Editing Mere addition paradox (section)

==Responses==
Some scholars, such as [[Larry Temkin]] and Stuart Rachels, argue that inconsistencies between the four claims (above) rely on the assumption that the "better than" relation is [[Transitive relation|transitive]]. The inconsistency could then be resolved by rejecting the assumption. According to this view, although A+ is no worse than A, and B− is better than A+, it does not follow that B− is better than A.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=S. Temkin |first=Larry |date=1987 |title=Intransitivity and the mere addition paradox |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TEMIAT |journal=Philosophy and Public Affairs}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rachels |first=Stuart |date=2001 |title=A set of solutions to Parfit's problems |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RACASO |journal=Noûs}}</ref>

Another response is the conclusion that [[Average and total utilitarianism|total utilitarianism]] must be rejected in favour of [[Average and total utilitarianism|average utilitarianism]], which would result in situation A+ being evaluated as worse than A, as the average happiness is lower.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Repugnant Conclusion |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> According to Parfit, this would however lead to an absurd conclusion, as it implies that adding people with lives worth living would make the world worse simply because they lower the average quality of life.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" />

[[Torbjörn Tännsjö]] argues that the intuition that B is worse than A is wrong. While the lives of those in B are worse than those in A, there are more of them, and thus the collective value of B is greater than A.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Torbjörn |first=Tännsjö |date=November 2002 |title=Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion |journal=Utilitas |volume=14 |issue=3 |pages=339–359 |doi=10.1017/S0953820800003642 |s2cid=233360601}}</ref> [[Michael Huemer]] also argues that the repugnant conclusion is not repugnant.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Huemer |first=Michael |date=2008 |title=In Defence of Repugnance |url=https://philarchive.org/archive/HUEIDO |journal=Mind |doi=10.1093/mind/fzn079}}</ref>

A number of philosophers (including [[Torbjörn Tännsjö]], [[Yew-Kwang Ng]], [[Hilary Greaves]] and [[Toby Ord]]) have agreed that avoiding the repugnant conclusion is not a necessary criterion for a satisfactory theory of [[population ethics]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Zuber |first=Stéphane |last2=Venkatesh |first2=Nikhil |last3=Tännsjö |first3=Torbjörn |last4=Tarsney |first4=Christian |last5=Stefánsson |first5=H. Orri |last6=Steele |first6=Katie |last7=Spears |first7=Dean |last8=Sebo |first8=Jeff |last9=Pivato |first9=Marcus |last10=Ord |first10=Toby |last11=Ng |first11=Yew-Kwang |last12=Masny |first12=Michal |last13=MacAskill |first13=William |last14=Lawson |first14=Nicholas |last15=Kuruc |first15=Kevin |date=2021-04-13 |title=What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/what-should-we-agree-on-about-the-repugnant-conclusion/EB52C686BAFEF490CE37043A0A3DD075 |journal=Utilitas |language=en |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=379–383 |doi=10.1017/S095382082100011X |issn=0953-8208|hdl=10852/90849 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Another critique highlights the conflict between maximizing total happiness and respecting individual autonomy. Thought experiments imagine scenarios where people are compelled to procreate, resulting in large, mostly happy populations. Although the outcome may be better in aggregate, such actions violate consent and may cause real suffering. These examples suggest that the repugnant conclusion can conflict with moral intuitions about rights and autonomy, beyond the formal issues of population ethics.<ref>{{cite book |author=Magnus Vinding |title=Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics |publisher=Ratio Ethica |year=2023 |isbn=9798215591673}}</ref>{{rp|61}}