Editing Self-deception (section)

===Analysis===
The traditional paradigm of self-deception is modeled after ''interpersonal'' deception, where ''A'' intentionally gets ''B'' to believe some proposition ''p'', all the while knowing or believing truly ¬''p'' (not ''p'').<ref name="stanford"/> Such deception is intentional and requires the deceiver to know or believe ¬''p'' and the deceived to believe ''p''. On this traditional mode, self-deceivers must (1) hold contradictory beliefs and (2) intentionally get themselves to hold a belief they know or believe truly to be false.<ref name="stanford">{{Cite SEP |url-id=self-deception |title=Self-Deception |last=Deweese-Boyd|first= Ian}}</ref>

The process of [[rationalization (psychology)|rationalization]], however, can obscure the intent of self-deception. Brian McLaughlin illustrates that such rationalizations in certain circumstances permit the phenomenon. When a person, who disbelieves ''p'', intentionally tries to make himself believe or continue believing ''p'' by engaging in such activities, and, as a result unintentionally misleads himself into believing or continuing to believe ''p'' via biased thinking, he deceives himself in a way appropriate for self-deception. No deceitful intention is required for this.<ref>"Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief" by Brian P. McLaughlin. [[PhilPapers]]: [http://philpapers.org/rec/MCLETP MCLETP]</ref>