Editing Strategic voting (section)

==Mitigation==
Switching from a method that is highly manipulable to one that is more resistant would help discourage widespread strategic voting, all else equal.

From a voting method, it's possible to design another voting method that attempts to strategize on behalf of the voter. Such methods are called ''declared strategy voting'' methods, and seek to improve a method's strategy resistance by moving the strategy into the method itself. DSV methods have been proposed for [[plurality voting]], [[approval voting]], and [[score voting]].<ref name="Cranor">{{Cite thesis |last=Cranor |first=Lorrie Faith |title=Declared-strategy voting: an instrument for group decision-making |date=1996 |degree=PhD |publisher=Washington University |url=https://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/diss/ |place=USA}}</ref><ref name="RLDSV1">{{Cite thesis |last=Legrand |first=Robert Hampton |title=Computational aspects of approval voting and declared-strategy voting |date=2008 |degree=PhD |publisher=Washington University |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/1467782 |place=USA}}</ref><ref name="RLDSV2">{{Cite conference |last1=Legrand |first1=Robert Hampton |last2=Cytron |first2=Ron K. |title=Approval-rating systems that never reward insincerity |conference=COMSOC-2008: 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social Choice |conference-url=https://comsoc-community.org/proceedings/2008/ |url=https://comsoc-community.org/assets/proceedings/comsoc-2008/LeGrand.pdf |year=2008}}</ref>