Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Vietnam: Estimates===
In 1966, Helms as the new DCI inherited a CIA "fully engaged in the policy debates surrounding Vietnam." The CIA had formed "a view on policy but [was] expected to contribute impartially to the debate all the same."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) at 450.</ref> American intelligence agents had a relatively long history in Vietnam, dating back to [[Office of Strategic Services|OSS]] contacts with the communist-led resistance to Japanese occupation forces during World War II.<ref>Tucker, editer, ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (Oxford Univ. 1998, 2000), "C.I.A." at 66.</ref> In 1953 the CIA's first annual [[National Intelligence Estimate]] on Vietnam reported that French prospects may "deteriorate very rapidly".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 430–431.</ref> After French withdrawal in 1954, CIA officers including Lt. Col. [[Edward Lansdale]] assisted the new President [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] in his efforts to reconstitute an independent government in the south: the [[Republic of Viet Nam]].<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 104, 142–145. Lansdale was an early counterinsurgency advisor.</ref><ref>Tucker, ed., ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' (1998, 2000), "Lansdale" at 220.</ref>

Nonetheless, CIA reports did not present an optimistic appraisal of Diem's future. Many of its analysts reluctantly understood that, in the [[anti-colonialism|anti-colonialist]] and nationalist context then prevailing, a favorable outcome was more likely for the [[Democratic Republic of Viet Nam|new communist regime in the north]] under its long-term party leader [[Ho Chi Minh]], who was widely admired as a Vietnamese patriot. A 1954 report by the CIA qualifiedly stated that if nationwide elections scheduled for 1956 by the recent [[Geneva Conference (1954)|Geneva Accords]] were held, Ho's party "the [[Viet Minh]] will almost certainly win."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 431. Earlier Eisenhower, supported by another CIA report, had rejected immediate American military intervention and the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Ranelagh (at 776, n11) refers to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Communist reaction to certain US courses of action with respect to Indochina" (June 1954).</ref><ref>CIA National Intelligence Estimate of August 3, 1954, referenced by the [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] in its 12-volume edition of ''United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967'' (Washington: Government Printing Office [1972]) p. 10: 697. This once-secret DOD study became known as the [[Pentagon Papers]] after portions began to appear in ''The New York Times'' starting in June 1971. The multi-volume edition is quoted by Len Ackland in his ''Credibility Gap. A digest of the Pentagon Papers'' (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee 1972) p. 33 (1954 CIA estimate), at "introduction" (1971 ''NYT'' leak).</ref><ref>Cf., [[David Halberstam]], ''Ho'' (New York: Random House 1971; reprint McGraw-Hill 1987) pp. 60–64, 103–104, 106–107.</ref> The nationwide elections were avoided. According to 1959 reports, the CIA saw Diem as "the best anticommunist bet" if he undertook reforms, but also stated that Diem consistently avoided reform.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 431–432, quote at 431.</ref><ref>CIA National Intelligence Estimate of May 26, 1959: "Diem's regime reflects his ideas. A façade of representative government is maintained, but the government is in fact essentially authoritarian." [Defense Department], ''United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967'' (Washington [1972]) pp. 10: 1192, cited by Ackland, ''Credibility Gap'' (1972) p. 42.</ref>

[[File:Coat of Arms of South Vietnam (1954 - 1955).svg|thumb|150px|[[Emblem of Vietnam|Coat of arms of South Vietnam]]]]
As the political situation progressed during the 1960s and American involvement grew, subsequent CIA reports crafted by its analysts continued to trend pessimistic regarding the prospects for South Vietnam.<ref>Cf., Turner (2005) pp. 109–110.</ref> "Vietnam may have been a policy failure. It was not an intelligence failure."<ref>Senate [Church] (1976) pp. 268–269, statement by the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Edward Procter in 1975, but "the pessimistic CIA estimate on Vietnam had little or no effect on U.S. policy decisions there."</ref> The CIA eventually became sharply divided over the issue. Those active in CIA operations in Vietnam, e.g., [[Lucien Conein]], and [[William Colby]], adopted a robust optimism regarding the outcome of their contentious projects. Teamwork in dangerous circumstances, and social cohesion among such operatives in the field, worked to reinforce and intensify their positive views.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 161–162, 278–280.</ref><ref>Cf., William Colby, ''Lost Victory. A firsthand account of America's sixteen-year involvement in Vietnam'' (Chicago: Contemporary Books 1989).</ref>

"At no time was the institutional dichotomy between the operational and analytic components more stark."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 81.</ref><ref>Cf., [[Richard Helms, early career]], section "Elephant and Gorilla".</ref> Helms later described the predicament at CIA as follows.

<blockquote>From the outset, the intelligence directorate and the Office of National Estimates held a pessimistic view of the military developments. The operations personnel—going full blast ... in South Vietnam—remained convinced the war could be won. Without this conviction, the operators could not have continued their difficult face-to-face work with the South Vietnamese, whose lives were often at risk. In Washington, I felt like a circus rider standing astride two horses, each for the best of reasons going its own way.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 311 (quote); 321.</ref><ref>See section above "Elephant and Gorilla".</ref></blockquote>

Negative news would prove to be highly unwelcome at the Johnson White House. "After each setback the CIA would gain little by saying 'I told you so' or by continuing to emphasize the futility of the war," author Ranelagh writes about the CIA predicament.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 446.</ref> In part it was DCI McCone's worrisome reports and unwelcome views about Vietnam that led to his exclusion from President Johnson's inner circle; consequently, McCone resigned in 1965. Helms remembered that McCone left the CIA because "he was dissatisfied with his relation with President Johnson. He didn't get to see him enough, and he didn't feel that he had any impact."<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 106–111, Helms quote at 111.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 421–423.</ref>

Helms' institutional memory probably contested for influence over his own decisions as DCI when he later served under Johnson. According to CIA intelligence officer [[Ray Cline]], "Up to about 1965/66, estimates were not seriously biased in any direction." As American political commitment to Vietnam surged under Johnson, however, "the pressure to give the right answer came along," stated Cline. "I felt increasing pressure to say the war was winnable."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 452.</ref>