Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

==History==
===Pre-1945===
{{See also|The bomber will always get through}}
The concept of MAD had been discussed in the literature for nearly a century before the invention of nuclear weapons. One of the earliest references comes from the English author [[Wilkie Collins]], writing at the time of the [[Franco-Prussian War]] in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace."<ref>{{cite web | url=http://wilkiecollinssociety.org/newsletter-spring-2009/ | title=Wilkie Collins and Mutually Assured Destruction | publisher=The Wilkie Collins Society | date=Spring 2009 | access-date=17 September 2014}}</ref> The concept was also described in 1863 by [[Jules Verne]] in his novel ''[[Paris in the Twentieth Century]]'', though it was not published until 1994. The book is set in 1960 and describes "the engines of war", which have become so efficient that war is inconceivable and all countries are at a perpetual stalemate.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Paris in the twentieth century|author=Verne, Jules|date=1996|publisher=Random House|others=Howard, Richard, 1929-|isbn=978-0-679-44434-3|edition= first US |location=New York|oclc=32854161}}</ref>{{primary source inline|date=February 2019}}

MAD has been invoked by more than one weapons inventor. For example, [[Richard Jordan Gatling]] patented his namesake [[Gatling gun]] in 1862 with the partial intention of illustrating the futility of war.<ref>Paul Wahl and Don Toppel, ''The Gatling Gun'', Arco Publishing, 1971.</ref> Likewise, after his 1867 invention of [[dynamite]], [[Alfred Nobel]] stated that "the day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops."<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://history1900s.about.com/od/medicaladvancesissues/a/nobelhistory.htm|title=Everything You Need to Know About the First Nobel Prizes|access-date=2016-10-04|archive-date=2016-08-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160801011956/http://history1900s.about.com/od/medicaladvancesissues/a/nobelhistory.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 1937, [[Nikola Tesla]] published ''The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media'',<ref>Tesla, Nikola, [http://www.teslaradio.com/pages/teleforce.htm ''The New Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media, System of Particle Acceleration for Use in National Defense''], circa 16 May 1935.</ref> a treatise concerning [[charged particle beam]] weapons.<ref name="Seifer454">{{cite book |last=Seifer |first=Marc J. |title=Wizard: the life and times of Nikola Tesla: biography of a genius |year=2001 |publisher=Citadel |isbn=978-0-8065-1960-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h2DTNDFcC14C |page=454}}</ref> Tesla described his device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war."

The March 1940 [[Frisch–Peierls memorandum]], the earliest technical exposition of a practical nuclear weapon, anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Andrew|last2=Arnold|first2=Lorna|date=2010-09-20|title=The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence|journal=International Relations|language=en|volume=24|issue=3|pages=293–312|doi=10.1177/0047117810377278|s2cid=143594540}}</ref>

===Early Cold War===
[[File:Hiroshima aftermath.jpg|thumb|right|270px|Aftermath of the atomic bomb explosion over [[Hiroshima]] (August 6, 1945), to date one of the only two times a nuclear strike has been performed as an act of war]]
In August 1945, the United States became the first nuclear power after the [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki]]. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union [[RDS-1|detonated its own nuclear device]]. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American [[Convair B-36]] and the Soviet [[Tupolev Tu-95]], both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official policy of the United States became one of "Instant Retaliation", as coined by Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]], which called for massive atomic attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Abel |first1=Elie |title=DULLES SAYS PACTS GIVE TO PRESIDENT RETALIATION RIGHT; Declares Congress Need Not Be Consulted First if Foe Strikes U. S. or Allies |url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/03/17/92820904.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0 |access-date=22 September 2022 |agency=The New York TImes Archives |work=The New York TImes |date=March 17, 1954}}</ref>

By the time of the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the "third leg" of the [[nuclear triad]] weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first-strike]] attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating [[second strike|retaliatory strike]] against the aggressor, increasing a nation's [[nuclear deterrence]].<ref name="NW">{{cite magazine |author=John Barry |url=http://www.newsweek.com/id/226494 |title=Do We Still Need a Nuclear 'Triad'? |magazine=[[Newsweek]] |date=2009-12-12 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |title=Nuclear Stockpile |publisher=US Department of Defense |author=Office for the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters |access-date=2010-10-08 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100510015329/http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/USNuclearDeterrence.html |archive-date=2010-05-10 }}</ref><ref name="Time">{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080307080808/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959948,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 7, 2008 |title=Toning Up the Nuclear Triad |magazine=Time |date=1985-09-23 |access-date=2010-10-08}}</ref>

Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]] argue that [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (Soviet leader 1953 to 1964) decided that policies that facilitated nuclear war were too dangerous to the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.<ref>Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]], "MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (2018) 41#1/2:208-233.</ref>

===Strategic Air Command===
{{More citations needed|subsection|date=July 2019}}
{{see also|Operation Chrome Dome}}
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Beginning in 1955, the United States [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) kept one-third of its bombers on alert, with crews ready to take off within fifteen minutes and fly to designated targets inside the [[Soviet Union]] and destroy them with nuclear bombs in the event of a Soviet first-strike attack on the United States. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy increased funding for this program<ref>{{cite web | url=https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal61-1373672# | title=CQ Almanac Online Edition }}</ref> and raised the commitment to 50 percent of SAC aircraft.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

During periods of increased tension in the early 1960s, SAC kept part of its B-52 fleet airborne at all times, to allow an extremely fast retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise attack on the United States. This program continued until 1969. Between 1954 and 1992, bomber wings had approximately one-third to one-half of their assigned aircraft on quick reaction ground alert and were able to take off within a few minutes.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-budget-message-the-congress-fiscal-year-1961 | title=Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1961. &#124; the American Presidency Project }}</ref> SAC also maintained the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP, pronounced "kneecap"), also known as "Looking Glass", which consisted of several EC-135s, one of which was airborne at all times from 1961 through 1990.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.stratcom.mil/About/History/ | title=History }}</ref> During the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] the bombers were dispersed to several different airfields, and sixty-five B-52s were airborne at all times.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20815-08-us-strategic-air-command-history-and-research-division-historical-study-no-90-vol | title=U.S. Strategic Air Command, History and Research Division, Historical Study No. 90, Vol. I, Strategic Air Command Operations during the Cuban Crisis of 1962, circa 1963, Top Secret, Excised Copy &#124; National Security Archive }}</ref>

During the height of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the 1960s, two popular films were made dealing with what could go terribly wrong with the policy of keeping nuclear-bomb-carrying airplanes at the ready: ''[[Dr. Strangelove]]'' (1964)<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.tvovermind.com/movies/50-years-later-2001-a-space-odyssey-is-still-an-unparalleled-marvel-on-the-big-screen |title=50 Years Later, '2001: A Space Odyssey' Is Still an Unparalleled Marvel on the Big Screen |date=2018-08-31 |work=TVOvermind |access-date=2018-09-15 |language=en-US}}</ref> and ''[[Fail-Safe (1964 film)|Fail Safe]]'' (1964).<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/gerald-hirschfeld-dead-young-frankenstein-fail-safe-cinematographer-was-95-977763 |title=Gerald Hirschfeld, Cinematographer on 'Young Frankenstein' and 'Fail-Safe,' Dies at 95 |work=The Hollywood Reporter |access-date=2018-09-15 |language=en}}</ref>
{{clear right}}

===Retaliation capability (second strike)===
{{see also|Second strike}}
[[File:Robert McNamara official portrait.jpg|thumb|120px|left|[[Robert McNamara]]]]
The strategy of MAD was fully declared in the early 1960s, primarily by [[United States Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]]. In McNamara's formulation, there was the very real danger that a nation with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise, devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. The true second-strike capability could be achieved only when a nation had a ''guaranteed'' ability to fully retaliate after a first-strike attack.<ref name=":0" />

The United States had achieved an early form of second-strike capability by fielding continual patrols of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or from fail-safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still retaliate, even after a devastating first-strike attack. The tactic was expensive and problematic because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they would be shot down by Soviet [[Surface-to-air missile|anti-aircraft missile]]s before reaching their targets. In addition, as the idea of a [[missile gap]] existing between the US and the Soviet Union developed, there was increasing priority being given to [[ICBM]]s over bombers.

[[File:USS George Washington (SSBN-598) underway at sea, circa in the 1970s.jpg|thumb|210px|right|The [[USS George Washington (SSBN-598)|USS ''George Washington'' (SSBN-598)]], the lead ship of the [[US Navy]]'s first class of [[Ballistic missile|Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, Nuclear (SSBN)]]]]
It was only with the advent of [[nuclear submarine|nuclear-powered]] [[ballistic missile submarine]]s, starting with the [[George Washington class submarine|'' George Washington'' class]] in 1959, that a genuine [[Survivability|survivable]] nuclear force became possible and a retaliatory second strike capability guaranteed.

The deployment of fleets of ballistic missile submarines established a guaranteed second-strike capability because of their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary—it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile silo with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long-range, high [[survivability]] and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were credible and effective means for full-scale retaliation even after a massive first strike.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter3.html | title=NMHB 2020 &#91;Revised&#93; }}</ref>

This deterrence strategy and the program have continued into the 21st century, with nuclear submarines carrying [[Trident II]] ballistic missiles as one leg of the US [[strategic deterrence|strategic nuclear deterrent]] and as the sole deterrent of the United Kingdom. The other elements of the US deterrent are intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on alert in the continental United States, and nuclear-capable bombers. Ballistic missile submarines are also operated by the navies of China, France, India, and Russia.

The [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] anticipates a continued need for a [[Nuclear triad|sea-based strategic nuclear force]].{{cn|date=April 2024}} The first of the current [[Ohio-class submarine|''Ohio''-class SSBNs]] are expected to be retired by 2029,{{cn|date=April 2024}} meaning that a replacement platform must already be seaworthy by that time. A replacement may cost over $4 billion per unit compared to the USS ''Ohio''{{'}}s $2 billion.<ref name="Frost">
 {{cite news
 |url = http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_subs_0424apr24,0,5810806.story
 |title = Newport News contract awarded
 |newspaper = [[Daily Press (Virginia)|Daily Press]]
 |last = Frost
 |first = Peter
 |access-date = 2011-09-27
 |url-access=subscription 
 |url-status = dead
 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090426041620/http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_subs_0424apr24,0,5810806.story
 |archive-date = 2009-04-26
}}</ref> The USN's follow-on class of SSBN will be the [[Columbia-class submarine|Columbia]] class, which began construction in 2021 and enter service in 2031.<ref>{{cite web |title=Navy Columbia(SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated June 24, 2019 |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110504225457/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf |archive-date=2011-05-04 |url-status=live |website=fas.org |publisher=Congressional Research Service |access-date=July 17, 2019}}</ref>

=== ABMs threaten MAD ===
{{main|Anti-ballistic missile}}
{{See also|Strategic Defense Initiative}}
In the 1960s both the Soviet Union ([[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]]) and the United States ([[LIM-49 Nike Zeus]]) developed anti-ballistic missile systems. Had such systems been able to effectively defend against a retaliatory [[second strike]], MAD would have been undermined. However, multiple scientific studies showed technological and logistical problems in these systems, including the inability to distinguish between real and decoy weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=HSIN|first=HONOR|date=2003|title=Episode II: US Ballistic Missile Defense|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43648994|journal=Harvard International Review|volume=25|issue=3|pages=15–16|jstor=43648994|issn=0739-1854}}</ref>

===MIRVs===
{{main|Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle}}
{{Unreferenced Section|date=August 2013}}
[[File:Peacekeeper RV vehicles.jpg|thumb|right|175px|A time exposure of seven [[multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle|MIRVs]] from [[Peacekeeper missile]] passing through clouds]]

==== MIRVs as counter against ABM ====
The [[multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle]] (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one [[ICBM]] could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance the Soviet [[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]]s around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could be counted on to destroy only one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest US MIRVed missiles, the [[LGM-118A Peacekeeper]], could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around {{convert|300|ktonTNT|PJ|lk=in}}—all together, an explosive payload equivalent to 230 [[Little Boy|Hiroshima-type]] bombs. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the available technology, leaving the threat of retaliatory attack as the only viable defensive option. MIRVed land-based ICBMs tend to put a premium on striking first.<!--For example, assume that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo. In this case, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. --> The [[START II]] agreement was proposed to ban this type of weapon, but never entered into force.

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on [[Western Europe]], [[NATO]] planned to use [[tactical nuclear weapons]]. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons (tactical or otherwise) against Soviet forces would be grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike ([[massive retaliation]]). Thus it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with [[apocalypse|apocalyptic]] conclusions.

==== Land-based MIRVed ICBMs threaten MAD ====
[[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRVed]] land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike (inherently [[counterforce]]) or a counterforce [[second strike]], due to:
# Their high accuracy (low [[circular error probable]]), compared to submarine-launched ballistic missiles which used to be less accurate, and more prone to defects;
# Their fast response time, compared to bombers which are considered too slow;
# Their ability to carry multiple MIRV warheads at once, useful for destroying a whole missile field or several cities with one missile.

Unlike a [[decapitation strike]] or a [[countervalue strike]], a [[counterforce strike]] might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed with three warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included the [[SS-18 Satan]] which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threaten [[Minuteman III]] silos, which led [[Team B|some]] [[neoconservatives]] to conclude a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] first strike was being prepared for.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} This led to the development of the aforementioned [[Pershing II]], the [[Trident I]] and [[Trident II]], as well as the [[MX missile]], and the [[B-1 Lancer]].

MIRVed land-based [[ICBM]]s are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many [[warhead]]s (up to eight in existing US missiles, limited by [[New START]], though Trident II is capable of carrying up to 12<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://missilethreat.com/missiles/ugm-133-trident-d-5/ |title=UGM-133 Trident D-5 - Missile ThreatTrident 2 &#124; Missile Threat |access-date=2015-02-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151027084659/http://missilethreat.com/missiles/ugm-133-trident-d-5/ |archive-date=2015-10-27 |url-status=dead }}</ref>) and deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with five warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing two warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about five by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was intended to be banned under the [[START II]] agreement; however, the START II agreement was never brought into force, and neither Russia nor the United States ratified the agreement.

===Late Cold War===
The original US MAD doctrine was modified on July 25, 1980, with US President [[Jimmy Carter]]'s adoption of ''countervailing strategy'' with [[Presidential Directive 59]]. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense [[Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense)|Harold Brown]], "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Soviet population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Soviet surrender before total destruction of the Soviet Union (and the United States). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] with the announcement of the [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI, nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the United States.

SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [[Margaret Thatcher]]) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If the United States had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first-strike capability, which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist [[Andrei Sakharov]]) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications. Supporters also argued that SDI could trigger a new arms race, forcing the USSR to spend an increasing proportion of GDP on defense—something which has been claimed to have been an indirect cause of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. [[Mikhail Gorbachev|Gorbachev]] himself in 1983 announced that “the continuation of the S.D.I. program will sweep the world into a new stage of the arms race and would destabilize the strategic situation.”<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Webb|first1=Rachel|last2=Connolly|first2=Erin|last3=Gott|first3=Jessica|last4=Hadfield|first4=Zach|last5=Hamel|first5=Michael|last6=Heimer|first6=Brandon W.|last7=Kattan|first7=Ari|last8=Kirkegaard|first8=Marie C.|last9=Kuhns|first9=Ryan|last10=Maloney|first10=Jillian|last11=Mascaro|first11=Anthony D.|date=2019|title=Defensive Satellites:: Who Will Shoot First?|journal=On the Horizon|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22545.20|pages=190–199}}</ref>

Proponents of [[ballistic missile defense]] (BMD) argue that MAD is exceptionally dangerous in that it essentially offers a single course of action in the event of a nuclear attack: full retaliatory response. The fact that [[nuclear proliferation]] has led to an increase in the number of nations in the "[[nuclear club]]", including nations of questionable stability (e.g. [[North Korea]]), and that a nuclear nation might be hijacked by a [[Despotism|despot]] or other person or persons who might use nuclear weapons without a sane regard for the consequences, presents a strong case for proponents of BMD who seek a policy which both protect against attack, but also does not require an escalation into what might become [[World War III|global nuclear war]]. Russia continues to have a strong public distaste for Western BMD initiatives, presumably because proprietary operative BMD systems could exceed their technical and financial resources and therefore degrade their larger military standing and sense of security in a post-MAD environment. Russian refusal to accept invitations {{Citation needed|reason=who and when invited Russia to join BMD?|date=January 2021}} to participate in NATO BMD may be indicative of the lack of an alternative to MAD in current Russian war-fighting strategy due to the dilapidation of conventional forces after the breakup of the [[Soviet Union]].

==== Proud Prophet ====
[[Proud Prophet]] was a series of war games played out by various American military officials. The simulation revealed MAD made the use of nuclear weapons virtually impossible without total nuclear annihilation, regardless of how nuclear weapons were implemented in war plans. These results essentially ruled out the possibility of a limited nuclear strike, as every time this was attempted, it resulted in a complete expenditure of nuclear weapons by both the United States and USSR. Proud Prophet marked a shift in American strategy; following Proud Prophet, American rhetoric of strategies that involved the use of nuclear weapons dissipated and American war plans were changed to emphasize the use of conventional forces.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bracken|first=Paul|title=The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics|pages=81–90}}</ref>

==== TTAPS Study ====
In 1983, a group of researchers including [[Carl Sagan]] released the TTAPS study (named for the respective initials of the authors), which predicted that the large scale use of nuclear weapons would cause a “[[nuclear winter]]”. The study predicted that the debris burned in nuclear bombings would be lifted into the atmosphere and diminish sunlight worldwide, thus reducing world temperatures by “-15° to -25°C”.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Turco|first1=R. P.|last2=Toon|first2=O. B.|last3=Ackerman|first3=T. P.|last4=Pollack|first4=J. B.|last5=Sagan|first5=Carl|date=1983-12-23|title=Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions|url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.222.4630.1283|journal=Science|language=en|volume=222|issue=4630|pages=1283–1292|doi=10.1126/science.222.4630.1283|issn=0036-8075|pmid=17773320|bibcode=1983Sci...222.1283T|s2cid=45515251|url-access=subscription}}</ref> These findings led to theory that MAD would still occur with many fewer weapons than were possessed by either the United States or USSR at the height of the Cold War. As such, nuclear winter was used as an argument for significant reduction of nuclear weapons since MAD would occur anyway.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Plous|first=Scott|date=1984|title=Will Deterrence Survive a Nuclear Winter?|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1693566|journal=Science|volume=225|issue=4659|pages=268|doi=10.1126/science.225.4659.268-a|jstor=1693566|pmid=17749541|issn=0036-8075|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===Post-Cold War===
{{more citations needed section|date=May 2018}}
[[File:EKV prototype launch.jpg|thumb|200px|A payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype [[Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle|exoatmospheric kill vehicle]] is launched from [[Meck Island]] at the [[Kwajalein Missile Range]] on December 3, 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.]]

After the [[fall of the Soviet Union]], the [[Russian Federation]] emerged as a sovereign entity encompassing most of the territory of the former USSR. Relations between the United States and Russia were, at least for a time, less tense than they had been with the Soviet Union.{{citation needed|date=March 2025}}

While MAD has become less applicable for the US and Russia, it has been argued as a factor behind [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons]]. Similarly, diplomats have warned that Japan may be pressured to nuclearize by the presence of North Korean nuclear weapons. The ability to launch a nuclear attack against an enemy city is a relevant deterrent strategy for these powers.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=SOKOLSKI|first=HENRY D.|date=2004|title=PREFACE|journal=Getting Mad|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12035.3|pages=v–viii}}</ref>

The administration of US President [[George W. Bush]] withdrew from the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]] in June 2002, claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they proposed to build was designed only to prevent [[nuclear blackmail]] by a state with limited nuclear capability and was not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have improved and an intentional nuclear exchange is more unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the [[post–Cold War era]] may have had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. A 2006 article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that the United States is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.<ref>Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', March/April 2006, pp 42–55.</ref>

However, in a follow-up article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including [[Peter C. W. Flory|Peter Flory]], the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record."<ref name="PCWF">Peter C. W. Flory ''Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?'' [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060925140832/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html |date=2006-09-25 }}</ref> Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait".

A situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries. The strategic balance between the United States and Russia is becoming less stable, and the objective, the technical possibility of a first strike by the United States is increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability could lead to an accidental nuclear war. For example, if Russia feared a US nuclear attack, Moscow might make rash moves (such as putting its forces on alert) that would provoke a US preemptive strike.<ref name="PCWF" />

An outline of current US nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "[[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]" in 1995.

In November 2020, the US successfully destroyed a dummy ICBM outside the atmosphere with another missile. [[Bloomberg Opinion]] writes that this defense ability "ends the era of nuclear stability".<ref>{{Cite news|last=Kluth|first=Andreas|date=2020-11-29|title=A Successful U.S. Missile Intercept Ends the Era of Nuclear Stability|language=en|work=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-30/a-successful-u-s-missile-intercept-ends-the-era-of-nuclear-stability|access-date=2020-11-30}}</ref>

==== India and Pakistan ====
MAD does not entirely apply to all nuclear-armed rivals. [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|India and Pakistan]] are an example of this; because of the superiority of conventional Indian armed forces to their Pakistani counterparts, Pakistan may be forced to use their nuclear weapons on invading Indian forces out of desperation regardless of an Indian retaliatory strike. As such, any large-scale attack on Pakistan by India could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, thus rendering MAD inapplicable. However, MAD is applicable in that it may deter Pakistan from making a “suicidal” nuclear attack rather than a defensive nuclear strike.<ref name=":1"/>

==== North Korea ====
Since the emergence of [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|North Korea as a nuclear state]], military action has not been an option in handling the instability surrounding North Korea because of their option of nuclear retaliation in response to any conventional attack on them, thus rendering non-nuclear neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan incapable of resolving the destabilizing effect of North Korea via military force.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Baranwal|first=Sanjay|title="Nuclear Nihilism of North Korea: Perils and Path Ahead"|date=2011|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761440|journal=The Indian Journal of Political Science|volume=72|issue=2|pages=547–554|jstor=42761440|issn=0019-5510}}</ref> MAD may not apply to the situation in North Korea because the theory relies on rational consideration of the use and consequences of nuclear weapons, which may not be the case for potential North Korean deployment.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2017|title=Time to re-assess mutually assured destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26951722|journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal|volume=359|jstor=26951722|issn=0959-8138}}</ref>