Editing Taylor Report (section)

===Police control===
Taylor found there was "no provision" for controlling the entry of spectators into the turnstile area. Questioned why more action had not been taken to screen individuals and improve the flow of supporters approaching the stadium from the west "where the turnstile area was so small and awkwardly laid out", senior police officers responded that policy and practice had been no different from in the past, and they had no reason to anticipate problems as earlier events had proceeded without major incident. In fact, Taylor noted only two occasions when the entry at Leppings Lane had been the sole access to the north and west sides of the ground, at the 1987 and 1988 semi-finals, with evidence of congestion at both, but owing to good fortune and circumstance police policy "was not put to the same test and strain as a year later".

<blockquote>The senior police officers said it had never happened before so there was no reason to foresee it. In fact, the only two previous occasions when the Leppings Lane terraces had been used to fill the whole of the north and west sides of the ground were at the two semi-finals, in 1987 and 1988. In 1987, the match was on a Sunday scheduled for 12 noon, and kick-off was postponed for a quarter of an hour because of late arrivals.<ref name="taylor 36">Taylor (1989), p. 36.</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The need to open gate C was due to dangerous congestion at the turnstiles. That occurred because, as both Club and police should have realised, the turnstile area could not easily cope with the large numbers demanded of it unless they arrived steadily over a lengthy period. The Operational Order and police tactics on the day failed to provide for controlling a concentrated arrival of large numbers should that occur in a short period. That it might so occur was foreseeable and it did.<ref name="taylor 47">Taylor (1989), p. 47.</ref></blockquote>

As a result of the inadequate number of turnstiles, it has been calculated that it would have taken until 3:40&nbsp;pm to get all ticket holders into the Leppings Lane end had an exit gate not been opened. Gate C was opened to let fans in, but the number of fans entering the terrace was not thought to have been more than the capacity of the entire standing area. Once inside the stadium, most fans entering the terraces headed for the central pens 3 and 4, as directed by a large sign above the access tunnel.

<blockquote>Since pens 3 and 4 were full by 2.50&nbsp;pm, the tunnel should have been closed off whether gate C was to be opened or not. ... [I]t should have been clear in the control room where there was a view of the pens and of the crowd at the turnstiles that the tunnel had to be closed. If orders had been given to that effect when gate C was opened, the fans could have been directed to the empty areas of the wings and this disaster could still have been avoided. Failure to give that order was a blunder of the first magnitude.<ref name="taylor 40">Taylor (1989), p. 40.</ref></blockquote>

Standard procedure for league fixtures was to estimate the size of the visiting fan base, determine how many enclosures need to be opened, then fill each standing area one at a time.<ref name="taylor 30">Taylor (1989), p. 30.</ref> For all-ticket games that had sold out, such as semi-final matches, a different approach was adopted whereby supporters were allowed to enter any enclosure they wished upon arrival. There was no mechanical or electronic means for calculating when individual enclosures had reached capacity. A police officer made a visual assessment before guiding fans to other pens.<ref name="taylor 23">Taylor (1989), p. 23.</ref>

<blockquote>Whilst in theory the police would intervene if a pen became "full", in practice they permitted the test of fullness to be what the fans would tolerate. By 2.52&nbsp;pm when gate C was opened, pens 3 and 4 were over-full even by this test. Many were uncomfortable. To allow any more into those pens was likely to cause injuries; to allow in a large stream was courting disaster.<ref name="taylor 32">Taylor (1989), p. 32.</ref></blockquote>

The official combined capacity of the central pens was 2,200, but the [[Health and Safety Executive]] found this should have been reduced to 1,693 as crush barriers and perimeter gates did not conform to the ''Green Guide''.<ref name="taylor 24">Taylor (1989), p. 24.</ref> It is estimated that more than 3,000 people were in the pens shortly after kick off at 3:00&nbsp;pm. Overcrowding caused the fatal crush.

<blockquote>When spectators first appeared on the track, the immediate assumption in the control room was that a pitch invasion was threatened. This was unlikely at the beginning of a match. It became still less likely when those on the track made no move towards the pitch. ... [T]here was no effective leadership either from control or on the pitch to harness and organise rescue efforts. No orders were given for officers to enter the tunnel and relieve pressure.<ref name="taylor 44">Taylor (1989), p. 44.</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The anxiety to protect the sanctity of the pitch has caused insufficient attention to be paid to the risk of a crush due to overcrowding. Certain it was, that once the crush occurred on 15 April gates 3 and 4 were wholly inadequate for rescue purposes.<ref name="taylor 46">Taylor (1989), p. 46.</ref></blockquote>

Lord Taylor regarded spectator allocation irrelevant to the disaster. "I do not consider choice of ends was causative of the disaster. Had it been reversed, the disaster could well have occurred in a similar manner but to Nottingham supporters."<ref name="taylor 49">Taylor (1989), p. 49.</ref>