Editing Modularity of mind (section)

==Evolutionary psychology and massive modularity==
The definition of ''module'' has caused confusion and dispute. In J.A. Fodor's views, modules can be found in peripheral and low-level visual processing, but not in central processing. Later, he narrowed the two essential features to ''domain-specificity'' and ''information encapsulation''. According to Frankenhuis and Ploeger, domain-specificity means that "a given cognitive mechanism accepts, or is specialized to operate on, only a specific class of information".<ref name="FP2007" /> Information encapsulation means that information processing in the module cannot be affected by information in the rest of the brain. One example is that the effects of an optical illusion, created by low-level processes, persist despite high-level processing caused by conscious awareness of the illusion itself.<ref name="FP2007">{{Cite journal | last1 = Frankenhuis | first1 = W. E. | last2 = Ploeger | first2 = A. | doi = 10.1080/09515080701665904 | title = Evolutionary Psychology Versus Fodor: Arguments for and Against the Massive Modularity Hypothesis | journal = Philosophical Psychology | volume = 20 | issue = 6 | pages = 687 | year = 2007 | s2cid = 96445244 }}</ref>

Other perspectives on modularity come from [[evolutionary psychology]]. Evolutionary psychologists propose that the mind is made up of genetically influenced and domain-specific<ref>Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of Domain Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organization. In L.A. Hirschfeld and S.A. Gelmen, eds., Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in R. Cummins and D.D. Cummins, eds., Minds, Brains, and Computers. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, 523–543.</ref> mental algorithms or computational modules, designed to solve specific evolutionary problems of the past.<ref>Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange. In Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992, 163–228.</ref> Modules are also used for central processing. This theory is sometimes referred to as ''massive modularity''.<ref name="FP2007" /> [[Leda Cosmides]] and [[John Tooby]] claimed that modules are units of mental processing that evolved in response to selection pressures. To them, each module was a complex computer that innately processed distinct parts of the world, like facial recognition, recognizing human emotions, and problem-solving.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Samuels|first=Richard|date=1998|title=Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis|journal=The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science|volume=49|issue=4|pages=575–602|doi=10.1093/bjps/49.4.575|jstor=688132}}</ref> On this view, much modern human psychological activity is rooted in adaptations that occurred earlier in [[human evolution]], when [[natural selection]] was forming the modern human species.

A 2010 review by evolutionary psychologists Confer et al. suggested that domain general theories, such as for "rationality", has several problems: 1. Evolutionary  theories using the idea of numerous domain-specific adaptions have produced testable predictions that have been empirically confirmed; the theory of domain-general rational thought has produced no such predictions or confirmations. 2. The rapidity of responses such as jealousy due to infidelity indicates a domain-specific dedicated module rather than a general, deliberate, rational calculation of consequences. 3. Reactions may occur instinctively (consistent with innate knowledge) even if a person has not learned such knowledge. One example being that in the ancestral environment it is unlikely that males during development learn that infidelity (usually secret) may cause paternal uncertainty (from observing the phenotypes of children born many  months later and making a statistical conclusion from the phenotype dissimilarity to the cuckolded fathers).<ref name=AmPs2010>{{Cite journal | last1 = Confer | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Easton | first2 = J. A. | last3 = Fleischman | first3 = D. S. | last4 = Goetz | first4 = C. D. | last5 = Lewis | first5 = D. M. G. | last6 = Perilloux | first6 = C. | last7 = Buss | first7 = D. M. | doi = 10.1037/a0018413 | title = Evolutionary psychology: Controversies, questions, prospects, and limitations | journal = American Psychologist | volume = 65 | issue = 2 | pages = 110–126 | year = 2010 | pmid =  20141266| url = http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010.pdf| citeseerx = 10.1.1.601.8691 }}</ref> With respect to general purpose problem solvers, Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992) have suggested in ''[[The Adapted Mind]]: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture'' that a purely general problem solving mechanism is impossible to build due to the [[frame problem]]. Clune et al. (2013) have argued that computer simulations of the evolution of neural nets suggest that modularity evolves because, compared to non-modular networks, connection costs are lower.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Clune |first1= Jeff |last2= Mouret |first2= Jean-Baptiste |last3= Lipson |first3= Hod |year= 2013 |title= The evolutionary origins of modularity |journal= Proceedings of the Royal Society |volume= 280 |issue= 1755 |pages= 20122863|doi= 10.1098/rspb.2012.2863 |arxiv= 1207.2743|pmid= 23363632 |pmc= 3574393}}</ref>

Several groups of critics, including psychologists working within evolutionary frameworks,<ref name="Panksepp, J. 2000">Panksepp, J. & Panksepp, J. (2000). [http://www.flyfishingdevon.co.uk/salmon/year3/psy364criticisms-evolutionary-psychology/panksepp_seven_sins.pdf The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology. Evolution and Cognition], 6:2, 108–131.</ref> argue that the massively modular theory of mind does little to explain adaptive psychological traits. Proponents of other models of the mind argue that the [[computational theory of mind]] is no better at explaining human behavior than a theory with mind entirely a product of the environment. Even within evolutionary psychology there is discussion about the degree of modularity, either as a few generalist modules or as many highly specific modules.<ref name="Panksepp, J. 2000"/><ref>Buller, David J. and Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2005) Chapter 4. "Modularity", in Buller, David J. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology. The MIT Press. pp. 127 – 201</ref> Other critics suggest that there is little empirical support in favor of the domain-specific theory beyond performance on the [[Wason selection task]], a task critics state is too limited in scope to test all relevant aspects of reasoning.<ref name="Davies">{{cite journal |last1= Davies |first1= Paul Sheldon |last2= Fetzer |first2= James H. |last3= Foster |first3= Thomas R. |year= 1995 |title= Logical reasoning and domain specificity |journal= [[Biology and Philosophy]] |volume= 10 |issue= 1 |pages= 1–37 |doi= 10.1007/BF00851985 |s2cid= 83429932 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1= O'Brien |first1= David |last2= Manfrinati |first2= Angela |editor1-first= Mike |editor1-last= Oaksford |editor2-last= Chater |editor2-first= Nick |title= Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking |year= 2010 |publisher= Oxford University Press |location= New York |isbn= 978-0-19-923329-8 |pages= 39–54 |chapter= The Mental Logic Theory of Conditional Propositions |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=iQSDOqAvXIoC&pg=PA47 }}</ref> Moreover, critics argue that Cosmides and Tooby's conclusions contain several inferential errors and that the authors use untested evolutionary assumptions to eliminate rival reasoning theories.<ref name="Davies"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1= Lloyd |first1= Elizabeth A. |year= 1999 |title= Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof |journal= Biology and Philosophy |volume= 19 |issue= 2 |pages= 211–233 |doi= 10.1023/A:1006638501739 |s2cid= 1929648 |url= http://philpapers.org/archive/LLOEPT.pdf |access-date=October 6, 2014}}</ref>

Criticisms of the notion of modular minds from genetics include that it would take too much genetic information to form innate modularity of mind, the limits to the possible amount of functional genetic information being imposed by the number of mutations per generation that led to the prediction that only a small part of the human genome can be functional in an information-carrying way if an impossibly high rate of lethal mutations is to be avoided, and that selection against lethal mutations would have stopped and reversed any increase in the amount of functional DNA long before it reached the amount that would be required for modularity of mind. It is argued that proponents of the theory of mind conflate this with the straw man argument of assuming no function in any non-protein-coding DNA when pointing at discoveries of some parts of [[non-coding DNA]] having regulatory functions, while the actual argument of limited amount of functional DNA does acknowledge that some parts of non-coding DNA can have functions but putting bounds on the total amount of information-bearing genetic material regardless of whether or not it codes for proteins, in agreement with the discoveries of regulatory functions of non-coding DNA extending only to parts of it and not be generalized to all DNA that does not code for proteins. The maximum amount of information-carrying heredity is argued to be too small to form modular brains.<ref>Peters, Brad M. (2013). http://modernpsychologist.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/EP-Neglecting-Neurobiology-in-Defining-the-Mind1.pdf (PDF) [[Theory & Psychology]] https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959354313480269</ref>

Wallace (2010) observes that the evolutionary psychologists' definition of "mind" has been heavily influenced by [[Cognitivism (psychology)|cognitivism]] and/or [[Information processing (psychology)|information processing]] definitions of the mind.<ref>Wallace, B. (2010). Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won't Work. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.</ref> Critics point out that these assumptions underlying evolutionary psychologists' hypotheses are controversial and have been contested by some psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists. For example, [[Jaak Panksepp]], an affective neuroscientist, point to the "remarkable degree of neocortical plasticity within the human brain, especially during development" and states that "the developmental interactions among ancient special-purpose circuits and more recent general-purpose brain mechanisms can generate many of the "modularized" human abilities that evolutionary psychology has entertained."<ref name="Panksepp, J. 2000"/>

Philosopher David Buller agrees with the general argument that the human mind has evolved over time but disagrees with the specific claims evolutionary psychologists make. He has argued that the contention that the mind consists of thousands of modules, including sexually dimorphic jealousy and parental investment modules, are unsupported by the available [[empirical evidence]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Buller |first1= David J. |year= 2005 |title= Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm |journal= Trends in Cognitive Sciences |volume= 9 |issue= 6 |pages= 277–283 |doi= 10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.003|url= http://commons.lib.niu.edu/bitstream/10843/13182/1/BullerTiCS%20Reprint.pdf |access-date=March 23, 2013 |pmid=15925806|s2cid= 6901180 |hdl= 10843/13182 |hdl-access= free }}</ref> He has suggested that the "modules" result from the brain's developmental [[Neuroplasticity|plasticity]] and that they are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Buller |first1= David J. |last2= Hardcastle |first2= Valerie |year= 2000 |title= Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity |journal= Brain and Mind |volume= 1 |issue= 3 |pages= 307–325 |doi= 10.1023/A:1011573226794 |s2cid= 5664009 |url= http://commons.lib.niu.edu/bitstream/10843/13181/1/evolutionarypsych.pdf |access-date=March 23, 2013}}</ref> However, Buller has also stated that even if massive modularity is false this does not necessarily have broad implications for evolutionary psychology. Evolution may create innate motives even without innate knowledge.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Buller |first1= David J. |year= 2005 |title= Get Over: Massive Modularity |journal= Biology & Philosophy |volume= 20 |issue= 4 |pages= 881–891 |doi= 10.1007/s10539-004-1602-3 |s2cid= 34306536 |url= http://www.niu.edu/phil/~buller/publications/_pdf/over.pdf |access-date= March 23, 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20150317231528/http://www.niu.edu/phil/~buller/publications/_pdf/over.pdf |archive-date= March 17, 2015 |url-status= dead |df= mdy-all }}</ref>

In contrast to modular mental structure, some theories posit [[Domain-general learning|domain-general processing]], in which mental activity is distributed across the brain and cannot be decomposed, even abstractly, into independent units. A staunch defender of this view is [[William Uttal]], who argues in ''The New Phrenology'' (2003) that there are serious philosophical, theoretical, and methodological problems with the entire enterprise of trying to localise cognitive processes in the [[brain]].<ref>Uttal, William R. (2003). ''The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain.'' Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.</ref> Part of this argument is that a successful [[Taxonomy (general)|taxonomy]] of mental processes has yet to be developed.

Merlin Donald argues that over evolutionary time the mind has gained adaptive advantage from being a general problem solver.<ref>Donald, ''A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness'' [https://web.archive.org/web/20060620060057/http://psyc.queensu.ca/faculty/donald/book/mindsorare2.htm].</ref> The mind, as described by Donald, includes module-like "central" mechanisms, in addition to more recently evolved "domain-general" mechanisms.