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=== Economic factors === ==== Economic development and modernization theory ==== [[File:Museum of Science and Industry, Power Hall - geograph.org.uk - 3025961.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Industrialization was seen by many theorists as a driver of democratization.]] Scholars such as [[Seymour Martin Lipset]];<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lipset|first=Seymour Martin|s2cid=53686238|date=1959|title=Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=53|issue=1|pages=69–105|doi=10.2307/1951731|issn=0003-0554|jstor=1951731}}</ref> Carles Boix and [[Susan Stokes]],<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Stokes|first2=Susan C.|date=2003|title=Endogenous Democratization|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=55|issue=4|pages=517–549|doi=10.1353/wp.2003.0019|issn=0043-8871|s2cid=18745191}}</ref> and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, [[Evelyne Huber|Evelyne Stephens]], and John Stephens<ref>{{Cite book|title=Capitalist Development and Democracy|publisher=University Of Chicago Press|year=1992}}</ref> argue that [[economic development]] increases the likelihood of democratization. Initially argued by Lipset in 1959, this subsequently been referred to as [[modernization theory]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Geddes|first=Barbara|editor1-first=Robert E|editor1-last=Goodin|date=2011|title=What Causes Democratization|url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-029|url-status=live|website=The Oxford Handbook of Political Science|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001|isbn=978-0-19-960445-6|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140530042316/http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com:80/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-029 |archive-date=2014-05-30 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Korom|first=Philipp|date=2019|title=The political sociologist Seymour M. Lipset: Remembered in political science, neglected in sociology|journal=European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology|volume=6|issue=4|pages=448–473|doi=10.1080/23254823.2019.1570859|issn=2325-4823|pmc=7099882|pmid=32309461}}</ref> According to Daniel Treisman, there is "a strong and consistent relationship between higher income and both democratization and democratic survival in the medium term (10–20 years), but not necessarily in shorter time windows."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Treisman|first=Daniel|date=2020|title=Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=23|pages=241–257|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Robert Dahl]] argued that market economies provided favorable conditions for democratic institutions.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web|url=https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300194463/democracy|title=On Democracy|last=Dahl|first=Robert|website=yalebooks.yale.edu|publisher=Yale University Press|access-date=2020-02-02}}</ref> A higher [[List of countries by GDP (nominal) per capita|GDP/capita]] correlates with democracy and some claim the wealthiest democracies have never been observed to fall into authoritarianism.<ref name="przeworski">{{cite book | last = Przeworski | first = Adam | author-link = Adam Przeworski| title = Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year = 2000 | location = Cambridge|display-authors=etal}}</ref> The rise of Hitler and of the Nazis in Weimar Germany can be seen as an obvious counter-example, but although in early 1930s Germany was already an advanced economy, by that time, the country was also living in a state of economic crisis virtually since the first World War (in the 1910s), a crisis which was eventually worsened by the effects of the Great Depression. There is also the general observation that democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Empirical research thus led many to believe that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy, or helps newly established democracies consolidate.<ref name="przeworski" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rice|first1=Tom W.|last2=Ling|first2=Jeffrey|date=2002-12-01|title=Democracy, Economic Wealth and Social Capital: Sorting Out the Causal Connections |journal=Space and Polity|volume=6|issue=3|pages=307–325|doi=10.1080/1356257022000031995|s2cid=144947268|issn=1356-2576}}</ref> One study finds that economic development prompts democratization but only in the medium run (10–20 years). This is because development may entrench the incumbent leader but make it more difficult for him deliver the state to a son or trusted aide when he exits.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover|journal = American Journal of Political Science|date = 2015-10-01|issn = 1540-5907|pages = 927–942|volume = 59|issue = 4|doi = 10.1111/ajps.12135|language = en|first = Daniel|last = Treisman| s2cid=154067095 |url = https://zenodo.org/record/895598}}</ref> However, the debate about whether democracy is a consequence of wealth, a cause of it, or both processes are unrelated, is far from conclusive.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Traversa | first1 = Federico | year = 2014 | title = Income and the stability of democracy: Pushing beyond the borders of logic to explain a strong correlation? | journal = Constitutional Political Economy | volume = 26| issue = 2| pages = 121–136| doi = 10.1007/s10602-014-9175-x | s2cid = 154420163 }}</ref> Another study suggests that economic development depends on the political stability of a country to promote democracy.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=FENG|first1=YI|title=Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth|journal=British Journal of Political Science|date=July 1997|volume=27|issue=3|pages=416, 391–418|doi=10.1017/S0007123497000197|doi-broken-date=2024-11-14 |s2cid=154749945 }}</ref> Clark, Robert and Golder, in their reformulation of Albert Hirschman's model of ''Exit, Voice and Loyalty'', explain how it is not the increase of wealth in a country ''per se'' which influences a democratization process, but rather the changes in the socio-economic structures that come together with the increase of wealth. They explain how these structure changes have been called out to be one of the main reasons several European countries became democratic. When their socioeconomic structures shifted because modernization made the agriculture sector more efficient, bigger investments of time and resources were used for the manufacture and service sectors. In England, for example, members of the gentry began investing more in commercial activities that allowed them to become economically more important for the state. This new kind of productive activities came with new economic power were assets became more difficult for the state to count and hence more difficult to tax. Because of this, predation was no longer possible and the state had to negotiate with the new economic elites to extract revenue. A sustainable bargain had to be reached because the state became more dependent of its citizens remaining loyal and, with this, citizens had now leverage to be taken into account in the decision making process for the country.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=William Roberts |first2=Matt |last2=Golder |first3=Sona N. |last3=Golder |year=2013 |title=Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game |journal=Unpublished Manuscript |url=https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/clark_golder.pdf }}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=April 2018}}<ref>"Origins and growth of Parliament". The National Archives. Retrieved 7 April 2015.[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/citizen_subject/origins.htm "Origins and growth of Parliament". The National Archives. Retrieved 7 April 2015.]</ref> [[Adam Przeworski]] and [[Fernando Limongi]] argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Przeworski|first1=Adam|last2=Limongi|first2=Fernando|date=1997|title=Modernization: Theories and Facts|journal=World Politics|volume=49|issue=2|pages=155–183|issn=0043-8871|jstor=25053996|doi=10.1353/wp.1997.0004|s2cid=5981579}}</ref> Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/voting-for-autocracy/F6671D230EC7C458A30035ADB20F9289|title=Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico|last=Magaloni|first=Beatriz|date=September 2006|publisher=Cambridge Core|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511510274 |isbn=9780521862479 |language=en|access-date=2019-12-17}}</ref> [[Andrew J. Nathan]] argues that China is a problematic case for the thesis that economic development causes democratization.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-puzzle-of-the-chinese-middle-class/|title=The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class|website=Journal of Democracy|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-22}}</ref> Michael Miller finds that development increases the likelihood of "democratization in regimes that are fragile and unstable, but makes this fragility less likely to begin with."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=2012|title=Economic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=56|issue=4|pages=1002–1020|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00595.x}}</ref> There is research to suggest that greater urbanization, through various pathways, contributes to democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Glaeser|first1=Edward L.|last2=Steinberg|first2=Bryce Millett|date=2017|title=Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change?|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w22860.pdf|journal=Regional Studies|volume=51|issue=1|pages=58–68|doi=10.1080/00343404.2016.1262020|bibcode=2017RegSt..51...58G |s2cid=157638952}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barceló|first1=Joan|last2=Rosas|first2=Guillermo|date=2020|title=Endogenous democracy: causal evidence from the potato productivity shock in the old world|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|volume=9|issue=3|language=en|pages=650–657|doi=10.1017/psrm.2019.62|issn=2049-8470|doi-access=free}}</ref> Numerous scholars and political thinkers have linked a large [[middle class]] to the emergence and sustenance of democracy,<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-pol/|title=Aristotle: Politics {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|website=www.iep.utm.edu|access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref> whereas others have challenged this relationship.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rosenfeld|first=Bryn|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jbjtDwAAQBAJ|title=The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy|date=2020|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-20977-7|language=en}}</ref> In "Non-Modernization" (2022), [[Daron Acemoglu]] and [[James A. Robinson (economist)|James A. Robinson]] argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development "because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'."<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/epdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-103913 | doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-103913 | title=Non-Modernization: Power–Culture Trajectories and the Dynamics of Political Institutions | year=2022 | last1=Acemoglu | first1=Daron | last2=Robinson | first2=James | journal=Annual Review of Political Science | volume=25 | pages=323–339 | hdl=1721.1/144425 | hdl-access=free }}</ref> A meta-analysis by [[Gerardo L. Munck]] of research on Lipset's argument shows that a majority of studies do not support the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads to more democracy.<ref>Gerardo L.Munck, "Modernization Theory as a Case of Failed Knowledge Production." ''The Annals of Comparative Democratization'' 16, 3 (2018): 37–41. [https://mk0apsaconnectbvy6p6.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/2018/10/2018_16_3-Annals_of_CD_September.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190813130345/https://mk0apsaconnectbvy6p6.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/2018/10/2018_16_3-Annals_of_CD_September.pdf|date=2019-08-13}}</ref> A 2024 study linked industrialization to democratization, arguing that large-scale employment in manufacturing made mass mobilization easier to occur and harder to repress.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Van Noort |first=Sam |date=2024 |title=Industrialization and Democracy |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/933069 |journal=World Politics |volume=76 |issue=3 |pages=457–498 |doi=10.1353/wp.2024.a933069 |issn=1086-3338}}</ref> ====Capital Mobility==== Theories on causes to democratization such as economic development focuses on the aspect of gaining capital. Capital mobility focuses on the movement of money across borders of countries, different financial instruments, and the corresponding restrictions. In the past, there have been multiple theories as to what the relationship is between capital mobility and democratization. <ref>FREEMAN, J. R., & QUINN, D. P. (2012). The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered. American Political Science Review, 106(1), 58–80. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000505</ref> The “doomsway view” is that capital mobility is an inherent threat to underdeveloped democracies by the worsening of economic inequalities, favoring the interests of powerful elites and external actors over the rest of society. This might lead to depending on money from outside, therefore affecting the economic situation in other countries. [[Sylvia Maxfield]] argues that a bigger demand for transparency in both the private and public sectors by some investors can contribute to a strengthening of democratic institutions and can encourage democratic consolidation. <ref>Maxfield, S. (2000). Capital Mobility and Democratic Stability. Journal of Democracy 11(4), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0080.</ref> A 2016 study found that [[Preferential trading area|preferential trade agreements]] can increase democratization of a country, especially trading with other democracies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Manger|first1=Mark S.|last2=Pickup|first2=Mark A.|date=2016-02-01|title=The Coevolution of Trade Agreement Networks and Democracy|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=60|issue=1|pages=164–191|doi=10.1177/0022002714535431|s2cid=154493227|issn=0022-0027}}</ref> A 2020 study found increased trade between democracies reduces [[democratic backsliding]], while trade between democracies and autocracies reduces democratization of the autocracies.<ref name="a964">{{cite journal | last=Pronin | first=Pavel | title=International Trade And Democracy: How Trade Partners Affect Regime Change And Persistence | journal=SSRN Electronic Journal | publisher=Elsevier BV | year=2020 | issn=1556-5068 | doi=10.2139/ssrn.3717614 | page=| url=https://wp.hse.ru/data/2020/10/23/1373846754/75PS2020.pdf }}</ref> Trade and capital mobility often involve international organizations, such as the [[International Monetary Fund]] (IMF), [[World Bank]], and [[World Trade Organization]] (WTO), which can condition financial assistance or trade agreements on democratic reforms.<ref>Chwieroth, J. M. (2010). Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization. Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sbnq</ref> ==== Classes, cleavages and alliances ==== [[File:Reeve and Serfs.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Theorists such as Barrington Moore Jr. argued that the roots of democratization could be found in the relationship between lords and peasants in agrarian societies.]] Sociologist [[Barrington Moore Jr.]], in his influential [[Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy]] (1966), argues that the distribution of power among classes – the peasantry, the bourgeoise and the landed aristocracy – and the nature of alliances between classes determined whether democratic, authoritarian or communist revolutions occurred.<ref>{{cite book|title=Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world|last=Moore|first=Barrington Jr.|publisher=[[Beacon Press]]|year=1993|isbn=978-0-8070-5073-6|edition=with a new foreword by Edward Friedman and James C. Scott|location=Boston|page=430|author-link=Barrington Moore, Jr.|orig-date=1966}}</ref> Moore also argued there were at least "three routes to the modern world" – the liberal democratic, the fascist, and the communist – each deriving from the timing of industrialization and the social structure at the time of transition. Thus, Moore challenged modernization theory, by stressing that there was not one path to the modern world and that economic development did not always bring about democracy.<ref>Jørgen Møller, ''State Formation, Regime Change, and Economic Development''. London: Routledge Press, 2017, Ch. 6.</ref> Many authors have questioned parts of Moore's arguments. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, [[Evelyne Huber|Evelyne Stephens]], and John D. Stephens, in ''Capitalist Development and Democracy'' (1992), raise questions about Moore's analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization.<ref>Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. ''Capitalist Development and Democracy.'' Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</ref> Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances, the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bellin|first=Eva|date=January 2000|title=Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=52|issue=2|pages=175–205|doi=10.1017/S0043887100002598|s2cid=54044493|issn=1086-3338}}</ref> Samuel Valenzuela argues that, counter to Moore's view, the landed elite supported democratization in Chile.<ref>J. Samuel Valenzuela, 2001. "Class Relations and Democratization: A Reassessment of Barrington Moore's Model", pp. 240–86, in Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves (eds.), The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.</ref> A comprehensive assessment conducted by James Mahoney concludes that "Moore's specific hypotheses about democracy and authoritarianism receive only limited and highly conditional support."<ref>James Mahoney, "Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research: The Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism," pp. 131–74, in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), ''Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences.'' New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 145. For an earlier review of a wide range of critical response to ''Social Origins'', see Jon Wiener, "Review of Reviews: ''Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy''", ''History and Theory'' 15 (1976), 146–75.</ref> A 2020 study linked democratization to the [[Mechanised agriculture|mechanization of agriculture]]: as landed elites became less reliant on the repression of agricultural workers, they became less hostile to democracy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Samuels|first1=David J.|last2=Thomson|first2=Henry|date=2020|title=Lord, Peasant … and Tractor? Agricultural Mechanization, Moore's Thesis, and the Emergence of Democracy|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/lord-peasant-and-tractor-agricultural-mechanization-moores-thesis-and-the-emergence-of-democracy/0D322FCC606F75D44D9446358F3B9690/share/fa7c5e053c9936ef179231a40604b88d8eac9957|journal=Perspectives on Politics|volume=19|issue=3|language=en|pages=739–753|doi=10.1017/S1537592720002303|s2cid=225466533|issn=1537-5927|url-access=subscription}}</ref> According to political scientist [[David Stasavage]], representative government is "more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/public-debt-and-the-birth-of-the-democratic-state/9995D18B9CC015BA69C37133E44DDE23|title=Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain 1688–1789|author1-link=David Stasavage|last=Stasavage|first=David|date=2003|publisher=Cambridge University Press|language=en|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511510557|access-date=2019-12-24|isbn=9780521809672}}</ref> A 2021 study found that constitutions that emerge through pluralism (reflecting distinct segments of society) are more likely to induce liberal democracy (at least, in the short term).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Negretto|first1=Gabriel L.|last2=Sánchez-Talanquer|first2=Mariano|date=2021|title=Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900–2015|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/constitutional-origins-and-liberal-democracy-a-global-analysis-19002015/AD138F031B07119CBEF099B8879FB888|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=115|issue=2|pages=522–536|doi=10.1017/S0003055420001069|hdl=10016/39537 |s2cid=232422425|issn=0003-0554|via=|hdl-access=free}}</ref>
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