Editing Sense and reference (section)

==Sense and description==
In his [[theory of descriptions]], [[Bertrand Russell]] held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised [[definite description]]s. For example, 'Aristotle' can be understood as "The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander", or by some other uniquely applying description. This is known as the [[descriptivist theory of names]]. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. Thus Russell's theory of descriptions was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century this "Frege–Russell" view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics. [[Saul Kripke]] argued influentially against the descriptivist theory, asserting that proper names are [[rigid designator]]s which designate the same object in every possible world.<ref>Kripke, S. A., ''Naming and Necessity'' (Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press]], 1980), [https://books.google.com/books?id=9vvAlOBfq0kC&pg=PA48&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false pp. 48-49].</ref>{{rp|48–49}} Descriptions, however, such as "the President of the U.S. in 1969" do not designate the same entity in every possible world. For example, someone other than [[Richard Nixon]], e.g. [[Hubert H. Humphrey]], might have been the President in 1969. Hence a description (or cluster of descriptions) cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot ''mean'' the same as a description.<ref>Kripke, S. A., ''Naming and Necessity'' (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), [https://books.google.com/books?id=9vvAlOBfq0kC&pg=PA49&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false p. 49].</ref>{{rp|49}}

However, the Russellian descriptivist reading of Frege has been rejected by many scholars, in particular by [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] in ''The Varieties of Reference''<ref>{{cite book|last=Evans|first=Gareth|title=The Varieties of Reference|year=1982|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|editor=John McDowell}}</ref> and by [[John McDowell]] in "The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name",<ref>{{cite journal|last=McDowell|first=John|title=On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name|journal=Mind|date=April 1977|volume=86|series=New Series|issue=342}}</ref> following [[Michael Dummett]], who argued that Frege's notion of sense should not be equated with a description. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. He and McDowell both take the line that Frege's discussion of empty names, and of the idea of sense without reference, are inconsistent, and that his apparent endorsement of descriptivism rests only on a small number of imprecise and perhaps offhand remarks. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction ''does'' have (i.e., to solve at least the first two problems), even if it is not given a descriptivist reading.