Editing Operation Anaconda (section)

==Prelude==
[[File:Operation Anaconda -- the plan.jpg|thumb|A map illustrating the plan for Operation Anaconda]]
During the planning phase of the operation, [[Advanced Force Operations]] (AFO) units carried out reconnaissance to gather intelligence about the Taliban and Al-Qaeda positions in Shah-i-Kot. Efforts to access U.S. intelligence databases had provided no useful information. Even extensive satellite imagery of the Shah-i-Kot area didn't reveal much because the Al-Qaeda forces there were too lightly equipped and too adept at camouflage to stand out, unlike the easily recognizable Iraqi tank brigades in the [[Gulf War|First Gulf War]].<ref name="Dutton Caliber"/>

Intelligence operatives realized that they would have to rely mainly on human intelligence gathering ([[Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)|HUMINT]]) and intercepted signals ([[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]]) to gather insights about the situation in the valley.<ref name="Dutton Caliber"/> The commander of [[Delta Force]], [[Lieutenant colonel (United States)|lieutenant colonel]] Pete Blaber ruled out any helicopter infiltration of AFOs into the area as not to alert the terrorists in the valley; in addition to AFOs conducting reconnaissance of routes into and around the valley on modified [[Polaris Inc.|Polaris]] [[All-terrain vehicle|ATV]]s (often in adverse weather conditions on difficult terrain), two teams (codenamed India and Juliet) with 3 and 5 operators (respectively) of highly experienced Delta operators from their squadrons Reconnaissance and Surveillance Troop and elite Air Force combat controllers from the 24th STS climbed high into the mountains and gorges of the Shah-i-Kot, often in extreme weather conditions, to conduct environmental reconnaissance. Their vital intelligence was fed back to the AFO and would prove invaluable once the operation started. On February 28, three AFO teams were covertly infiltrated into the valley, one codenamed Juliet was made up of 5 Delta operators, a combat controller, and a signals intelligence specialist from the [[Intelligence Support Activity|ISA]], entered the valley on ATVs from the north, driving through the night in adverse weather conditions, eventually reaching a covert hide on the eastern side of the valley. Another team codenamed India, composed of three Delta operators, a combat controller, and an attached ISA operator walked into the valley through the same conditions to hide in the southwest of the valley, known as the "Fish Hook".  The final team was known as Mako 31 and was composed of three SEALs from [[DEVGRU]]s Red Team, a USAF Combat Controller, and a US Navy EOD operator. They infiltrated the area on foot via the southern edge of the valley to set up an observation post on a terrain feature known as 'The Finger.' All three teams were tasked with confirming enemy strengths and dispositions including antiaircraft emplacements, ensuring the designated Rakkasan helicopter landing zones were clear of obstructions, and providing terminal guidance for air support both prior to and during the insertion of conventional forces. SOF teams from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64 were also inserted into the valley to establish observation posts which according to US planners "had to be tenable, afford good reconnaissance, and cover the identified escape routes or 'rat lines' into Pakistan"<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.50-54</ref>

After reading the daily reports from the AFO team, general [[Tommy Franks]] became convinced that a major operation was necessary to deal with what appeared to be a significant enemy presence in the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The military authorities finalized their plan for the attack on the valley. Task Force Rakkasan were to air assault into the valley using CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters, supported by six [[AH-64A|AH-64A Apache]] attack helicopters. Their role was to occupy several blocking positions along the eastern ridgeline of Shah-i-Kot. Task Force Hammer, led by Commander Zia Lodin with 500 Afghan [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] units, would enter the valley through the northern entrance in a ground assault convoy. Before their ground assault, a planned aerial bombardment would target known enemy positions. As Task Force Hammer moved through the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak, where enemy forces were believed to be concentrated, the Task Force Rakkasan soldiers manning the blocking positions would be ready to engage any fleeing enemy forces. Additionally, two Afghan militias were assigned to create an outer cordon to prevent any Al-Qaeda or IMU stragglers from escaping into Pakistan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=Special Forces in the War on Terror |date=19 May 2015 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-0790-8 |pages=83–84 |language=English}}</ref> The operation was originally scheduled to be launched February 28, but was delayed until March 2 due to a severe snowstorm.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kugler |first1=Richard |title=Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf |language=en}}</ref>