Editing Preparedness Movement (section)

==Democrats==
{{Further|Presidency of Woodrow Wilson#Preparedness}}
The [[History of the Democratic Party (United States)#Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921)|Democratic Party]] saw the preparedness movement as a threat. Roosevelt, Root and Wood were prospective [[History of the Republican Party#Progressive Era: 1896–1932|Republican]] presidential candidates. More subtly, the Democrats were rooted in localism that appreciated the National Guard, and the voters were hostile to the rich and powerful in the first place. Working with the Democrats who controlled Congress, Wilson was able to sidetrack the preparedness forces. Army and Navy leaders were forced to testify before Congress to the effect that the nation's military was in excellent shape. Wilson had to resist the demands for preparedness because there was a powerful anti-preparedness element of the party, led by [[William Jennings Bryan]], women,<ref>Frances H. Early, ''A World without War: How U.S. Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I.'' (1997).</ref> Protestant churches,<ref>Andrew Preston, ''Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy'' (2012), pp. 240–245.</ref> the [[American Federation of Labor]],<ref>Simeon Larson, "The American Federation of Labor and the Preparedness Controversy." ''Historian'' 37.1 (1974): 67–81.</ref> and Southern Democrats such as [[Claude Kitchin]], chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee. [[John Morton Blum]], a biographer of Wilson, wrote: "Wilson's long silence about preparedness had permitted such a spread and such a hardening of antipreparedness attitudes within his party and across the nation that when he came in at late last to his task, neither Congress nor the country was amenable to much persuasion."<ref>John Morton Blum, ''Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality'' (1956) p. 121.</ref>

In July 1915, Wilson instructed the Army and Navy to formulate plans for expansion. In November, he asked for far less than the experts said was needed, seeking an army of 400,000 volunteers at a time when European armies were 10 times as large. Congress ignored the proposal and the Army remained at 100,000 soldiers. Wilson was severely handicapped by the weaknesses of his cabinet. According to Blum, his [[Secretary of the Navy|Secretaries of the Navy]] and War displayed a "confusion, inattention to industrial preparation, and excessive deference to peacetime mores [that] dangerously retarded the development of the armed services."<ref>John Morton Blum, ''The Republican Roosevelt'' (2nd ed. 1977), p. 153.</ref> Even more, Wilson was constrained by the traditional [[American non-interventionism]]. Wilson believed that a massive military mobilization could only take place after a declaration of war, even though that meant a long delay in sending troops to Europe. Many Democrats felt that no American soldiers would be needed, only American money and munitions.<ref>David Esposito, David. "Political and Institutional Constraints on Wilson's Defense Policy." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 26.4 (1996): 1114–1125.</ref> Wilson had more success in his request for a dramatic expansion of the Navy. Congress passed the [[Naval Act of 1916]], which encapsulated the planning by the Navy's professional officers to build a fleet of top-rank status, but it would take several years to become operational.<ref>Arthur Link, ''Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era'' (1954) p. 179.</ref>