Editing Middle Way (section)

=== Teaching by the Middle (''majjhena desanā'') ===
{{Main|Pratītyasamutpāda}}
Other early sources like the ''Kaccānagotta-sutta'' also state that "the [[Tathāgata|Tathagatha]] teaches ''by the middle way''" (''majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti'') which often refers to the doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]] as a view between the extremes of [[Sassatavada|eternalism]] and [[Eternal oblivion|annihilationism]] as well as the extremes of existence and non-existence.<ref name=":0">Wallis, Glenn (2007) ''Basic Teachings of the Buddha: A New Translation and Compilation, With a Guide to Reading the Texts,'' p. 114.
</ref><ref name=":2" /> Gethin 78

According to [[Bhikkhu Bodhi]], there are two extreme metaphysical views that are avoided through the Buddha's "teaching by the middle" (''majjhena dhammaṃ''):<ref name=":1">Bhikkhu Bodhi (2005). ''In the Buddha's Words An Anthology  of Discourses from the Pali Canon,'' pp. 315–316. Wisdom Publications.</ref>

* '''Eternalism (''sassatavāda'')''', this refers to the view that there is "an indestructible and eternal self, whether individual or universal". It can also refer to the idea that the world is maintained by a permanent being or entity, like [[God]] or some other eternal metaphysical Absolute. The main problem with this view is that it leads to grasping at the [[Skandha|five aggregates]], which are impermanent and empty of a self.
* '''Annihilationism (''ucchedavāda'')''', is the idea that a person is utterly annihilated at death and there is nothing which survives. The main problem with this view is that it leads to [[nihilism]], particularly [[Moral nihilism|ethical nihilism]].

According to Bodhi, by steering clear of both of these extremes, dependent origination teaches that "existence is constituted by a current of conditioned phenomena devoid of a metaphysical self yet continuing on from birth to birth as long as the causes that sustain it remain effective."<ref name=":1" />

One of the most famous and clear expositions of dependent origination is found in the ''Kaccānagotta-sutta''."<ref name=":1" /> The ''Kaccānagotta-sutta'' (SN 12.15 with Chinese Agama parallels at SA 262 and SA 301 and also a Sanskrit parallel ''Kātyāyanaḥsūtra'') explains the middle way view as follows:<ref name=":2">''Kaccānagottasutta'' SN 12.15 (SN ii 16), translated by Bhikkhu Sujato. https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15</ref><blockquote>Kaccāna, this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence. But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world. The world is for the most part shackled by attraction, grasping, and insisting. But if—when it comes to this attraction, grasping, mental fixation, insistence, and underlying tendency—you don't get attracted, grasp, and commit to the notion 'my self', you'll have no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is just suffering arising, and what ceases is just suffering ceasing. Your knowledge about this is independent of others.  </blockquote><blockquote>This is how right view is defined. 'All exists': this is one extreme. 'All doesn't exist': this is the second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way: 'Ignorance is a condition for choices. Choices are a condition for consciousness. …  [the rest of the 12 elements of dependent origination follow]</blockquote>

A similar passage is also found in SN 12.47.<ref>Aññatarabrāhmaṇasutta SN 12.46 (SN ii 75) https://suttacentral.net/sn12.47/en/sujato</ref> According to David Kalupahana, the terms "existence" (atthitā) and "non-existence" (natthitā) are referring to two absolutist theories (which were common in Indian philosophy at the time): the doctrine of permanent existence found in the Upanishads and the doctrine of non-existence (at death) of the materialist Carvaka school.<ref name="Kalupahana" />

==== Dependent origination and personal identity ====
"Dependent origination" (''[[pratītyasamutpāda]]'') describes the existence of phenomena as coming about due to various causes and conditions. When one of these causes changes or disappears, the resulting object or phenomena will also change or disappear, as will the objects or phenomena depending on the changing object or phenomena. Thus, there is nothing with an eternal self, essence or [[Ātman (Hinduism)|atman]], there are only mutually dependent origination and existence (hence, the middle doctrine avoids an eternal substance or being). However, the absence of an atman does not mean there is nothing at all (hence, the middle doctrine avoids nihilism). Therefore, according to Rupert Gethin, the "middle" doctrine of early Buddhism, when applied to the question of [[personal identity]] is closely connected with the Buddhist understanding of causality and with the doctrine of not-self (''anatta''). 143

The connection between dependent origination and personal identity is explored in SN 12.35. In this sutta, a monk asks the Buddha the following question regarding the 12 links of dependent origination: "what now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?" The Buddha responds:<ref>Saṁyutta Nikāya 12.35. With Ignorance as Condition (1) translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi, https://suttacentral.net/sn12.35/en/bodhi</ref><blockquote>"Not a valid question," the Blessed One replied. "Bhikkhu, whether one says, 'What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?' or whether one says, 'Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another'—both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. If there is the view, 'The soul and the body are the same,' there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, 'The soul is one thing, the body is another,' there is no living of the holy life. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: 'With birth as condition, aging-and-death.'"</blockquote>Another passage which discusses personal identity with regard to the middle teaching is found in the ''Aññatarabrāhmaṇasutta'' (SN 12.46, with a Chinese parallel at SA 300). This sutta outlines two further extreme views with regards to personal identity and karma:<ref>Aññatarabrāhmaṇasutta SN 12.46 (SN ii 75) https://suttacentral.net/sn12.46/en/sujato</ref>

* "'The person who does the deed experiences the result': this is one extreme."
* "'One person does the deed and another experiences the result': this is the second extreme.

The ''Timbarukasutta'' outlines a similar set of two extremes regarding personality:<ref>Timbarukasutta SN 12.18 (SN ii 22) https://suttacentral.net/sn12.18/</ref><blockquote>"Suppose that the feeling and the one who feels it are the same thing. Then for one who has existed since the beginning, pleasure and pain is made by oneself. I don't say this. Suppose that the feeling is one thing and the one who feels it is another. Then for one stricken by feeling, pleasure and pain is made by another. I don't say this. Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:  'Ignorance is a condition for choices.  </blockquote>The discourse then states that the Buddha teaches by the middle and outlines the twelve elements of dependent origination.

Gethin states that for early Buddhism, personal continuity is explained through the particular way that the various phenomena which make up a sentient being are causally connected.143 According to Gethin, this middle teaching "sees a 'person' as subsisting in the causal connectedness of dependent arising".<ref name=":3">Gethin (1998), p. 145</ref>{{NoteTag|Gethin's endnote (p. 290, ''n''. 22) then references [[Samyutta Nikaya|SN]] 12.17. See [http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.017.than.html Thanissaro 2005)]}} Therefore, thinking that there is something unchanging and constant in a person is eternalistic, while thinking that there is no real connection between the same person at different points in time is annihilationist. As Gethin writes:   <blockquote>
In other words, if we deny that there is a real connectedness between events this is annihilationism, but if we understand that connectedness in terms of an unchanging self this is eternalism; the middle way is that there is only the connectedness, there is only dependent arising.<ref name=":3" />

</blockquote>"Dependent origination" also gives a rationale for [[Rebirth (Buddhism)|rebirth]]:
{{blockquote|Conditioned Arising is [...] a 'Middle Way' which avoids the extremes of 'eternalism' and 'annihilationism': the survival of an eternal self, or the total annihilation of a person at death.<ref>Harvey (2007), p. 58.</ref>}}