Editing Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (section)

==Security==
PPTP has been the subject of many security analyses and serious security vulnerabilities have been found in the protocol. The known vulnerabilities relate to the underlying PPP authentication protocols used, the design of the [[Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption|MPPE]] protocol as well as the integration between MPPE and PPP authentication for session key establishment.<ref>{{cite web|title=Malware FAQ: Microsoft PPTP VPN|url=https://www.sans.org/security-resources/malwarefaq/pptp-vpn|access-date=2017-06-29}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Microsoft says don't use PPTP and MS-CHAP|url=http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Microsoft-says-don-t-use-PPTP-and-MS-CHAP-1672257.html|access-date=2012-11-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=A death blow for PPTP|url=http://www.h-online.com/security/features/A-death-blow-for-PPTP-1716768.html|access-date=2012-11-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Differences between PPTP and L2TP|url=https://www.bestvpnrating.com/blog/main-differences-between-pptp-l2tp|access-date=7 August 2016|work=bestvpnrating|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160914125558/https://www.bestvpnrating.com/blog/main-differences-between-pptp-l2tp|archive-date=14 September 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>

A summary of these vulnerabilities is below:

* [[MS-CHAP]]-v1 is fundamentally insecure. Tools exist to trivially extract the NT Password hashes from a captured MSCHAP-v1 exchange.<ref name="schneier1">[http://www.schneier.com/paper-pptp.pdf Bruce Schneier, ''Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604062340/http://www.schneier.com/paper-pptp.pdf |date=2011-06-04 }}.</ref>
* When using MS-CHAP-v1, [[Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption|MPPE]] uses the same RC4 session key for encryption in both directions of the communication flow. This can be cryptanalysed with standard methods by XORing the streams from each direction together.<ref>[http://www.schneier.com/paper-pptpv2.pdf Bruce Schneier, ''Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's PPTP Authentication Extensions (MS-CHAPv2)'', October 19 1999].</ref>
* MS-CHAP-v2 is vulnerable to dictionary attacks on the captured challenge response packets. Tools exist to perform this process rapidly.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.willhackforsushi.com/?page_id=41 |title=Asleap |last=Wright |first=Joshua |access-date=2017-11-01}}</ref>
* In 2012, it was demonstrated that the complexity of a brute-force attack on a MS-CHAP-v2 key is equivalent to a brute-force attack on a single [[Data Encryption Standard|DES]] key. An online service was also demonstrated which is capable of decrypting a MS-CHAP-v2 MD4 passphrase in 23 hours.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/ |title=Divide and Conquer: Cracking MS-CHAPv2 with a 100% success rate |publisher=Cloudcracker.com |date=2012-07-29 |access-date=2012-09-07 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160316174007/https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/ |archive-date=2016-03-16 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/31/ms_chapv2_crack/ |title=Marlinspike demos MS-CHAPv2 crack |publisher=[[The Register]] |date=2012-07-31 |access-date=2012-09-07}}</ref>
* MPPE uses the [[RC4]] stream cipher for encryption. There is no method for authentication of the ciphertext stream and therefore the ciphertext is vulnerable to a bit-flipping attack. An attacker could modify the stream in transit and adjust single bits to change the output stream without possibility of detection. These bit flips may be detected by the protocols themselves through checksums or other means.<ref name="schneier1"/>

[[Extensible Authentication Protocol#EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS)|EAP-TLS]] is seen as the superior authentication choice for PPTP;<ref>[https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc739638%28WS.10%29.aspx Choosing EAP-TLS or MS-CHAP v2 for User-Level Authentication], Microsoft TechNet, March 28, 2003</ref> however, it requires implementation of a [[public-key infrastructure]] for both client and server certificates. As such, it may not be a viable authentication option for some remote access installations. Most networks that use PPTP have to apply additional security measures or be deemed completely inappropriate for the modern internet environment. At the same time, doing so means negating the aforementioned benefits of the protocol to some point.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.vpnunlimited.com/blog/vpn-protocol-comparison/|title=VPN Protocol Comparison: IKEv2 vs IKEv1 vs OpenVPN vs L2TP vs PPTP|date=2018-05-14|work=VPN Unlimited Blog|access-date=2018-06-19|language=en-US}}</ref>