 1963, General [[Welborn G. Dolvin]], a former tank commander, was chosen to lead the US team as project manager. Three contractors—[[Chrysler Defense]], [[General Motors]] and a joint venture of Ford and [[FMC Corporation|FMC]]—entered contention to become the contractor on the American side. Dolvin chose GM, anticipating the company would bring more fresh ideas to the table than longtime incumbent tank producer Chrysler. For the Germans, the German Development Corporation was formed as a joint venture of several German firms.<ref name="King" />

For the first phase of development, GM engineers would work alongside German engineers in [[Augsburg]]. For this part, Americans would manage Germans. For the second phase, the arrangement would be reversed: Germans would take over management at GM's factories in Detroit.<ref name="King" />

There were disputes over almost every part of the design: the gun, the engine, and the use of both [[Metric system|metric]] and [[Society of Automotive Engineers|SAE]] units in the separately manufactured components of the tank. This last dispute was, by far, the most contentious. The disagreement rose to McNamara and German Defense Minister [[Kai-Uwe von Hassel]], who were also unable to settle on a common measurement system. An agreement was made for both sides to use their own preferred measurements on parts they designed. The Americans conceded that metric be used on all fastening points.<ref name="King" /> This was settled by an agreement to use a common metric standard in all interface connections. The resulting complexity contributed to delays in the development schedule, and an inflated project budget.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|1990|p=117}} Another national difference was [[Multiview orthographic projection|different methods of projection]]. In production, confusion over which projection method was being used could result in fabrication errors such as holes placed in the wrong side.<ref name="King" />

The Americans were taken aback by the German's approach to [[intellectual property]]. The German firms jealously guarded their trade secrets from the Americans and pushed aggressively for the use of their products in the final product. This cultural confusion stemmed from differences in the procurement system of both countries. In the US, the Pentagon footed the expenses for most research and development. In return, the government kept complete ownership of the product of the research.<ref name="King"/> German firms conducted research and development under government contracts like in the US,{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=13-14}} but retained all the rights to their design. There was thus a great incentive for German firms to solicit orders for their designs.<ref name="King"/>

Dolvin stepped down in October 1966 to assume command of an armored division. The program was considered to be at least moderately successful when Major General Edwin H. Burba took over the project.<ref name="King"/>

Nevertheless, many problems with the tank's political future arose in the US. When a design was finalized in 1965, US program costs were estimated at $138 million. With a production decision looming in 1968, this rose to $303 million. The following year critics came up with a different estimate of more than half a billion by accounting for other additional costs.<ref name="King"/>

Programmatic complexity and growing costs contributed to Germany's disillusionment with the joint project. Germany was concerned about the design differences that were emerging between the two teams. Germany regarded the unconventional American engine as unproven and believed the American gun/launcher as a design that would add costs and complexity to the design while offering only marginal gains in accuracy at ranges beyond 2000 meters (while being worse at ordinary ranges). The use of non-metric fasteners, insisted upon by the Americans, was also believed by Germany to have been an unnecessary compromise.<ref name="500 Germany" /> In 1965, Germany reduced its financial commitment to the program, claiming it was unable to pay for its half of the expenses.{{sfn|McNaugher|1981|p=23-24}} By 1969, Germany had reduced its involvement with the project, which was becoming a political embarrassment within the Bundeswehr. Germany reduced its Detroit office presence to a mere skeleton crew. Germany sought to reduce the size of its KPz-70 purchase, originally 500 tanks, if not cancel it altogether.<ref name="500 Germany" >{{cite book |editor1-last=Pretty |editor1-first=R. T. |editor2-last=Archer |editor2-first=D. H. R. |title=Jane's Weapon Systems 1969–1970 |publisher=B. P. C. Publishing |location=London |year=1969 |isbn=0-354-00516-2 |pages=191–192, 211–212 |edition=1st |chapter=Land Platforms |url=https://archive.org/details/janesweaponsyste0000unse_m9k0}}</ref>

Many Americans both inside and outside the project, including General [[Creighton Abrams]], hoped for an amicable end to German involvement in the program. Burba was succeeded by Brigadier General Bernard R. Luczak in mid-1968. Luczak agreed that the German partnership was not working out. Luczak found support from Deputy Secretary [[David Packard]], who brokered an agreement to end the tank partnership in January 1970.<ref name="King"/>