Editing Objectivism (section)

=== Epistemology: reason ===
According to Rand, attaining knowledge beyond what is given by perception requires both [[volition (psychology)|volition]] (or the exercise of [[free will]]) and performing a specific method of validation by observation, concept-formation, and the application of [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] and [[deductive reasoning]]. For example, a belief in dragons, however sincere, does not mean that reality includes dragons. A process of proof identifying the basis in reality of a claimed item of knowledge is necessary to establish its truth.<ref>{{harvnb|Peikoff|1991|pp=116–121}}</ref>

Objectivist [[epistemology]] begins with the principle that "consciousness is identification". This is understood to be a direct consequence of the metaphysical principle that "existence is identity".<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1961|p=124}}</ref> Rand defined "reason" as "the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses".<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1964|p=22}}</ref> Rand wrote "The fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is [[logic]]. The distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions (actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification) and their goal (knowledge)—while omitting the length, complexity or specific steps of the process of logical inference, as well as the nature of the particular cognitive problem involved in any given instance of using logic."<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=36}}</ref>

According to Rand, [[consciousness]] possesses a specific and finite identity, just like everything else that exists; therefore, it must operate by a specific method of validation. An item of knowledge cannot be "disqualified" by being arrived at by a specific process in a particular form. Thus, for Rand, the fact that consciousness must itself possess identity implies the rejection of both universal skepticism based on the "limits" of consciousness, as well as any claim to revelation, emotion or faith-based belief.

Objectivist epistemology maintains that all knowledge is ultimately based on perception. "Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident."<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=5}}</ref> Rand considered the validity of the senses to be axiomatic and said that purported arguments to the contrary all commit the fallacy of the "stolen concept"<ref>{{cite journal |last=Branden |first=Nathaniel |author-link=Nathaniel Branden |date=January 1963 |title=The Stolen Concept |journal=The Objectivist Newsletter |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=2, 4}}</ref> by presupposing the validity of concepts that, in turn, presuppose the validity of the senses.<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=3}}</ref> She said that perception, being determined physiologically, is incapable of error. For example, [[optical illusion]]s are errors in the conceptual identification of what is seen, not errors of sight itself.<ref name="Kelley 1986">{{harvnb|Kelley|1986}}</ref> The validity of sense perception, therefore, is not susceptible to proof (because it is presupposed by all proof as proof is only a matter of adducing sensory evidence) nor should its validity be denied (since the conceptual tools one would have to use to do this are derived from sensory data). Perceptual error, therefore, is not possible. Rand consequently rejected [[philosophical skepticism|epistemological skepticism]], as she said that the skeptics' claim to knowledge "distorted" by the form or the means of perception is impossible.<ref name="Kelley 1986"/>

The Objectivist theory of perception distinguishes between the ''form'' and ''object.'' The form in which an organism perceives is determined by the physiology of its sensory systems. Whatever form the organism perceives it in, what it perceives—the object of perception—is reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Kelley|1986}}; {{harvnb|Peikoff|1991|pp=44–48}}</ref> Rand consequently rejected the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] dichotomy between "things as we perceive them" and "things as they are in themselves". Rand wrote:

{{Blockquote|The attack on man's consciousness and particularly on his conceptual faculty has rested on the unchallenged premise that any knowledge acquired by a ''process'' of consciousness is necessarily subjective and cannot correspond to the facts of reality, since it is ''processed'' knowledge … [but] all knowledge ''is'' processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition.<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=81}}</ref>}}

[[File:Rand - ITOE.jpg|thumb|right|upright|alt=book cover|Rand's ''[[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology]]'' explains her theory of concept formation.]]
The aspect of epistemology given the most elaboration by Rand is the theory of concept-formation, which she presented in ''[[Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology]]''. She argued that concepts are formed by a process of measurement omission. Peikoff described this as follows:
{{Blockquote|To form a concept, one mentally ''isolates'' a group of concretes (of distinct perceptual units), on the basis of observed similarities which distinguish them from all other known concretes (similarity is 'the relationship between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree'); then, by a process of omitting the particular measurements of these concretes, one ''integrates'' them into a single new mental unit: the concept, which subsumes all concretes of this kind (a potentially unlimited number). The integration is completed and retained by the selection of a perceptual symbol (a word) to designate it.
"A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted."<ref>Peikoff, Leonard. "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy". In {{harvnb|Rand|1990|pp=97–98}}. The quotes within this passage are of Rand's material elsewhere in the same book.</ref>}}

According to Rand, "the term 'measurements omitted' does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that ''measurements exist, but are not specified''. That measurements ''must'' exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in ''some'' quantity, but may exist in ''any'' quantity."<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=12}}; for more on Rand's theory of concepts see also Kelley, David "A Theory of Abstraction" and "The Psychology of Abstraction", ''Cognition and Brain Theory'' vol. vii, no. 3 and 4 (Summer/Fall 1984), and [[Douglas B. Rasmussen|Rasmussen, Douglas B.]], "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism", ''The New Scholasticism'' 58 (Summer, 1984)</ref>

Rand argued that concepts are organized hierarchically. Concepts such as 'dog,' which bring together "concretes" available in perception, can be differentiated (into the concepts of 'dachshund,' 'poodle,' etc.) or integrated (along with 'cat,' etc., into the concept of 'animal'). Abstract concepts such as 'animal' can be further integrated, via "abstraction from abstractions", into such concepts as 'living thing.' Concepts are formed in the context of knowledge available. A young child differentiates dogs from cats and chickens but need not explicitly differentiate them from deep-sea tube worms, or from other types of animals not yet known to him, to form a concept 'dog'.<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1990|pp=15–28}}</ref>

Because of its characterization of concepts as "open-ended" classifications that go well beyond the characteristics included in their past or current definitions, Objectivist epistemology rejects the [[analytic-synthetic distinction]] as a [[false dichotomy]]<ref>Peikoff, Leonard. "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy". In {{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=94}}</ref> and denies the possibility of ''[[a priori (philosophy)|a priori]]'' knowledge.<ref>Peikoff, Leonard. "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy". In {{harvnb|Rand|1990|pp=116–118}}</ref>

Rand rejected "feeling" as sources of knowledge. Rand acknowledged the importance of emotion for human beings, but she maintained that emotions are a consequence of the conscious or subconscious ideas that a person already accepts, not a means of achieving awareness of reality. "Emotions are not tools of cognition."<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1961|p=64}}</ref> Rand also rejected all forms of [[faith]] or mysticism, terms that she used synonymously. She defined faith as "the acceptance of allegations without evidence or proof, either apart from or ''against'' the evidence of one's senses and reason... Mysticism is the claim to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-definable, non-identifiable means of knowledge, such as 'instinct,' 'intuition,' 'revelation,' or any form of 'just knowing.{{'"}}<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1982|pp=62–63}}</ref> Reliance on revelation is like reliance on a [[Ouija|Ouija board]]; it bypasses the need to show how it connects its results to reality. Faith, for Rand, is not a "short-cut" to knowledge, but a "short-circuit" destroying it.<ref>{{harvnb|Rand|1961|p=223}}; {{harvnb|Peikoff|1991|pp=182–185}}</ref>

Objectivism acknowledges the facts that human beings have limited knowledge, are vulnerable to error, and do not instantly understand all of the implications of their knowledge.<ref>Lecture by Leonard Peikoff, cited in {{harvnb|Sciabarra|1995}}.</ref> According to Peikoff, one can be certain of a proposition if all of the available evidence verifies it, i.e., it can be logically integrated with the rest of one's knowledge; one is then certain within the context of the evidence.<ref>{{harvnb|Peikoff|1991|pp=171–181}}</ref>

Rand rejected the traditional [[rationalism|rationalist]]/[[empiricism|empiricist]] dichotomy, arguing that it embodies a false alternative: conceptually based knowledge independent of perception (rationalism) versus perceptually based knowledge independent of concepts (empiricism). Rand argued that neither is possible because the senses provide the material of knowledge while conceptual processing is also needed to establish knowable propositions.

==== Criticism on epistemology ====
The philosopher [[John Hospers]], who was influenced by Rand and shared her moral and political opinions, disagreed with her concerning issues of epistemology.<ref>{{harvnb|Branden|1987|p=323}}</ref>  Some philosophers, such as [[Tibor Machan]], have argued that the Objectivist epistemology is incomplete.<ref name="tiborneedwork">For example, {{harvnb|Machan|2000|pp=134–151}}</ref>

Psychology professor [[Robert L. Campbell]] writes that the relationship between Objectivist epistemology and cognitive science remains unclear because Rand made claims about human cognition and its development which belong to psychology, yet Rand also argued that philosophy is logically prior to psychology and in no way dependent on it.<ref name="itoephilpsych">{{harvnb|Rand|1990|p=289}}</ref><ref name="cogrev">{{cite journal |last=Campbell |first=R. L. |date=Fall 1999 |title=Ayn Rand and the Cognitive Revolution in Psychology |journal=Journal of Ayn Rand Studies |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=107–134 |url=http://campber.people.clemson.edu/randcogrev.html}}</ref>

The philosophers [[Randall Dipert]] and {{ill|Roderick Long|ar|رودريك تي لونغ|arz|رودريك تى لونج|es|Roderick Long|ru|Лонг, Родерик Трейси|zh|罗德里克·T·朗}} have argued that Objectivist epistemology conflates the perceptual process by which judgments are formed with the way in which they are to be justified, thereby leaving it unclear how sensory data can validate judgments structured propositionally.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Dipert |first=Randall R. |author-link=Randall Dipert |date=Spring 1987 |title=Review Essay: David Kelley's ''Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory of Perception'' |journal=Reason Papers |issue=12 |pages=57–70 |url=http://www.reasonpapers.com/pdf/12/rp_12_7.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Reason and Value: Rand versus Aristotle |last=Long |first=Roderick T. |location=Poughkeepsie, NY |publisher=The Objectivist Center |year=2000 |isbn=978-1-57724-045-7 |oclc=49875339 |series=Objectivist Studies Monographs}}</ref>