Editing Mediocrity principle (section)

==Comparison with other approaches==
The mediocrity principle is in contrast with the [[anthropic principle]], which asserts that the presence of an intelligent observer (humans) limits the circumstances to bounds under which intelligent life can be observed to exist, no matter [[Rare Earth hypothesis|how improbable]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/cosmo/lectures/lec24.html|title=Anthropic Principle|website=abyss.uoregon.edu}}</ref> Both stand in contrast to the [[Fine-tuned universe|fine-tuning hypothesis]], which asserts that the natural conditions for intelligent life are implausibly rare.

The mediocrity principle implies that Earth-like environments are necessarily common, based in part on the evidence of [[Doomsday argument|any happening at all]], whereas the anthropic principle suggests that no assertion can be made about the probability of intelligent life based on a sample set of one ([[Dunning–Kruger effect|self-described]]) example, who are necessarily capable of making such an assertion about themselves.

It is also possible to handle the Mediocrity Principle as a statistical problem, a case of a single [[data point]] statistics, also present in the [[German tank problem]].