Editing Russian Ground Forces (section)

=== Post-Soviet reform plans ===
The [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]] newspaper ''[[Krasnaya Zvezda]]'' published a reform plan on 21 July 1992. Later one commentator said it was "hastily" put together by the General Staff "to satisfy the public demand for radical changes."<ref name="Baev 1996">{{Cite book
  | last = Baev
  | first = Pavel
  | title = The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles
  | publisher = Sage Publications
  | location = Oslo
  | year = 1996
  | page = [https://archive.org/details/russianarmyintim00baev/page/67 67]
  | isbn = 978-0-7619-5187-2
  | series = International Peace Research Institute
  | url = https://archive.org/details/russianarmyintim00baev/page/67
  }}</ref> The [[General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation|General Staff]], from that point, became a bastion of conservatism, causing a build-up of troubles that later became critical. The reform plan advocated a change from an Army-Division-Regiment structure to a Corps-Brigade arrangement. The new structures were to be more capable in a situation with no front line, and more capable of independent action at all levels.<ref name="dick1993">{{Cite journal
  | last = Dick
  | first = Charles
  | title = Russian Views on Future War—Part 3
  | journal = Jane's Intelligence Review
  | date = November 1993
  | page = 488
  | publisher = IHS Jane's
  | issn = 1350-6226}}</ref>

Cutting out a level of command, omitting two out of three higher echelons between the theatre headquarters and the fighting battalions, would produce economies, increase flexibility, and simplify command-and-control arrangements.<ref name="dick1993" /> The expected changeover to the new structure proved to be rare, irregular, and sometimes reversed. The new brigades that appeared were mostly divisions that had broken down until they happened to be at the proposed brigade strengths. New divisions—such as the new [[3rd Motor Rifle Division]] in the [[Moscow Military District]], formed on the basis of disbanding tank formations—were formed, rather than new brigades.

Few of the reforms planned in the early 1990s eventuated, for three reasons: Firstly, there was an absence of firm civilian political guidance, with President Yeltsin primarily interested in ensuring that the Armed Forces were controllable and loyal, rather than reformed.<ref name="Baev 1996"/>{{sfn|Arbatov|1998|page=112}} Secondly, declining funding worsened the progress. Finally, there was no firm consensus within the military about what reforms should be implemented. General [[Pavel Grachev]], the first Russian Minister of Defence (1992–96), broadly advertised reforms, yet wished to preserve the old Soviet-style Army, with large numbers of low-strength formations and continued mass conscription. The General Staff and the armed services tried to preserve Soviet-era doctrines, deployments, weapons, and missions in the absence of solid new guidance.{{sfn|Arbatov|1998|page=113}}

British military expert Michael Orr claims that the hierarchy had great difficulty in fully understanding the changed situation, due to their education. As graduates of [[Military academies in Russia|Soviet military academies]], they received great operational and staff training, but in political terms they had learned an ideology, rather than a wide understanding of international affairs. Thus, the generals—focused on [[Enlargement of NATO|NATO expansion]] in Eastern Europe—could not adapt themselves and the Armed Forces to the new opportunities and challenges they faced.{{sfn|Orr|2003|pages=2-3}}