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Game theory
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=== Defence science and technology === Game theory has been used extensively to model decision-making scenarios relevant to defence applications.<ref name=":3">{{cite journal |last1=Ho |first1=Edwin |last2=Rajagopalan |first2=Arvind |last3=Skvortsov |first3=Alex |last4=Arulampalam |first4=Sanjeev |last5=Piraveenan |first5=Mahendra |title=Game Theory in Defence Applications: A Review |journal=Sensors |date=28 January 2022 |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=1032 |doi=10.3390/s22031032 |doi-access=free |pmid=35161778 |pmc=8838118 |arxiv=2111.01876 |bibcode=2022Senso..22.1032H }}</ref> Most studies that has applied game theory in defence settings are concerned with Command and Control Warfare, and can be further classified into studies dealing with (i) Resource Allocation Warfare (ii) Information Warfare (iii) Weapons Control Warfare, and (iv) Adversary Monitoring Warfare.<ref name=":3" /> Many of the problems studied are concerned with sensing and tracking, for example a surface ship trying to track a hostile submarine and the submarine trying to evade being tracked, and the interdependent decision making that takes place with regards to bearing, speed, and the sensor technology activated by both vessels. The tool,<ref name=":4">{{cite conference |last1=Phetmanee |first1=Surasak |last2=Sevegnani |first2=Michele |last3=Andrei |first3=Oana |title=StEVe: A Rational Verification Tool for Stackelberg Security Games |book-title=Integrated Formal Methods: 19th International Conference, IFM 2024 |date=2024 |pages=267–275 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |location=Manchester, United Kingdom |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-76554-4_15 |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-76554-4_15 }}</ref> for example, automates the transformation of public vulnerability data into models, allowing defenders to synthesize optimal defence strategies through Stackelberg equilibrium analysis. This approach enhances cyber resilience by enabling defenders to anticipate and counteract attackers’ best responses, making game theory increasingly relevant in adversarial cybersecurity environments. Ho et al. provide a broad summary of game theory applications in defence, highlighting its advantages and limitations across both physical and cyber domains.
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