Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===Integrated information theory===
{{further|Integrated information theory}}
Integrated information theory (IIT), developed by the neuroscientist and psychiatrist [[Giulio Tononi]] in 2004 and more recently also advocated by Koch, is one of the most discussed models of consciousness in neuroscience and elsewhere.<ref name="comp-iit">{{cite journal|last1=Krohn|first1=Stephan|last2=Ostwald|first2=Dirk|title=Computing integrated information|journal=Neuroscience of Consciousness|date=2017|volume=2017|issue=1|pages=nix017|doi=10.1093/nc/nix017|pmid=30042849|pmc=6007153}}</ref><ref name="critique-iit">{{cite journal|last1=Cerullo|first1=Michael A.|editor1-last=Kording|editor1-first=Konrad P.|title=The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory|journal=PLOS Computational Biology|date=September 2015|volume=11|issue=9|pages=e1004286|pmid=26378789|pmc=4574706|doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286|bibcode=2015PLSCB..11E4286C|doi-access=free}}</ref> The theory proposes an [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] between consciousness and integrated information, with the latter item (denoted as Φ) defined mathematically and thus in principle measurable.<ref name="critique-iit"/><ref name="morch-iit">{{cite web|last1=Mørch|first1=Hedda Hassel|title=The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness|url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/121/The_Integrated_Information_Theory_of_Consciousness|website=Philosophy Now|access-date=22 April 2018|date=2017}}</ref> The hard problem of consciousness, write Tononi and Koch, may indeed be intractable when working from matter to consciousness.<ref name="tononi+koch"/> However, because IIT inverts this relationship and works from phenomenological axioms to matter, they say it could be able to solve the hard problem.<ref name="tononi+koch"/> In this vein, proponents have said the theory goes beyond identifying human neural correlates and can be extrapolated to all physical systems. Tononi wrote (along with two colleagues):

<blockquote>While identifying the "neural correlates of consciousness" is undoubtedly important, it is hard to see how it could ever lead to a satisfactory explanation of what consciousness is and how it comes about. As will be illustrated below, IIT offers a way to analyse systems of mechanisms to determine if they are properly structured to give rise to consciousness, how much of it, and of which kind.<ref name="iit-3.0">{{cite journal|last1=Oizumi|first1=Masafumi|last2=Albantakis|first2=Larissa|last3=Tononi|first3=Giulio|title=From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0|journal=PLOS Computational Biology|date=May 2014|volume=10|issue=5|pages=e1003588|doi=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588|pmid=24811198|pmc=4014402|bibcode=2014PLSCB..10E3588O|doi-access=free}}</ref></blockquote>

As part of a broader critique of IIT, Michael Cerullo suggested that the theory's proposed explanation is in fact for what he dubs (following [[Scott Aaronson]]) the "Pretty Hard Problem" of methodically inferring which physical systems are conscious—but would not solve Chalmers' hard problem.<ref name="critique-iit"/> "Even if IIT is correct," he argues, "it does not explain why integrated information generates (or is) consciousness."<ref name="critique-iit"/> Chalmers agrees that IIT, if correct, would solve the "Pretty Hard Problem" rather than the hard problem.<ref name="mindt-2017">{{cite journal|last1=Mindt|first1=Garrett|title=The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=2017|volume=24|issue=7–8|pages=130–154|url=http://newdualism.org/papers/G.Mindt/Mindt-JCS2017.pdf|access-date=22 February 2022}}</ref>