Editing Metaphysical necessity (section)

== Absolute necessity ==
Absolute necessity is a modality of necessity which is at least as strong as all others, where all its necessities are necessities of every other type. Philosophers disagree over whether logical necessity or metaphysical necessity is absolute, with some arguing they are identical and others distinguishing them. This debate centers on whether logical necessity, grounded in formal logic, or metaphysical necessity, often tied to the essences of objects, provides the most fundamental account of what must be true.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

=== '''Logical necessity as''' '''absolute''' '''necessity''' ===
If logical necessity is absolute, then all logical necessities (e.g., "if A then B") are also physical or metaphysical necessities. Some philosophers, notably [[Bob Hale (philosopher)|Bob Hale]], argue that logical necessity is absolute necessity, meaning there is no sense in which a logical necessity could be false.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hale |first=Bob |date=1996 |title=Absolute Necessities |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216238?origin=crossref |journal=Noûs |volume=30 |pages=93 |doi=10.2307/2216238|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Hale defines logical necessity broadly to include not only logical truths (e.g., "A or not-A") but also conceptual necessities, such as "all vixens are female," which depend on the meanings of nonlogical terms. His argument, inspired by Ian McFetridge, uses a [[reductio ad absurdum]]: assuming a logical necessity (e.g., "if A then B") and a possibility where it fails leads to a contradiction, suggesting logical necessities hold in all possible scenarios. Hale posits that logical necessity is the most restrictive modality, subsumed by all other necessities, making it absolute.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

Critics, such as Scott Shalkowski, challenge this view, arguing that Hale’s broadly logical necessity is not absolute because stricter necessities, like austerely logical necessity (truths dependent only on logical constants), exist.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shalkowski |first=Scott A. |last2=Journal of Philosophy, Inc. |date=2004 |title=Logic and Absolute Necessity: |url=http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=jphil_2004_0101_0002_0055_0082&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=55–82 |doi=10.5840/jphil200410128 |issn=0022-362X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Additionally, nontraditional logics, such as [[Paraconsistent logic|paraconsistent logics]], allow contradictions to be possible, undermining Hale’s assumption that contradictions are impossible. Shalkowski contends that Hale’s argument fails to establish logical necessity as absolute, as it does not address essentialist claims that metaphysical necessity is more fundamental.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

=== Metaphysical necessity and essentialism ===
Essentialist philosophers argue that metaphysical necessity, grounded in the essences or natures of objects, is absolute, with logical necessity as a subset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fine |first=Kit |date=1994 |title=Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214160?origin=crossref |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |volume=8 |pages=1 |doi=10.2307/2214160|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[Essentialism]] holds that some truths are necessary due to the intrinsic nature of objects or propositions, such as water’s chemical composition (H₂O) or an object’s origin. For example, while it is logically possible for a lectern to be made of ice, essentialists argue it is metaphysically impossible if its essence requires a different material. Similarly, [[Elizabeth II|Queen Elizabeth II’s]] parentage is essential to her identity, ruling out logical possibilities of different origins.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

Shalkowski argues that logical necessity depends on a prior metaphysical necessity, as model-theoretic accounts of logical truths (e.g., truth in all models) assume modal constraints about what counts as a possible model. Essentialists view logical necessities as truths about the essences of logical items (e.g., propositions) or universal truths across all objects, while nonlogical metaphysical necessities are specific to certain entities. By constraining genuine possibilities to those consistent with essences, metaphysical necessity is seen as absolute, unlike logical necessity, which overgenerates possibilities by ignoring specific essences.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

=== Ongoing debate ===
The debate over absolute necessity reflects differing views on modality’s foundations. Proponents of logical necessity value its apparent clarity and formal grounding, while essentialists argue it presupposes metaphysical commitments. Both sides rely on [[A priori and a posteriori|a priori reasoning]] to justify their constraints on possibility, leaving the question of absolute necessity open for further exploration.{{cn|date=May 2025}}