Editing Mind uploading (section)

=== "Immortality" or backup ===
{{Main|Digital immortality}}

In theory, if the information and processes of the mind can be disassociated from the biological body, they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of that body. Furthermore, information within a brain could be partly or wholly copied or transferred to one or more other substrates (including digital storage or another brain), thereby—from a purely mechanistic perspective—reducing or eliminating "mortality risk" of such information. This general proposal was discussed in 1971 by [[biomedical gerontology|biogerontologist]] [[George M. Martin]] of the [[University of Washington]].<ref name="Martin 1971 339">{{cite journal |last= Martin |first= G. M. |title=Brief proposal on immortality: an interim solution |journal=Perspectives in Biology and Medicine |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=339–340 |year=1971 |pmid= 5546258 |doi=10.1353/pbm.1971.0015|s2cid=71120068 }}</ref> This questions the concept of identity. From the perspective of the biological brain, the simulated brain may just be a copy, even if it is conscious and has an indistinguishable character. As such, the original biological being, before the uploading, might consider the digital twin to be a new and independent being rather than the future self.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Rosenberg |first=Louis |date=2022-08-13 |title=Identity crisis: Artificial intelligence and the flawed logic of 'mind uploading' |url=https://venturebeat.com/virtual/identity-crisis-artificial-intelligence-and-the-flawed-logic-of-mind-uploading/ |access-date=2024-05-10 |website=VentureBeat |language=en-US}}</ref>