Editing RAF Coastal Command (section)

===Early war===

[[File:RAF crew with Boeing Fortress IIA at Lajes c1943.jpg|thumb|RAF Coastal Command crew holding a final conference before taking off in their [[Boeing B-17]], from [[Lajes Field]] on [[Terceira Island]] in the [[Azores]], 1943]]
From its formation in 1936, Coastal Command did not receive the support it required to be an effective naval air service. In September 1939 [[Nazi Germany]] [[Polish Campaign|invaded Poland]] beginning the [[European Theatre of Operations|war in Europe]]. The Command's position was comfortable for the first nine months of the war, the period known as the [[Phoney War]]. German submarines were not able to reach the Atlantic unless they undertook a dangerous transit journey through the [[North Sea]] and around Britain's northern waters or through the [[English Channel]], which was guarded by the Royal and [[French Navy|French Navies]]. The powerful French Navy was responsible for covering half of the Atlantic shipping routes and thus contributed half of the Allied forces available.<ref>Milner 2005, p. 40.</ref>

The events of April to June 1940 overturned the balance of naval and [[air power]], as the Germans conquered [[German invasion of Denmark (1940)|Denmark]], [[Norwegian Campaign|Norway]], [[Battle of the Netherlands|The Netherlands]], [[Battle of Belgium|Belgium]] and [[Battle of France|France]]. The occupation of these countries permitted the ''Luftwaffe'' and ''Kriegsmarine'' to operate from French ports on the Atlantic coast, hundreds of miles closer to the Atlantic shipping lanes.<ref>Hendrie 2006, pp. 60, 74.</ref> German medium bombers could also reach British ports on the westernmost and northernmost coasts. The advantage enjoyed by the Germans, allowed them to interdict merchant shipping supplying food and war materials to Britain much more effectively, which had the potential to starve Britain. While merchant shipping was suffering these losses, Coastal Command had proven ineffective at countering German air and sea attacks on shipping.<ref>Hendrie 2006, p. 69.</ref> But the command could not protect [[English Channel]] convoys, and was forced to abandon operations until July 1940. RAF Fighter Command was given the task, supplying air attack and defence with the enemy. Warning signs after the First World War, that U-boats could become a serious threat once again, meant that aircraft would be the best counter to their operations. This fact not being fully understood, Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until about 1943.<ref>Hewitt 2009, p. 39-41.</ref>

The situation would not improve until 1942.<ref>Hendrie 2006, pp. 103–104.</ref> Coastal Command did operate with effect alongside [[RAF Bomber Command]] in disrupting enemy shipping during the [[Battle of Britain]] in 1940. Coastal Command attacked shipping and mined waters around invasion ports. The German invasion of Britain in 1940, [[Operation Sea Lion]], was eventually cancelled owing to the German defeat in the Battle of Britain.<ref>Ashworth 1992, p. 28.</ref>

During the first three years of the Second World War, Coastal Command and the Admiralty fought a battle with the RAF and Air Ministry over the primacy of trade defence, in relation to the bomber effort against mainland Germany, a strategic tussle which conceivably could have cost the [[Allies of World War II|Western Alliance]] the [[Battle of the Atlantic]]. The Air Staff and Bomber Command enjoyed the backing of Churchill and the maritime air effort struggled to receive the recognition it needed. On the outbreak of war, the [[order of battle]] listed just 298 aircraft, of which only 171 were operational.<ref>Ashworth 1992, p. 18.</ref> On 15 February 1941, Coastal Command was placed under the operational control of the Admiralty. Instrumental in improving the strike rate against submarines was scientific advisor and assistant director of research [[Evan James Williams|E. J. Williams]], who applied scientific analysis to the logistical problems to great effect. Williams was present at some meetings of the Cabinet Anti-U-boat Committee at 10 Downing Street, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.<ref>{{cite web|title=Dictionary of Welsh Biography|url=https://biography.wales/article/s2-WILL-JAM-1903|access-date=17 November 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|publisher=BBC Radio|title=E. J. Williams|date=22 November 1949}}</ref>

Owing to the starvation of resources, even as late as March 1943, the Atlantic supply lines were being threatened. This situation arose as a direct result of the lack of very long-range aircraft. Despite the enormous losses of the disastrous 1940–1942 period, known to the Germans as the "[[First Happy Time|First]]" and "[[Second Happy Time]]", the Air Ministry refused to invest in trade defence. Further delays in resource procurement might have led to German success, which could have defeated Britain and forced it out of the war or at least caused a postponement of [[Operation Torch]], the Allied landings in French North-West Africa in 1942 and [[Operation Overlord]], the landing in France, in 1944.<ref>Buckley 1995, pp. 115–116.</ref><ref>Terraine 1989, p. 612.</ref> Other research indicates that losses unquestionably affected the build-up for [[Operation Neptune]], the naval phase of the landings in Europe.<ref>Leighton in Blumenson & Greenfield 1984, pp. 199–224.</ref>