Editing Second Happy Time (section)

===American deficiencies===
[[File:Noblackout.gif|thumb|Animation simulating a tanker silhouetted against lights of a city. When partial blackouts were introduced towards the middle of 1942, [[skyglow]] continued to be a problem in coastal cities.]]
The American response in early 1942 was hampered by poor organization and doctrine, and a lack of [[anti-submarine warfare]] (ASW) aircraft, ships, and personnel.

The USN entered the war without the equivalent of the British {{sclass|Black Swan|sloop|0}} [[Sloop-of-war|sloop]] or the {{sclass2|River|frigate}} despite previous involvement in the Atlantic (see {{USS|Reuben James|DD-245|6}}.) The massive new naval construction program prioritized other types of ships. Fleet destroyers did not have the qualities for ASW; the ideal ASW escort had relatively low speed; carried a large number of depth charges; was highly maneuverable; and had long endurance.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} The 50 World War I-era [[destroyer]]s transferred to Britain in the 1941 [[Destroyers for Bases Agreement]] would have been poor ASW escorts, even had they been retained, due to poor maneuverability.<ref>Gannon 1990. p. 238</ref>

The USN had some destroyers available on the east coast at the time of the first attacks. It had previously recalled at least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers, including seven at anchor in [[New York Harbor]]. It initially refused to use them as escorts even as losses mounted.<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p238}} When the first destroyers were finally released, their employment was hampered by poor doctrine. They were assigned to offensive patrols rather than escorting convoys due to public and political pressure. As late as March, USN escort doctrine was aggressive with an emphasis on destroying attackers, rather than stopping losses.<ref>Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("In the absence of proper escort vessels...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}} The option of pressing small civilian ships into service as rudimentary convoy escorts in early 1942 was not exercised.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("The establishment of a convoy system...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}

Even if escorts had been available, the USN was unprepared to perform "Naval Control of Shipping" (NCS), the control and tracking of shipping (in convoy or sailing independently), although it had already received the reference material from Canada. Without escorts, the US could not take advantage of the existing Allied NCS. For shipping in the western Atlantic north of the equator, NCS was handled by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] (RCN) since the start of the war; the RCN only passed the responsibility to the USN in July 1942.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs"/>

Operationally, the USN's ASW effort was fragmented. In theory, Admiral King was responsible for coordinating all ASW activities, including the development of doctrine. In practice, King's many other responsibilities prevented him from doing an adequate job. Therefore, the three Atlantic operational commands – the Atlantic Fleet, the [[Eastern Sea Frontier]], and the [[Sea Frontier|Gulf Sea Frontier]] – were left to develop their own ASW tactics individually.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_us_asw">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("The U-boat campaign in American waters...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}} The issue was not resolved until May 1943 with the formation of the [[United States Tenth Fleet]].<ref name="milner_2011_ch7_us10">Milner (2011): chapter 7 ("His moves did not go unnoticed.")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}

British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to their shipping during the [[First Happy Time]] confirmed that ships sailing in [[convoy]] – with or without escort – were far safer than ships sailing alone. The British recommended that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal [[Blackout (wartime)|blackout]] be enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility. For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors.<ref name=Gannon/> {{rp|p186}}

The primary target area was the Eastern Sea Frontier, commanded by Rear-Admiral [[Adolphus Andrews]] and covering the area from [[Maine]] to [[North Carolina]]. Andrews had practically no modern forces to work with: on the water he commanded seven [[United States Coast Guard|Coast Guard]] [[United States Coast Guard Cutter|cutters]], four converted yachts, three 1919-vintage [[patrol boat]]s, two [[gunboat]]s dating back to 1905, and four wooden [[submarine chaser]]s. About 100 aircraft were available, but these were short-range models only suitable for training. As a consequence of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the USN and the [[United States Army Air Forces|Army Air Forces]], all larger aircraft remained under USAAF control, and in any case the USAAF was neither trained nor equipped for ASW.<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p182}}