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Universal pragmatics
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==Three aspects of universal pragmatics== There are three ways to evaluate an utterance, according to UP. There are ''theories that deal with elementary propositions'', ''theories of first-person sentences'', and ''theories of speech acts''. A theory of elementary propositions investigates those things in the real world that are being ''[[Theory of reference|reference]]d'' by an utterance, and the things that are implied by an [[utterance]], or ''predicate'' it. For example, the utterance "The first [[Prime Minister]] of Canada" refers to a man who went by the name of Sir [[John A. Macdonald]]. And when a speaker delivers the utterance, "My [[husband]] is a [[lawyer]]", it implies that the speaker is married to a man. A theory of first-person sentences examines the expression of the ''intentions'' of the actor(s) through language and in the first-person. Finally, a theory of speech acts examines the setting of standards for interpersonal relations through language. The basic goal of speech act theory is to explain how and when utterances in general are ''[[performative]]''. (1979:34) Central to the notion of speech acts are the ideas of [[illocutionary force]] and [[Perlocutionary act|perlocutionary force]], both terms coined by philosopher [[J.L. Austin]]. ''Illocutionary force'' describes the intent of the speaker, while ''perlocutionary force'' means ''the effect an utterance has in the world'', or more specifically, the effect on others. A performative utterance is a sentence where an action being performed is done by the utterance itself. For example: "I inform you that you have a moustache", or "I promise you I will not burn down the house". In these cases, the words are also taken as significant actions: the act of informing and promising (respectively). Habermas adds to this the observation that speech acts can either succeed or fail, depending on whether or not they succeed on ''[[Influence (sociology)|influencing]]'' another person in the intended way. (1979:35) This last method of evaluation—the theory of speech acts—is the domain that Habermas is most interested in developing as a ''theory of communicative action''.
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