Editing Value judgment (section)

==Value judgments and their context==
Some argue that true objectivity is impossible, that even the most rigorous rational analysis is founded on the set of values accepted in the course of analysis.<ref name=Scriven>
{{cite book |author=Michael Scriven |title=Proceedings of the 1972 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association |chapter=Exact role of value judgments in science |editor1=Kenneth F. Schaffner |editor2=Robert Sonné Cohen |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nhY1vAIbdakC&pg=PA237 |pages=237 ''ff'' |isbn=9027704082 |year=1974 |publisher=Springer}}
</ref> 
Consequently, all conclusions are necessarily value judgments (and therefore may be parochial). Of course, putting all conclusions in one category does nothing to distinguish between them, and is, therefore, a useless descriptor. Categorizing a conclusion as a value judgment takes substance when the context framing the judgment is specified.<ref name=Cushan>
{{cite book |author=Anna-Marie Cushan |title=Investigation into Facts and Values: Groundwork for a theory of moral conflict resolution |url=http://www.ondwelle.com/ValueJudgements.pdf |orig-year=1983|year=2014 |publisher=Ondwelle: Melbourne}}</ref>

As an example, scientific "truths" are considered objective but are held tentatively, with the understanding that more careful evidence and/or wider experience might change matters. Further, a scientific view (in the sense of a conclusion based upon a value system) is a ''value judgment'' that is [[Social constructionism|socially constructed]] based upon rigorous evaluation and wide consensus. With this example in mind, characterizing a view as a ''value judgment'' is vague without a description of the context surrounding it.

However, as noted in the first segment of this article, in common usage the term ''value judgment'' has a much simpler meaning with context simply implied, not specified.