Editing Metaethics (section)

=== Cognitivist theories ===
''[[Cognitivism (ethics)|Cognitivist]]'' theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express [[proposition]]s (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or '[[Truth-bearer|truth bearers]]', capable of being true or false), as opposed to [[non-cognitivism]]. Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such propositions are true (including moral realism and ethical subjectivism), as opposed to [[error theory]], which asserts that all are erroneous.

==== Moral realism ====
[[Moral realism]] (in the ''robust'' sense; see [[moral universalism]] for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about ''robust'' or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Metaethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "[[anti-realism]]" regarding moral facts: [[ethical subjectivism]], [[error theory]], or [[non-cognitivism]]. Realism comes in two main varieties:

# ''[[Ethical naturalism]]'' holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are [[reductionism|reducible]] or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as [[supervenience]]) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have [[empiricism|empirical]] knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many [[modern philosophy|modern]] ethical theorists, particularly [[utilitarianism|utilitarians]].
# ''[[Ethical non-naturalism]]'', as put forward by [[G. E. Moore]], holds that there are objective and ''irreducible'' moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have [[ethical intuitionism|intuitive]] or otherwise ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's [[open question argument]] against what he considered the [[naturalistic fallacy]] was largely responsible for the birth of metaethical research in contemporary [[analytic philosophy]].

==== Ethical subjectivism ====
[[Ethical subjectivism]] is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are [[moral relativism|relativist]], but there are notable forms that are [[moral universalism|universalist]]:
* [[Ideal observer theory]] holds that what is right is determined by the [[Attitude (psychology)|attitudes]] that a hypothetical ''ideal observer'' would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer Theory still purports to provide [[Moral universalism|universal]] answers to moral questions.
* [[Divine command theory]] holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the ''[[Euthyphro]]'' (see the [[Euthyphro problem]]) but retains some modern defenders ([[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]], [[Philip L. Quinn|Philip Quinn]], and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be [[Moral universalism|universalist]] despite its subjectivism.

==== Error theory ====
[[Error theory]], another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false. Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally permissible" are false, according to error theory. [[J. L. Mackie]] is probably the best-known proponent of this view. Since error theory denies that there are moral truths, error theory entails [[moral nihilism]] and, thus, [[moral skepticism]]; however, neither moral nihilism nor moral skepticism conversely entail error theory.