Editing X Article (section)

==Impact of the "long telegram"==

===On American foreign policy===
[[File:Forrestal2 crop.jpg|thumb|[[United States Secretary of the Navy|Secretary of the Navy]] [[James Forrestal]] (left) was largely responsible for the spread of the "long telegram", extending its readership to US President [[Harry S. Truman]] (right), amongst others.]]
Matthews sent Kennan a cable praising the telegram, describing it as "magnificent", adding, "I cannot overestimate its importance to those of us here struggling with the problem."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=218}} Byrnes praised it as well, writing he had read it "with the greatest interest" and describing it as "a splendid analysis".{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=218}} Harriman was less enthused, calling it "fairly long, and a little bit slow reading in spots."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=218}} He nonetheless sent a copy to [[United States Secretary of the Navy|Secretary of the Navy]] [[James Forrestal]]. Forrestal was largely responsible for the spread of the long telegram, sending copies across Washington.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=218}} It gained a larger readership than was typical for a classified document, with readers including [[List of ambassadors of the United States to Cuba|ambassador to Cuba]] [[Raymond Henry Norweb|Henry Norweb]], British diplomat [[Frank Roberts (diplomat)|Frank Roberts]], [[General of the Army (United States)|General]] [[George C. Marshall]] and President Truman.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|pp=218, 229}}

The long telegram was quickly read and accepted by Washington bureaucrats as the best explanation of Soviet behavior.{{sfn|Gaddis|2005a|p=20}} Policymakers, military officials and intelligence analysts generally came to understand that the Soviet Union's primary foreign policy goal was world domination under a Communist state.{{sfn|Leffler|2005|p=26}} Historian [[John Lewis Gaddis]] writes that the ultimate impact of the long telegram is that it "became the basis for United States strategy toward the Soviet Union throughout the rest of the Cold War",{{sfn|Gaddis|2005b|p=29}} and that it "won [Kennan] the reputation of being the government's foremost Soviet expert".{{sfn|Gaddis|2005a|p=24}} In 1967, Kennan reflected "My reputation was made. My voice now carried."<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|1983}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=222}}.</ref> In mid-April 1946, at Forrestal's insistence, Kennan received an appointment in the [[National War College]] as Deputy for Foreign Affairs.{{sfn|Miscamble|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rxFHpYix3BsC&pg=PA28 28]}}

The Truman administration quickly accepted Kennan's conclusion that the Soviets had no reasonable grievances with the West and would never cooperate with capitalist states. It was therefore senseless to try and address Soviet concerns, leaving a policy of containing Soviet interests as the best response.{{sfn|Schmitz|1999|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_Rzy_yNMKbcC&pg=PA149 149]}} Historian Louis Halle writes that the timing of the long telegram's appearance was important, "[coming] right at a time when the Department{{nbsp}}... was floundering about, looking for new intellectual moorings."<ref name="books.google.com">{{harvnb|Halle|1967|p=105}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Miscamble|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rxFHpYix3BsC&pg=PA26 26]}}.</ref> He continues that the telegram served as "a new and realistic conception to which it might attach itself."<ref name="books.google.com"/> Gaddis and historian Wilson D. Miscamble both believe that Halle overstates Kennan's impact on State Department thinking, emphasizing that the Department was already moving towards a more adversarial position against the Soviets,<ref>{{harvnb|Gaddis|2005a|p=404n2}}; {{harvnb|Miscamble|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rxFHpYix3BsC&pg=PA26 26–27]}}.</ref> though Miscamble concedes, "there can be no doubt that Kennan's cable exercised a catalytic effect upon departmental thinking especially as regards the possibility of the United States achieving any non-adversary relationship with the Soviet Union."{{sfn|Miscamble|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rxFHpYix3BsC&pg=PA26 26]}}

{{quote box|quote= If none of my previous literary efforts had seemed to evoke even the faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not to die down for many months.<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|1983}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005a|p=20}}.</ref> |source=– Kennan reflecting on the long telegram, 1967|width=25%|align=left|style=padding:8px;}}

Offering a different perspective, Matthews notes in a letter of March 12, 1946, that the administration had already moved in the direction of not catering to Soviet interests before the long telegram, pointing to a speech Byrnes delivered on 28 February, drafted before Byrnes had read Kennan's message.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=226}} In the speech, Byrnes explains: "We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or threat is used contrary to the purposes of the <nowiki>[</nowiki>[[United Nations]]<nowiki>]</nowiki> Charter.{{nbsp}}... If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=226}} Matthews explains that long telegram would instead serve as the administration's rationale for subsequent actions.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=226}}{{refn|group=note|In the same letter, Matthews writes that the long telegram is "to my mind the finest piece of analytical writing that I have ever seen come out of the [Foreign] Service{{nbsp}}..., [it] has been received in the highest quarters here as a basic outline of future Soviet policy."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=226}} He counts among its reader the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and those highest in the Army and Navy.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=226}}}} Historian [[Melvyn P. Leffler]] points out that before the long telegram had circulated widely, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] had already resolved in February 1946 that "collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East.{{sfn|Leffler|2005|p=28}}
{{clear}}

===On the Soviet Union===
Though the long telegram was a classified document, it circulated widely enough that a copy leaked out to Soviet intelligence. Stalin was among its readers and called on his [[List of ambassadors of Russia to the United States|American ambassador]], [[Nikolai Vasilevich Novikov|Nikolai Novikov]], to send a similar telegram from [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] to [[Moscow]].{{sfn|Gaddis|2005b|pp=29–30}} [[Ghostwriter|Ghostwritten]] by Soviet [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Foreign Minister]] [[Vyacheslav Molotov]],<ref>{{harvnb|Jensen|1993|p=75}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005b|p=30}}.</ref> the piece was sent on September 27, 1946.{{sfn|Gaddis|2005b|p=30}} Representative of Stalin's opinions,{{sfn|Gaddis|2005b|p=30}} Novikov's telegram argued in part: "The foreign policy of the United States reflects the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism, [and] is characterized{{nbsp}}... by a striving for world supremacy."<ref name="JqG">{{harvnb|Jensen|1993|pp=3–16}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2005b|p=30}}.</ref> America would attempt to achieve supremacy by cooperating with Great Britain,{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=229}} but their cooperation was "plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting{{nbsp}}... It is quite possible that the Near East will become a center of Anglo-American contradictions that will explode the agreements now reached between the United States and England."<ref name="JqG"/>

Kennan provided commentary on Novikov's telegram in a 1991 piece for the journal ''[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]''.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|pp=718n11, 762}} He wrote in part, "These poor people, put on the spot, produced the thing," but "it was only a way of saying to their masters in Moscow: 'How true, sir!{{'"}}.<ref>{{harvnb|Kennan|1991|pp=540–541}}, quoted in {{harvnb|Gaddis|2011|p=230}}.
</ref>