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Paraconsistent logic
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== Motivation == A primary motivation for paraconsistent logic is the conviction that it ought to be possible to reason with inconsistent [[information]] in a controlled and discriminating way. The principle of explosion precludes this, and so must be abandoned. In non-paraconsistent logics, there is only one inconsistent theory: the trivial theory that has every sentence as a theorem. Paraconsistent logic makes it possible to distinguish between inconsistent theories and to reason with them. Research into paraconsistent logic has also led to the establishment of the philosophical school of [[dialetheism]] (most notably advocated by [[Graham Priest]]), which asserts that true contradictions exist in reality, for example groups of people holding opposing views on various moral issues.<ref name="Fisher2007">{{cite book|author=Jennifer Fisher|title=On the Philosophy of Logic|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k8L_YW-lEEQC&pg=PT142|year=2007|publisher=Cengage Learning|isbn=978-0-495-00888-0|pages=132–134}}</ref> Being a dialetheist rationally commits one to some form of paraconsistent logic, on pain of otherwise embracing [[trivialism]], i.e. accepting that all contradictions (and equivalently all statements) are true.<ref name="GabbayWoods2007">{{cite book|editor1=Dov M. Gabbay|editor2=John Woods|title=The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3TNj1ZkP3qEC&pg=PA131|year=2007|publisher=Elsevier|isbn=978-0-444-51623-7|page=131|author=Graham Priest|chapter=Paraconsistency and Dialetheism}}</ref> However, the study of paraconsistent logics does not necessarily entail a dialetheist viewpoint. For example, one need not commit to either the existence of true theories or true contradictions, but would rather prefer a weaker standard like [[empirical adequacy]], as proposed by [[Bas van Fraassen]].<ref name="Allhoff2010">{{cite book|editor=Fritz Allhoff|title=Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Vu6cVCLvPt0C&pg=PA55|year=2010|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-1-4051-9995-7|page=55|author=Otávio Bueno|chapter=Philosophy of Logic}}</ref>
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