Editing Socratic method (section)

===Scholarly debate===
In Plato's early dialogues, the elenchus is the technique Socrates uses to investigate, for example, the nature or definition of [[ethical]] concepts such as justice or virtue. According to [[Gregory Vlastos]], it has the following steps:<ref>Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus", ''Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy I'', Oxford 1983, 27–58.</ref>

# Socrates' [[Interlocutor (linguistics)|interlocutor]] asserts a thesis, for example "Courage is endurance of the soul".
# Socrates decides whether the thesis is false and targets for refutation.
# Socrates secures his interlocutor's agreement to further premises, for example "Courage is a fine thing" and "Ignorant endurance is not a fine thing".
# Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, these further premises imply the contrary of the original thesis; in this case, it leads to: "courage is not endurance of the soul".
# Socrates then claims he has shown his interlocutor's thesis is false and its negation is true.

One elenctic examination can lead to a new, more refined, examination of the concept being considered, in this case it invites an examination of the claim: "Courage is {{em|wise}} endurance of the soul". Most Socratic inquiries consist of a series of {{wikt-lang|la|elenchi}} and typically end in puzzlement known as {{lang|la|[[aporia]]}}.

[[Michael Frede]] points out Vlastos' conclusion in step No. 5 above makes nonsense of the [[aporetic]] nature of the early dialogues. Having shown a proposed thesis is false is insufficient to conclude some other competing thesis must be true. Rather, the interlocutors have reached [[aporia]], an improved state of still not knowing what to say about the subject under discussion.<ref>Michael Frede, "Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form", ''Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy'', Supplementary Volume 1992, Oxford 1992, 201–19.</ref>

The exact nature of the elenchus is subject to a great deal of debate, in particular concerning whether it is a positive method, leading to knowledge, or a negative method used solely to refute false claims to knowledge.<ref>Stephen Salkever, [http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.05.09.html "Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160912224610/http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.05.09.html |date=12 September 2016 }} ([[Bryn Mawr Classical Review]])</ref> Some qualitative research shows that the use of the Socratic method within a traditional [[Yeshiva]] [[Jewish education|education]] setting helps students succeed in [[law school]], although it remains an open question as to whether that relationship is causal or merely correlative.<ref>
{{cite journal | last1=Klein |first1=Reuven Chaim |date=March 1, 2024 |title=A qualitative study on how traditional Yeshiva education prepares students for law school | url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03069400.2023.2296811 |journal=The Law Teacher |volume=58 |issue=1 |pages=111–130 |doi=10.17613/b462-fp41}}
</ref>

Yet, [[W. K. C. Guthrie]] in ''The Greek Philosophers'' sees it as an error to regard the Socratic method as a means by which one seeks the answer to a problem, or knowledge. Guthrie claims that the Socratic method actually aims to demonstrate one's ignorance. Socrates, unlike the [[Sophists]], did believe that knowledge was possible, but believed that the first step to knowledge was recognition of one's ignorance. Guthrie writes, "[Socrates] was accustomed to say that he did not himself know anything, and that the only way in which he was wiser than other men was that he was conscious of his own ignorance, while they were not. The essence of the Socratic method is to convince the interlocutor that whereas he thought he knew something, in fact he does not."<ref>[[W. K. C. Guthrie]] (1968) ''The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle'', page 74, London: Routledge.</ref>