Editing Naturalistic fallacy (section)

===Moore's discussion===
[[Image:Principia Ethica title page.png|thumb|right|200px|The title page of ''Principia Ethica'']]

According to [[G. E. Moore]]'s ''[[Principia Ethica]]'', when philosophers try to define ''good'' reductively, in terms of natural properties like ''pleasant'' or ''desirable'', they are committing the naturalistic fallacy.
{{Blockquote|...the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness. If, for example, it is believed that whatever is pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality. The naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words 'good' and, say, 'pleasant' necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute the same quality to them.<ref>[[Arthur Prior|Prior, Arthur N.]] (1949), [http://www.utilitarian.org/texts/prior.html#intro Chapter 1] of ''Logic And The Basis Of Ethics'', [[Oxford University Press]] ({{ISBN|0-19-824157-7}})</ref>|[[Arthur N. Prior]]|''Logic And The Basis Of Ethics''}}

In defense of [[ethical non-naturalism]] against [[ethical naturalism]], Moore's argument is concerned with the [[semantic]] and metaphysical underpinnings of ethics. Moore argues that good, in the sense of [[intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]], is simply ineffable. It cannot be defined because it is not reducible to other properties, being "one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever 'is' capable of definition must be defined".<ref>Moore, G.E. [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.10#s10p1 ''Principia Ethica'' § 10 ¶ 1]</ref> On the other hand, ethical naturalists eschew such principles in favor of a more empirically accessible [[analysis (philosophy)|analysis]] of what it means to be good: for example, in terms of pleasure in the context of [[hedonism]].

{{quotation|That "pleased" does not mean "having the sensation of red", or anything else whatever, does not prevent us from understanding what it does mean. It is enough for us to know that "pleased" does mean "having the sensation of pleasure", and though pleasure is absolutely indefinable, though pleasure is pleasure and nothing else whatever, yet we feel no difficulty in saying that we are pleased. The reason is, of course, that when I say "I am pleased", I do not mean that "I" am the same thing as "having pleasure". And similarly no difficulty need be found in my saying that "pleasure is good" and yet not meaning that "pleasure" is the same thing as "good", that pleasure ''means'' good, and that good ''means'' pleasure. If I were to imagine that when I said "I am pleased", I meant that I was exactly the same thing as "pleased", I should not indeed call that a naturalistic fallacy, although it would be the same fallacy as I have called naturalistic with reference to Ethics.|G. E. Moore|[http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.12 ''Principia Ethica'' § 12]}}

In §7, Moore argues that a property is either a complex of simple properties, or else it is irreducibly simple. Complex properties can be defined in terms of their constituent parts but a simple property lacks parts. In addition to ''good'' and ''pleasure'', Moore suggests that colour [[qualia]] are undefined: if one wants to understand yellow, one must see examples of it. It will do no good to read the dictionary and learn that ''yellow'' names the colour of egg yolks and ripe lemons, or that ''yellow'' names the primary colour between green and orange on the spectrum, or that the perception of yellow is stimulated by electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of between 570 and 590 nanometers, because yellow is all that and more, by the [[open question argument]].