Editing Mobilization (section)

===Modern era===
The [[Confederate States of America]] is estimated to have mobilized about 11% of its free population in the [[American Civil War]] (1861–1865).<ref name="LigtNorthwood2008"/> The [[Kingdom of Prussia]] mobilized about 6–7% of its total population in the years 1760 and 1813.<ref name="LigtNorthwood2008"/> The [[Swedish Empire]] mobilized 7.7% in 1709.<ref name="LigtNorthwood2008"/>

Armies in the seventeenth century possessed an average of 20,000 men.<ref name="Onorato">Onorato, Massimiliano G., [[Kenneth Scheve]], and [[David Stasavage]]. Technology and the Era of the Mass Army. Thesis. IMT Lucca, Stanford University, and New York University, 2013. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20150222185518/http://www.politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5395/mobilization-July-2013.pdf (archived) </ref> A military force of this size requires around 20 tons of food per day, shelter, as well as all the necessary munitions, transportation (typically horses or mules), tools, and representative garments.<ref name="Onorato"/> Without efficient transportation, mobilizing these average-sized forces was extremely costly, time-consuming, and potentially life-threatening.<ref name="Onorato"/> Soldiers could traverse the terrain to get to war fronts, but they had to carry their supplies.<ref name="Onorato"/> Many armies decided to forage for food;<ref name="Onorato"/> however, [[foraging]] restricted movement because it is based on the presumption that the army moves over land possessing significant agricultural production.<ref name="Onorato"/>

However, due to new policies (like conscription), greater populations, and greater national wealth, the nineteenth-century army was composed of an average of 100,000 men. For example, in 1812 [[Napoleon]] led an army of 600,000 [[French invasion of Russia|to Moscow]] while feeding off plentiful agricultural products introduced by the turn of the century, such as potatoes.<ref>Vincennes, Archive de l'Armèe de Terre (AAT), 7N848, Gaston Bodart, "Die Starkeverhaltnisse in den bedeutesten Schlachten." Craig, ''The Battle of Königgrätz''.</ref> Despite the advantages of mass armies, mobilizing forces of this magnitude took much more time than it had in the past.<ref name="Howard">Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (1961; London: Granada, 1979), p. 23.</ref>

The [[Second Italian War of Independence]] illustrated all of the problems in modern army mobilization. Prussia began to realize the future of mobilizing mass armies when [[Napoleon III]] transported 130,000 soldiers to Italy by [[military railways]] in 1859.<ref name="Howard"/> French caravans that carried the supplies for the French and [[Piedmont]]ese armies were incredibly slow, and the arms inside these caravans were sloppily organized.<ref name="Vincennes_845">Vincennes, AAT, MR 845, Anon., "Précis historique de la campagne d'Italie en 1859." Wolf Schneider von Arno, "Der österreichisch-ungarische Generalstab," (Kriegsarchiv Manuscript), vol. 7, pp. 18, 54, 55.</ref> These armies were in luck, however, in that their Austrian adversaries experienced similar problems with sluggish supply caravans (one of which apparently covered less than three miles per day).<ref name="Vincennes_845"/>

Not only did Prussia take note of the problems in transporting supplies to armies, but it also took note of the lack of communication between troops, officers, and generals. Austria's army was primarily composed of [[Slavs]], but it contained many other ethnicities as well.<ref name="DN">D. N., "Über die Truppensprachen unserer Armee," Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) 2 (1862), pp. 365–7.</ref> Austrian military instruction during peacetime utilized nine different languages, accustoming Austrian soldiers to taking orders only in their native language.<ref name="DN"/> Conversely, in an effort to augment the efficacy of the new "[[precision rifle]]" developed by the monarchy, officers were forced to only speak German when giving orders to their men.<ref name="DN"/> Even one Austrian officer commented at [[Battle of Solferino|Solferino]] that his troops could not even comprehend the command, "Halt."<ref name="DN"/> This demonstrates the ''communicative'' problems that arose quickly with the advent of the mass army.