Editing New riddle of induction (section)

===The old problem of induction and its dissolution===
Goodman poses [[Hume's problem of induction]] as a problem of the validity of the [[prediction]]s we make.  Since predictions are about what has yet to be observed and because there is no necessary connection between what has been observed and what will be observed, there is no objective justification for these predictions.  Deductive logic cannot be used to infer predictions about future observations based on past observations because there are no valid rules of deductive logic for such inferences.  Hume's answer was that observations of one kind of event following another kind of event result in habits of regularity (i.e., associating one kind of event with another kind).  Predictions are then based on these regularities or habits of mind.

Goodman takes Hume's answer to be a serious one.  He rejects other philosophers' objection that Hume is merely explaining the origin of our predictions and not their justification.  His view is that Hume has identified something deeper.  To illustrate this, Goodman turns to the problem of justifying a [[Deductive system|system of rules of deduction]].  For Goodman, the validity of a deductive system is justified by its conformity to good deductive practice.  The justification of rules of a deductive system depends on our judgements about whether to reject or accept specific deductive inferences.  Thus, for Goodman, the problem of induction dissolves into the same problem as justifying a deductive system and while, according to Goodman, Hume was on the right track with habits of mind, the problem is more complex than Hume realized.

In the context of justifying rules of induction, this becomes the problem of confirmation of generalizations for Goodman.  However, the confirmation is not a problem of justification but instead it is a problem of precisely defining how evidence confirms generalizations.  It is with this turn that ''grue'' and ''bleen'' have their philosophical role in Goodman's view of induction.