Editing Transferred intent (section)

=== In the United Kingdom ===
In the UK the transferred malice doctrine is not without controversy. The [[House of Lords]] in ''Attorney General's Reference  No  3  of  1994''<ref>{{cite BAILII
 | litigants = Attorney General's Reference No 3 of 1994
 | link = 
 | country = uk
 | court = UKHL
 | division = 
 | year = 1997
 | num = 31
 | para = 
 | eucase = 
 | parallelcite = [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 91, [1997] 3 All ER 936, [1997] 3 WLR 421, [1997] Crim LR 829, [1998] AC 245
 | date = 24 July 1997
 | courtname = [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]]
 | juris = 
 }}</ref> reversed the [[Court of Appeal of England and Wales|Court of Appeal]] decision (reported at (1996) 2 WLR 412), holding that the doctrine of transferred malice could not apply to convict an accused of [[murder in English law|murder]] when the defendant had stabbed a pregnant woman in the face, back and abdomen. Some days after she was released from hospital in an apparently stable condition, she went into labour and gave birth to a premature child, who died four months later. The child had been wounded in the original attack but the more substantial cause of death was her prematurity. It was argued that the [[fetus]] was part of the mother so that any intention to cause [[grievous bodily harm]] (GBH) to the mother was also an intent aimed at the fetus. Lord Mustill criticised the doctrine as having no sound intellectual basis, saying that it was related to the original concept of malice, i.e. that a wrongful act displayed a malevolence which could be attached to any adverse consequence, and this had long been out of date. Nevertheless, it would sometimes provide a justification to convict when that was a common sense outcome and so could sensibly be retained. The present case was not a simple "transfer" from mother to uterine child, but sought to create an intention to cause injury to the child after birth. This would be a double transfer: first from the mother to the fetus, and then from the fetus to the child when it was born. Then one would have to apply the fiction which converts an intention to commit GBH into the ''mens rea'' of murder. That was too much. But the accused could be convicted of [[manslaughter in English law|manslaughter]].

In ''[[R v Gnango]]'', the [[Supreme Court of the United Kingdom|Supreme Court]] controversially held that under the doctrines of joint enterprise and transferred malice D2 is guilty of V's murder if D1 and D2 voluntarily engage in fighting each other, each intending to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the other and each foreseeing that the other has the reciprocal intention, and if D1 mistakenly kills V in the course of the fight.<ref>{{cite BAILII|litigants=Regina v Armel Gnango|link=R v Gnango|court=UKSC|reporter=|scotcase=|year=2011|volume=|firstpage=|num=59|format=|parallelcite=|date=14 December 2011|courtname=|juris=}}</ref>
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