Editing Situated cognition (section)

==Key principles==
===Affordances/effectivities===
[[James J. Gibson]] introduced the idea of [[affordance]]s as part of a relational account of perception.<ref>Gibson, 1977</ref> Perception should not be considered solely as the encoding of environmental features into the perceiver's mind, but as an element of an individual's interaction with her environment (Gibson, 1977). Central to his proposal of an ecological psychology was the notion of affordances. Gibson proposed that in any interaction between an agent and the environment, inherent conditions or qualities of the environment allow the agent to perform certain actions with the environment.<ref name="Greeno, 1994">Greeno, 1994</ref> He defined the term as properties in the environment that presented possibilities for action and were available for an agent to perceive directly and act upon.<ref name="Gibson 1979/1986">Gibson 1979/1986</ref>
Gibson focused on the affordances of physical objects, such as doorknobs and chairs, and suggested that these affordances were directly perceived by an individual instead of mediated by mental representations such as mental models. It is important to note that Gibson's notion of direct perception as an unmediated process of noticing, perceiving, and encoding specific attributes from the environment, has long been challenged by proponents of a more category-based model of perception.{{who|date=May 2020}}

This focus on agent-situation interactions in ecological psychology was consistent with the situated cognition program of researchers such as James G. Greeno (1994, 1998), who appreciated Gibson's apparent rejection of the factoring assumptions underlying experimental psychology. The situated cognition perspective focused on "perception-action instead of memory and retrieval…A perceiving/acting agent is coupled with a developing/adapting environment and what matters is how the two interact".<ref>Young, Kulikowich, & Barab, 1997, p.&nbsp;139</ref> Greeno (1994) also suggested that affordances are "preconditions for activity," and that while they do not determine behavior, they increase the likelihood that a certain action or behavior will occur.

Shaw, Turvey, & Mace (as cited by Greeno, 1994) later introduced the term effectivities, the abilities of the agent that determined what the agent could do, and consequently, the interaction that could take place. Perception and action were co-determined by the effectivities and affordances, which acted 'in the moment' together.<ref>Gibson 1979/1986; Greeno, 1994; Young et al., 1997</ref> Therefore, the agent directly perceived and interacted with the environment, determining what affordances could be picked up, based on his effectivities. This view is consistent with Norman's (1988) theory of "perceived affordances," which emphasizes the agent's perception of an object's utility as opposed to focusing on the object itself.

An interesting question is the relationship between affordances and mental representations as set forth in a more cognitivist perspective. While Greeno (1998) argues that attunements to affordances are superior to constructs such as [[Schema (psychology)|schemata]] and mental models, Glenberg & Robertson (1999) suggested that affordances are the building blocks of mental models.

===Perception (variance/invariance)===
The work of Gibson (1986) in the field of visual [[perception]] greatly influences situated cognition.<ref name="Greeno, 1994"/> Gibson argued that visual perception is not a matter of the eye translating inputs into symbolic representation in the brain. Instead the viewer perceives and picks up on the infinite amount of information available in the environment. Specifically, an agent perceives affordances by discovering the variants, what changes, and more importantly the invariants, what does not change across different situations. Given a specific intention (or intentional set),{{clarify|date=October 2011}} perceptions of invariants are co-determined by the agent and the affordances of the environment, and are then built upon over time.{{clarify|date=October 2011}}

===Memory===
Situated cognition and ecological psychology perspectives emphasize perception and propose that [[memory]] plays a significantly diminished role in the learning process. Rather, focus is on the continuous tuning of perceptions and actions across situations based on the affordances of the environment and the interaction of the agent within that environment (Greeno, 1994). Representations are not stored and checked against past knowledge, but are created and interpreted in activity (Clancey, 1990).

Situated cognition understands memory as an interaction with the world, bounded by meaningful situations, that brings an agent toward a specified goal (intention). Thus, perception and action are co-determined by the effectivities and affordances, which act 'in the moment' together.<ref>Gibson 1979/1986; Greeno, 1994; Young Kulikowich, & Barab, 1997</ref> Therefore, the agent directly perceives and interacts with the environment, determining what affordances can be picked up, based on his effectivities, and does not simply recall stored symbolic representations.

===Knowing===
Situativity theorists recast knowledge not as an entity, thing, or noun, but as knowing as an action or verb.<ref name="Greeno, 1994"/> It is not an entity which can be collected as in knowledge acquisition models. Instead knowing is reciprocally co-determined between the agent and environment.<ref name="br2006">Barab & Roth, 2006</ref> This reciprocal interaction can not be separated from the context and its cultural and historical constructions.<ref name=":0" />  Therefore, knowing isn't a matter of arriving at any single truth but instead it is a particular stance that emerges from the agent-environment interaction.<ref name="br2006" />

Knowing emerges as individuals develop intentions<ref>Young, 1997</ref> through goal-directed activities within cultural contexts which may in turn have larger goals and claims of truth. The adoption of intentions relates to the direction of the agent's attention to the detection of affordances in the environment that will lead to accomplishment of desired goals. Knowing is expressed in the agent's ability to act as an increasingly competent participant in a community of practice. As agents participate more fully within specific communities of practice, what constitutes knowing continuously evolves.<ref name=":0" />  For example, a novice environmentalist may not look at water quality by examining oxygen levels but may consider the color and smell.<ref name="br2006" /> Through participation and enculturation within different communities, agents express knowing through action.

===Learning===
Since knowing is rooted in action and can not be decontextualized from individual, social, and historical goals<ref name="br2006" /> teaching approaches that focus on conveying facts and rules separately from the contexts within which they are meaningful in real-life do not allow for [[learning]] that is based on the detection of invariants. They are therefore considered to be impoverished methods that are unlikely to lead to transfer. Learning must involve more than the transmission of knowledge but must instead encourage the expression of effectivities and the development of attention and intention<ref>Young, 2004b</ref> through rich contexts<ref>Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1990</ref> that reflect real life learning processes.<ref name=":0" />

Learning, more specifically literacy learning is affected by the Internet and other communication technologies as also evidenced in other segments of society. As a result of this, youth are recently using affordances provided by these tools to become experts in a variety of domains.<ref name="Gee, 2010">Gee, 2010</ref> These practices by youth are viewed as them becoming "pro-ams" and becoming experts in whatever they have developed a passion for.<ref>Anderson, 2006; Leadbeater & Miller, 2004</ref>

===Language===
Individuals don't just read or write texts, they interact with them, and often these interactions involve others in various socio-cultural contexts. Since [[language]] is often the basis for monitoring and tracking learning gains in comprehension, content knowledge, and tool use in and out of school, the role of situated cognition in language learning activities is important. Membership and interaction in social and cultural groups is often determined by tools, technologies and [[discourse]] use for full participation. Language learning or literacy in various social and cultural groups must include how the groups work with and interact with these texts.<ref name="Gee, 2010"/> Language instruction in the context of situated cognition also involves the skilled or novice use of language by members of the group, and instruction of not only the elements of language, but what is needed to bring a student to the level of expert. Originating from emergent literacy,<ref>Dickinson & Neuman, 2006; Gee, 2004</ref> specialist-language lessons examines the formal and informal styles and discourses of language use in socio-cultural contexts.<ref>Gee, 2004; Gee, 2007</ref> A function of specialist-language lessons includes "lucidly functional language", or complex specialist language is usually accompanied by clear and lucid language used to explain the rules, relationships or meanings existing between language and meaning.<ref name="Gee, 2010"/>

===Legitimate peripheral participation===
According to [[Jean Lave]] and Wenger (1991) [[legitimate peripheral participation]] (LPP) provides a framework to describe how individuals ('newcomers') become part of a community of learners. Legitimate peripheral participation was central to Lave and Wenger's take on situated cognition (referred to as "situated activity") because it introduced socio-cultural and historical realizations of power and access to the way thinking and knowing are legitimated. They stated, "Hegemony over resources for learning and alienation from full participation are inherent in the shaping of the legitimacy and peripherality of participation in its historical realizations" (p.&nbsp;42). Lave and Wenger's (1991) research on the phenomenon of apprenticeship in communities of practice not only provided a unit of analysis for locating an individual's multiple, changing levels and ways of participation, but also implied that all participants, through increased involvement, have access to, acquire, and use resources available to their particular community.

To illustrate the role of LPP in situated activity, Lave and Wenger (1991) examined five apprenticeship scenarios (Yucatec midwives, Vai and Gola tailors, naval quartermasters, meat cutters, and non-drinking alcoholics involved in AA). Their analysis of apprenticeship across five different communities of learners lead them to several conclusions about the situatedness of LPP and its relationship to successful learning. Key to newcomers' success included:

* access to all that community membership entails,
* involvement in productive activity,
* learning the discourse(s) of the community including "talking about and talking within a practice," (p.&nbsp;109), and
* willingness of the community to capitalize on the inexperience of newcomers, "Insofar as this continual interaction of new perspectives is sanctioned, everyone's participation is legitimately peripheral in some respect. In other words, everyone can to some degree be considered a 'newcomer' to the future of a changing community" <ref name=":0" />

=== Planning vs. action ===
Suchman's book, ''Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-machine Communication'' (1987), provided a novel approach to the study of [[Human–computer interaction|human-computer interaction (HCI)]]. By adopting an anthropological approach to sensemaking and interpretation, Suchman was able to demonstrate how both action and planning were situated in the context of a flow of socially- and materially-mediated activities - an idea that stimulated many of the later conceptualizations of situated cognition. Her studies contrasted the deterministic approach to planning assumed by technology designers with the situated nature of planning as people make sense of the status of their workflow and adjust their course of action accordingly. For example, a photocopier will instruct its user to reload all pages in the original order after a jam, whereas the user understands that they only need to copy the last page again.  By arguing that plans were the result of ongoing processes of prospective/retrospective sense making, Suchman identified the limits of technology system access to relevant social and material resources as a major cause of limitations in how technology supports human work.<ref name=":1" />

This position led to a major debate with Vera and Simon (1993), who argued that cognition is based on symbolic representations and that planning must therefore be deterministic, based on a pre-determined repertoire of learned response. Most organizational theorists would now see this debate as reflecting individual/cognitive vs. socially-situated levels of analysis (requiring a similar need for paradigmatic co-existence as [[Wave–particle duality]]). Suchman (1993) argues that planning in the context of work-activity is similar to navigating a canoe through rapids: you know what point on the river you are aiming for, but you constantly adjust your course as you interact with rocks, swells, and currents on the way. As a result, many organizational theorists argue that plans can only be viewed as post-hoc justifications of action, while Suchman herself appears to view plans and actions as interrelated in the moment of action.<ref name=":2" />

===Representation, symbols, and schemata===
In situated theories, the term "[[Mental representation|representation]]" refers to external forms in the environment that are created through social interactions to express meaning (language, art, gestures, etc.) and are perceived and acted upon in the first person sense. "Representing" in the first person sense is conceived as an act of re-experiencing in the imagination that involves the dialectic of ongoing perceiving and acting in coordination with the activation of neural structures and processes. This form of reflective representation is considered to be a secondary type of learning, while the primary form of learning is found in the "adaptive recoordination that occurs with every behavior".<ref name="clancey1993">Clancey, 1993</ref> Conceptualizing is considered to be a "prelinguistic" act, while "knowing" involves creative interaction with [[symbol]]s in both their interpretation and use for expression. "Schema" develop as neural connections become biased through repeated activations to reactivate in situations that are perceived and conceived as temporally and compositionally similar to previous generalized situations.<ref name="clancey1993" />

===Goals, intention, and attention===
[[File:PS Dynamics.jpg|thumb|left|Young-Barab Model (1997)]]The Young-Barab Model (1997) pictured to the left, illustrates the dynamics of intentions and intentional dynamics involved in the agent's interaction with his environment when problem solving.

Dynamics of Intentions:<ref name=ksy>Kugler et al., 1991; Shaw et al., 1992; Young et al., 1997</ref> goal (intention) adoption from among all possible goals (ontological descent). This describes how the learner decides whether or not to adopt a particular goal when presented with a problem. Once a goal is adopted, the learner proceeds by interacting with their environment through intentional dynamics. There are many levels of intentions, but at the moment of a particular occasion, the agent has just one intention, and that intention constrains his behavior until it is fulfilled or annihilated.

Intentional Dynamics:<ref name=ksy /> dynamics that unfold when the agent has only one intention (goal) and begins to act towards it, perceiving and acting.<ref name="Gibson 1979/1986"/> It is a trajectory towards the achievement of a solution or goal, the process of tuning one's perception (attention). Each intention is meaningfully bounded, where the dynamics of that intention inform the agent of whether or not he is getting closer to achieving his goal. If the agent is not getting closer to his goal, he will take corrective action, and then continue forward. This is the agent's intentional dynamics, and continues on until he achieves his goal.

===Transfer===
There are various definition of transfer found within the situated cognition umbrella. Researchers interested in social practice often define transfer as increased participation.<ref name=":0" />  Ecological psychology perspectives define transfer as the detection of invariance across different situations.<ref>Young & McNeese, 1995</ref> Furthermore, transfer can only "occur when there is a confluence of an individual's goals and objectives, their acquired abilities to act, and a set of affordances for action".<ref>Young et al., 1997, p.&nbsp;147</ref>

===Embodied cognition===
{{main|Embodied cognition}}
The traditional cognition approach assumes that perception and motor systems are merely peripheral input and output devices.<ref>Niedenthal, 2007; Wilson, 2002</ref> However, [[embodied cognition]] posits that the mind and body interact 'on the fly' as a single entity. An example of embodied cognition is seen in the area of robotics, where movements are not based on internal representations, rather, they are based on the robot's direct and immediate interaction with its environment.<ref>Wilson, 2002</ref> Additionally, research has shown that embodied facial expressions influence judgments,<ref>Niedenthal, 2007</ref> and arm movements are related to a person's evaluation of a word or concept.<ref>Markman, & Brendl, 2005</ref> In the latter example, the individual would pull or push a lever towards his name at a faster rate for positive words, than for negative words. These results appeal to the embodied nature of situated cognition, where knowledge is the achievement of the whole body in its interaction with the world.