Editing Operation Rolling Thunder (section)

===Implementation===
In March 1964 the [[United States Indo-Pacific Command|Commander in Chief Pacific]] (CINCPAC) began developing plans for a sustained eight-week air campaign designed to escalate in three stages. This was published at the end of August as CINCPAC OPLAN 37–64, which included the "94 target list". Bridges, rail yards, docks, barracks and supply dumps were all targeted, and selected based on a criterion system considering:

{{blockquote|(a) reducing North Vietnamese support of communist operations in Laos and South Vietnam, (b) limiting North Vietnamese capabilities to take direct action against Laos and South Vietnam, and finally (c) impairing North Vietnam's capacity to continue as an industrially viable state.<ref>Drew 1986; Van Staaveren, p. 46; Tilford, p. 93.</ref>}}

There was widespread concern that an air campaign could lead to a wider conflict involving the Chinese or Soviets. Westmoreland referred to "an almost paranoid fear of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union" and a "phobia" that the Chinese would invade.<ref name=Drew/> Johnson later noted:

{{blockquote|By keeping a lid on all the designated targets, I knew I could keep the control of the war in my own hands. If China reacted to our slow escalation by threatening to retaliate, we'd have plenty of time to ease off the bombing. But this control—so essential for preventing World War III—would be lost the moment we unleashed a total assault on the North—for that would be rape rather than seduction—and then there would be no turning back. The Chinese reaction would be instant and total.<ref name=Drew/>}}

For a time, no overt action was taken, and the plans continued to evolve. A further refinement of the plan was developed by [[William Bundy|William]] and [[McGeorge Bundy]] on 29 November 1964, with a more moderate target list, which the Joint Chiefs opposed. No action was taken while these, and other, plans were considered. But matters came to a head with the [[attack on Camp Holloway]] on 7 February 1965, which demanded immediate action, and resulted in a reprisal raid known as [[Operation Flaming Dart]]. A [[1965 Qui Nhơn hotel bombing|sapper raid against an American enlisted men's billet at Qui Nhon]] on the 10th<ref>{{cite journal |first= Richard |last= Fournier |title= Qui Nhon, 1965: Terrorism Takes A Toll |journal=VFW Magazine |date= February 2015}}</ref> led to Flaming Dart II. These small-scale operations were launched against the southern region of the country, where the bulk of North Vietnam's ground forces and supply dumps were located.<ref>McMaster, pp. 218–222.</ref>

[[File:KC-135A refuels F-105Ds over Vietnam 1965.jpg|thumb|F-105Ds refueling en route to North Vietnam in 1965]]

These actions led to the plans for a sustained air campaign being reconsidered. On 13 February a new plan was approved and given the name "Rolling Thunder", merging targets and priorities from the lists produced by the Bundys and the JCS. This campaign was not aimed at specific actions on the part of the North Vietnamese, but was intended as a larger response to the growing hostilities as a whole. Although some within the administration believed that the campaign would be costly, and that it might not work, they reasoned that it was "an acceptable risk, especially when considered against the alternative of introducing American combat troops."<ref>Morocco, p. 40.</ref>{{efn|For the Secretary of Defense's thoughts on the planning and implementation of the air campaign see McNamara, pp. 171–177.}} ''Rolling Thunder'' called for an eight-week air campaign consistent with the restrictions imposed by that Johnson and [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] McNamara. If the insurgency continued "with DRV support, strikes against the DRV would be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel."<ref>McMaster, p. 226.</ref>

It was believed that selective pressure, controlled by Washington, combined with diplomatic overtures, would prevail and compel Hanoi to end its aggression.<ref>Schlight, ''A War Too Long'', p. 46.</ref> The military was still not satisfied, since, for the time being, the bombing campaign was to be limited to targets below the 19th parallel, each of which would have to be cleared individually by the President and McNamara.<ref>Morocco, p. 56.</ref>{{efn|The daily target selection meetings were soon replaced by weekly sessions and finally by the creation of bi-weekly "force packages."}}

The first mission of the new operation was launched on 2 March against an ammunition storage area near Xom Bang carried out by a strike package of 104 US aircraft containing [[Martin B-57 Canberra|B-57s]], [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief|F-105s]], and [[North American F-100 Super Sabre|F-100s]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d175 | title=Historical Documents - Office of the Historian }}</ref> On the same day, 19 RVNAF [[A-1 Skyraider]]s struck the [[Quang Khe Naval Base]]. The Americans were shocked when six of their aircraft were shot down during the mission.<ref>Van Staaveren, p. 86.</ref> Five of the downed crewmen were rescued, but it was a portent of things to come.<ref>Morocco, p. 54.</ref>