Editing R38-class airship (section)

==Operational history==
[[File:Zr2onground.jpg|thumb|left|The R38/ZR-2 leaving its hangar for trials, showing the top gun platform.]]
The airship was to be given a curtailed series of tests before being handed over to the U.S. Navy, who would fly it across the Atlantic.  [[J. E. M. Pritchard]], the officer in charge of flight testing, proposed to carry out 100 hours of flight testing, including flights in rough weather, followed by 50 more flown by an American crew before crossing the Atlantic.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 77</ref> The commander of the Howden Detachment Commander Maxfield disagreed and urged that the test of R.38 be completed in one day. Air Commodore Edward Maitland as the man most responsible for testing the R.38 was appalled and disagreed. He protested the abbreviated test schedule. He was told to not provide advice unless asked.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 78</ref>  The Air Ministry ruled that 50 hours would be sufficient.<ref>Robinson 1974, p. 170</ref> The decision had been made in ignorance by officials unfamiliar with airships as well as the knowledgeable officers who were reluctant to release an airship of unproven strength, egged on by an eagerness to return to America by Commander Maxfield.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 79</ref>

The ''R.38'' made its first flight on 23–24 June 1921, when it flew registered as R.38 but bearing the US designation ZR-2;<ref name=mil>{{Cite web|url=http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ac-forn/uk/uk-lta/r38.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030122112015/http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ac-forn/uk/uk-lta/r38.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=22 January 2003|publisher=Navy Historical Department|title=Airship R-38|access-date =15 December 2013 }}</ref> the seven-hour flight revealed problems with over-balance of the control surfaces.  With the balance area of the top rudder reduced, a second test flight was carried out on 17–18 July.  The control balance problem remained, and, on return to Cardington, all the control surfaces were reduced in area.  On 17–18 July, a third flight was made, during which the airship was flown from Cardington to Howden and then out over the North Sea, where the speed was increased to {{convert|58|mph|kph|abbr=on}}, causing the ship to begin [[Hunting oscillation|hunting]] over a range of around {{convert|500|ft|m|abbr=on}}.  The highly experienced Pritchard took over the controls from the American coxswain and reduced the oscillation, but several girders in the vicinity of the midship engine cars had already failed. The control surfaces were still over balanced. More importantly girders of intermediate frame 7b as well as longitudinal Girder F had failed in one place, while frame 7a and longitudinal F' each had failed in two locations.<ref>Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 39</ref> R.38 returned to [[RNAS Howden|Howden]] at reduced speed.<ref>Higham 1961, p. 221</ref> Work on reinforcing the buckled girders was carried out and completed by 30 July at Howden.<ref>{{cite magazine|author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.-->|title=The Airship Disaster|url=http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/images/d/d4/Er19210902.pdf|magazine=[[The Engineer (UK magazine)|The Engineer]]|pages=231|date=2 September 1921|access-date=13 July 2015}}</ref> There were increasing doubts being expressed about the design, including some made by [[Air Commodore]] [[Edward Maitland (aviator)|E. M. Maitland]], the very experienced commander of the Howden base. Maitland urged that all future speed trials be conducted at higher altitude as was the practice of the Germans while testing the fragile Zeppelins upon which the R.38 design was based.<ref name="Douglas H. Robinson 1935. page 40">Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 40</ref> There was considerable concern expressed by Admiral Griffen, the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.  Burgess at the Bureau of Construction and Repair was also concerned.<ref>Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p.  41</ref> Starr Truscott of the Bureau of Construction and Repairs believed that the negative endorsements of Admirals Griffin and Taylor would suffice to extend trials for the ZR-2 (R.38) but he was soon proven wrong. Admiral Taylor endorsed Commander Maxfield's optimistic report of July 20.<ref name="Douglas H. Robinson 1935. page 40"/> Truscott later came to accept that decision writing "We must accept ship as per British practice, i.e., if acceptable to Air Ministry it must be to us. Question of starting flight is up to people in England."<ref>Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 42</ref>

===Fatal crash===

[[File:R-38-rescue.jpg|thumb|Rescuers scramble across the wreckage of British R.38/USN ZR-2, 24 August 1921.]]
Following a spell of bad weather, the airship was walked out on 23 August and, in the early morning, took off for its fourth flight,<ref name=Alt>Althof 2004, p. 4</ref> which had an intended destination of [[RNAS Pulham]] in Norfolk, where it could be moored to a mast (a facility unavailable at Howden). The mooring, however, proved impossible because of low cloud, so the airship returned to sea for the night. The next day, after a brief speed trial (during which a speed of {{convert|71.9|mph|kph|abbr=on}} was reached), a series of turning trials was started at a speed of {{convert|62.7|mph|kph|abbr=on}} and an altitude of {{convert|2500|ft|m|abbr=on}}.<ref>Higham 1961, p. 222</ref> Passing over Hull, a series of control reversals were started which the Germans would never have attempted at such a low altitude. Wann, who was in the control gondola, stated that the controls were never put beyond 15 degrees, while Bateman, from the National Physical Laboratory who was recording pressures upon the vertical fins, stated clearly that the rudders were being driven rapidly from hard over to hard over which would have been 25 degrees from one side to 25 degrees to the other.<ref>Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 45</ref> At 17:37, while close offshore near [[Kingston upon Hull|Hull]] and watched by thousands of spectators, the structure failed amidships. Eyewitnesses reported seeing creases diagonally along the hull towards the stern. Both ends drooped. The R.38 then cracked open with men and objects dropping from the rupture.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 101.</ref> The two sections separated with the forward section catching fire followed by two colossal explosions.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 102.</ref> The two explosions broke windows over a large area with the flaming fore section falling rapidly followed by the aft section descending slowly.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 104.</ref> The remains fell into the shallow waters of the [[Humber|Humber Estuary]]. 16 of the 17 Americans, and 28 of the 32 Britons, in the crew were killed, including both Maitland and Pritchard.<ref>[https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-72000/NH-72412.html US Navy photograph of plaque showing US losses]</ref><ref>[https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/NH-72000/NH-72413.html US Navy photograph of plaque showing British losses]</ref> The only American to survive was Rigger Norman Otto Walker.<ref>Douglas H. Robinson, and Charles L. Keller. "''Up Ship!": U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919–1935.'' Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 220, note 36</ref> Four of those who survived were in the tail section, Flight Lieutenant Archibald Herbert Wann, R.38's British Commanding Officer, was in the control gondola and survived.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030193/1921-08-25/ed-1/seq-2/|title=The Evening World. [volume] (New York) 1887–1931, August 25, 1921, Wall Street Final Edition, Image 2|last=Humanities|first=National Endowment for the|date=25 August 1921|access-date=9 November 2019|pages=2|issn=1941-0654}}</ref><ref name=aht/>

A memorial was erected at Hull,<ref name=aht/> and in 2021, a centenary memorial service was held at [[Hull Minster]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Service marking 100 years since Humber airship disaster to be held in Hull Minster |url=https://www.hulldailymail.co.uk/news/hull-east-yorkshire-news/service-marking-100-years-humber-5799672 |website=Hull Daily Mail|date=17 August 2021 |accessdate=18 August 2021}}</ref>

===Aftermath===

The loss of the R.38, which represented the hope of airship men in Britain, resulted in three official enquiries into the disaster. The first, chaired by Air Vice-Marshal [[John Salmond|Sir John Salmond]] and composed mainly of RAF personnel, was convened on 27 August. Its remit was to consider the general circumstances of the accident, and, although it came to the conclusion that the structure had failed while extreme control forces were being exerted, it was considered necessary to carry out a more detailed technical inquiry into the airship's design. The report also criticized the system by which a single authority was responsible both for the airship's construction and for inspection of the work, and, given the great differences between R.38 and previous British designs, held that the design should have been subjected to a more thorough scrutiny.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1921/1921%20-%200671.html|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|title=R.38 Court of Enquiry|date=13 October 1921|page=671}}</ref>

The Admiralty held a second inquiry into the history of the design of the airship, and into its construction up to the point where it was taken over from the Admiralty by the Air Ministry. In contrast to the previous inquiry, this one concluded that the design did not incorporate any new features which affected the airship's strength, and further maintained that "there was at the time no body in existence which could have been called in to advise on the structural strength of R.38."<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1922/1922%20-%200031.html|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|title=Editorial Comment|date=19 January 1922|pages=31–32}}</ref>

The technical Committee of Enquiry, chaired by [[Mervyn O'Gorman]], concluded that no allowance had been made for aerodynamic [[stress analysis|stresses in the design]], and that while no loads had been placed on the structure during testing that would not have been met in normal use, the effects of the manoeuvres made had weakened the hull. No blame was attached to anyone, as this was not part of the committee's remit.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1922/1922%20-%200139.html |title=The Accident to H.M. Airship R. 38|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|date= 2 March 1922| page= 139}}</ref>

The R.38 disaster led to a rigorous investigation of the structure of airships preceding the design of the next two airships built in Britain, the [[R100|R.100]] and the more radical [[R101|R.101]]. What is curious is that the practice of having responsibility for design and ultimately judging the airworthiness of that design remained in the same hands.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 121.</ref>
Nevil Shute Norway (who was the novelist [[Nevil Shute]]) worked on the design of the R.100 airship for [[Vickers#Aviation|Vickers Ltd.]] from 1924. When he researched previous airship calculations and read the reports of the 1921 R.38 crash he was "unable to believe the words he was reading" that "the civil servants concerned had made no attempt to calculate the aerodynamic forces ... " and he asked one of his chiefs <!-- possibly Barnes Wallis --> "if this could possibly be true. Not only did he confirm it but he pointed out that no one had been sacked over it or even suffered any censure."{{sfn|Slide Rule|1954|pp=55–57}} For the men who built the R.38 its sale to the US Navy represented a last chance to salvage something from the Royal Navy's rigid airship program and its takeover and abandonment by the RAF. The demands of the Exchequer and the US Navy's commander Maxwell converged to cause risks to be taken which were questioned at the time and ignored with fatal consequences.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 124.</ref>

[[File:R38 Memorial Kingston upon Hull.jpg|thumb|right|R38 memorial, [[Hull General Cemetery|Western Cemetery]], Hull]]