Editing Operation Spring Awakening (section)

=== Creation of Operation Spring Awakening ===

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1989-105-13A, Ungarn, deutscher Rückzug.jpg|thumb|right|German units during the operation, March 1945]]

During a Situation Conference on 7 January 1945, at which both [[Hermann Göring]] and [[Gerd von Rundstedt|Rundstedt]] were present, Hitler proposed his intention of pulling the [[6th SS Panzer Army]] to reserve due to severe Allied air attacks.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=112}}</ref> Rundstedt received the withdrawal orders on January 8, and the Panzer Army's divisions began preparations to withdraw from the stalled [[Battle of the Bulge|Ardennes Offensive]].<ref name=":3" /> The slow withdrawal was greatly hampered by Allied air superiority.<ref name=":14">{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=113}}</ref>

On 12 January, the Soviet [[1st Ukrainian Front|1st Ukrainian]] and [[1st Belorussian Front|1st Belorussian]] Fronts began their Vistula–Oder offensive with over 2 million men{{citation needed|date=December 2023}}, placing considerable new pressure on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]]. When this news reached Hitler, he immediately began to plan a major offensive of his own on this Front. Unfortunately, at the time, Hitler's best remaining panzer forces were still engaged on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]].<ref name=":3" /> On 20 January, Hitler ordered Rundstedt to withdraw forces from the ongoing Battle of the Bulge; the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions managed to disengage and withdraw the same day.<ref name=":15">{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=115}}</ref> Almost all support units of the 6th SS Panzer Army were pulled from the [[Ardennes]] by 22 January, while the 9th SS Panzer Division was the last to leave on 23 January.<ref name=":15" />

On this same day, 22 January, Hitler committed to send the fatigued 6th SS Panzer Army to Hungary for his new counteroffensive, a view [[Heinz Guderian]] ([[Oberkommando des Heeres|OKH]]) partially agreed with. Guderian wanted the 6th SS Panzer Army on the Eastern Front, but would have preferred its employment in the defence of Berlin.<ref name=":14" /> A glimpse of the ensuing verbal exchange during this argument was captured in [[Alfred Jodl]]'s ([[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|OKW]]) post-war interrogation, where he quotes Hitler saying: "''You want to attack without oil – good, we'll see what happens when you attempt that''".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=120}}</ref>

Hitler's reasoning for sending the 6th SS Panzer Army south into Hungary can be understood through the list of main strategic points listed in a Situation in the East conference held on January 23: 1) The Hungarian oil region and Vienna oil region, which made up 80% of remaining reserves, had to be defended and/or retaken, and without which the war effort could not be continued; 2) the defense of the [[Province of Upper Silesia|Upper Silesian]] industrial region, vital for the war economy and coal production.<ref name=":14" /> Two quotes illustrate how seriously Hitler viewed this ruling: "''Hitler considered the protection of Vienna and Austria as of vital importance and that he would rather see Berlin fall than lose the Hungarian oil area and Austria''",<ref>{{Cite book|last=Warlimont|first=Walter|title=Inside Hitler's Headquarters|year=1990|pages=499}}</ref> "''He'' [Hitler] ''accepted the risk of the Russian threat to the Oder east of Berlin''".<ref name=":14" /> Hitler chose to ignore Guderian's view for how the 6th SS Panzer Army should be deployed.

On 27 January, Guderian was tasked by Hitler to stop the [[3rd Ukrainian Front]] in the vicinity of the Margit Line in order to protect the vital oil fields.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}} The following day, 28 January, this operation received its preliminary name, Operation Süd (German: South).{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}} The main objectives of the operation were as follows: 1) the security of vital raw materials such as oil, bauxite, and manganese for iron, 2) the defense of arable land for food and crops, the Austrian military industrial complex, and the city of Vienna, and 3) to stop the Soviet advance.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}} Interestingly, an additional side-objective was the hope that the counteroffensive would force the Soviet command to divert some forces from its northern offensives headed to [[Berlin]] instead towards Hungary.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}}<ref name=":14" />

Operation Süd was scheduled to start after a path to Budapest had been established.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}} The operation would be considered a success if 1) Operation Konrad III could pin the Soviets between the [[Vértes Mountains|Vértes mountains]] and the Danube, 2) the [[8th Army (Wehrmacht)|8th Army]] could secure its Front in Northern Hungary, and 3) if the incoming panzer armies could be refitted during transit to maintain the element of surprise.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=13}}

Four plans for Operation Süd were produced by high-ranking officials from [[Army Group South]], the 6th SS Panzer Army, and the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]]: "Lösung A" (German: Solution A) by [[Fritz Kraemer (Waffen-SS)|Fritz Krämer]] of the 6th SS Panzer Army; "Lösung B" and "Lösung C2" by Helmuth von Grolman of Army Group South; and "Lösung C1" by [[Heinrich Gaedcke]] of the 6th Army.  There was much fighting and bickering as to which plan should be implemented.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|pp=15–17}} The commander of Army Group South, [[Otto Wöhler]], chose "Lösung B".{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|pp=15–17}}

The four plans were sent to Guderian on 22 February for review, and Army Group South informed [[Army Group F]] commander [[Maximilian von Weichs]] on  23 February that the operation would commence on 5 March, in anticipation that Operation Südwind (German: South Wind) would have finished successfully by 24 February.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=17}} If Operation Südwind was successful, Operation Süd's start could be deferred by 8 to 9 days.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=18}} On 25 February, Hitler ordered Wöhler, Weichs, and Dietrich to personally present the plans for Operation Süd to him, along with Guderian and Jodl,<ref name=":19">{{Cite book|last=Maier|first=Georg|title=Drama Between Budapest and Vienna|publisher=J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.|year=2004|isbn=0-921991-78-9|location=Canada|pages=152}}</ref> at the [[Reich Chancellery]] in Berlin, where he ultimately chose "Lösung C2", disagreeing with the commander of Army Group South, Otto Wöhler.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=18}} Guderian then ordered Wöhler to increase the daily fuel allowance from 400 to 500 cubic meters of fuel on February 26,{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=20}} and by February 28 the specifics of the operation, now officially named "Operation Frühlingserwachen" (Spring Awakening), were completed.{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|p=18}} As per "Lösung C2", 3 offensive prongs were planned, with the main attack of the 6th Army and 6th SS Panzer Army, "Frühlingserwachen", being directed towards the Danube through Lakes Velence and Balaton; the [[2nd Panzer Army]]'s "Eisbrecher" (Icebreaker) attack directed eastward from the western end of Lake Balaton; and the [[LXXXXI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|LXXXXI Corps]] "Waldteufel" (Forest Devil) attack directed north from the [[Drava|Drava River]].{{sfn|Számvéber|2017|pp=19–20}}