Editing Submarine communications cable (section)

=== Geopolitical perspective ===

==== Geopolitical vulnerabilities ====
[[Fishing vessel]]s are the leading cause of accidental damage to submarine communication cables.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":4" /> However, some of the academic discussions and recent incidents point to geopolitical tactics influencing the cable's security more than previously expected.<ref name=":0" /> These tactics include the ease and potential with which fishing vessels can blend into regular maritime traffic and implement their attacks.<ref name=":14" />

The propensity for [[fishing trawler]] nets to cause cable faults may well have been exploited during the [[Cold War]]. For example, in February 1959, a series of 12 breaks occurred in five American trans-Atlantic communications cables. In response, a U.S. naval vessel, the [[USS Roy O. Hale (DE-336)|USS ''Roy O. Hale'']], detained and investigated the Soviet trawler ''Novorosiysk''. A review of the ship's log indicated it had been in the region of each of the cables when they broke. Broken sections of cable were also found on the deck of the ''Novorosiysk''. It appeared that the cables had been dragged along by the ship's nets, and then cut once they were pulled up onto the deck to release the nets. The Soviet Union's stance on the investigation was that it was unjustified, but the U.S. cited the [[Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables]] of 1884 to which Russia had signed (prior to the formation of the Soviet Union) as evidence of violation of international protocol.<ref>The Embassy of the United States of America. (1959, March 24). U.S. note to Soviet Union on breaks in trans-Atlantic cables. The New York Times, 10.</ref>

Several media outlets and organizations indicate that Russian fishing vessels, particularly in 2022, passed over a damaged submarine cable up to 20 times, suggesting potential political motives and the possibility of hybrid warfare tactics used from Russia's side.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Humpert |first=M |date=24 October 2022 |title=Fiber-optic submarine cable near Faroe and Shetland Islands damaged; Mediterranean cables also cut. |url=https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cable-near-faroe-and-shetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut |work=High North News.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=EUobserver |date=October 26, 2022 |title=Mysterious Atlantic cable cuts linked to Russian fishing vessels. |url=https://euobserver.com/nordics/156342 |work=}}</ref> Russian naval activities near submarine cables are often linked to increased hybrid warfare strategies targeting submarine cables, where sabotage is argued to serve as a tool to disrupt communication networks during conflict and destabilise adversaries.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":6" /> 

These tactics elevate cable security to a significant geopolitical issue.<ref name=":6" /> Criminal actors may further target cables as a means of economic warfare, aiming to destabilize economies or convey political messages.<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8" /> The disruption of submarine communication cables in highly politicised maritime areas thus has a significant political component that is receiving increased attention.

After two cable breaks in the [[Baltic Sea]] in November 2024, one between [[Lithuania]] and Sweden and the other between [[Finland]] and Germany, Defence Minister [[Boris Pistorius]] argued: 

''“No one believes that these cables were cut accidentally. I also don't want to believe in versions that these were ship anchors that accidentally caused the damage. Therefore, we have to state, without knowing specifically who it came from, that it is a 'hybrid' action. And we also have to assume, without knowing it yet, that it is sabotage."'' <ref>{{Cite web |last1=Cook |first1=Ellie |last2=Feng |first2=John |date=2024-11-19 |title="NATO lake" sabotage feared as two undersea cables damaged in 24 hours |url=https://www.newsweek.com/nato-baltic-sea-undersea-cables-sabotage-finland-germany-sweden-lithuania-1988002 |access-date=2024-12-06 |website=Newsweek |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-19 |title=Sweden opens "sabotage" investigation into severed Baltic Sea fibre-optic cables |url=https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20241119-germany-believes-telecom-cables-cut-in-baltic-sea-was-act-of-sabotage |access-date=2024-12-06 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref> 

This statement underlines the current discourse to recognize cable disruptions as threats to national security, which ultimately leads to their [[Securitization (international relations)|securitization]] in the international context.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Katzman |first=Jonathan |title=Securitization of Physical Cyberspace Infrastructure as a Nexus in U.S.-Russia Relations: The Case of Submarine Communications Cables |url=https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/cybercolumn/securitization-of-physical-cyberspace-infrastructure-as-a-nexus-in-u-s-russia-relations-the-case-of/ |access-date=2024-12-06 |website=russiancouncil.ru |language=en}}</ref>

==== Geopolitical risks and countermeasures ====
Submarine cables are inherently vulnerable to transnational threats like organized crime.<ref name=":1" />  International collaboration to address these threats tends to fall to existing organizations with a cable specific focus – such as the [[International Cable Protection Committee|International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)]] – which represent key submarine stakeholders, and play a vital role in promoting cooperation and information sharing among stakeholders.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":5" /> Such organizations are argued to be crucial to develop and implement a comprehensive and coordinated global strategy for cable security.<ref name=":17" />

As of 2025, a tense U.S.-China relationship complicates this task especially in the [[South China Sea]] where there are territorial disputes.  China has increasing control and influence over global cables networks, while both it and the USA financially supports allied-owned cable projects and exerts diplomatic pressure and regulatory action, e.g. against [[Vietnam]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Guarascio |first1=Francesco |last2=Nguyen |first2=Phuong |last3=Brock |first3=Joe |date=18 September 2024 |title=Exclusive: Inside the US push to steer Vietnam's subsea cable plans away from China |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/inside-us-push-steer-vietnams-subsea-cable-plans-away-china-2024-09-17/ |access-date=7 December 2024 |work=Reuters}}</ref><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":20" /> 

In light of [[Nord Stream pipelines sabotage]] in the [[Baltic Sea]], where subsea infrastructure vital to Germany and Russia was physically destroyed, and other incidents there, [[NATO]] has increased patrols and monitoring operations.<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-06-16 |title=NATO moves to protect undersea pipelines, cables as concern mounts over Russian sabotage threat |url=https://apnews.com/article/nato-russia-sabotage-pipelines-cables-infrastructure-507929033b05b5651475c8738179ba5c |access-date=2024-12-07 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>