Editing Problem of evil (section)

=== "Greater good" responses ===
The greater good defense is more often argued in response to the evidential version of the problem of evil,<ref name="DoughertyMcBrayer2014">{{cite book|first1=Trent|last1=Dougherty|first2=Justin P.|last2=McBrayer|title=Skeptical Theism: New Essays|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MaDNAwAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-966118-3 |pages=265–66 }}</ref> while the free will defense is often discussed in the context of the logical version.<ref>{{cite book|author=[[James Franklin Harris]] |title=Analytic Philosophy of Religion |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rx2Qf9ieFKYC&pg=PA243 |year=2002|publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-4020-0530-5|pages=243–244 }}</ref> Some solutions propose that omnipotence does not require the ability to actualize the logically impossible. "Greater good" responses to the problem make use of this insight by arguing for the existence of goods of great value which God cannot actualize without also permitting evil, and thus that there are evils he cannot be expected to prevent despite being omnipotent.

Skeptical theologians argue that, since no one can fully understand God's ultimate plan, no one can assume that evil actions do not have some sort of greater purpose.<ref name=WhitneyTheodicy>{{cite web|last1=Whitney|first1=B|title=Theodicy|url=http://go.galegroup.com/ps/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANCE&inPS=true&prodId=GVRL&userGroupName=nysl_ce_colgul&tabID=T003&searchId=R1&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&contentSegment=&searchType=BasicSearchForm&currentPosition=1&contentSet=GALE%7CCX3407710979&&docId=GALE%7CCX3407710979&docType=GALE|website=Gale Virtual Reference Library|publisher=Gale|access-date=10 December 2014}}</ref>

====Skeptical theism====
{{Main|Skeptical theism}}
"According to skeptical theism, if there were a god, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond [human] ken, ... the fact that we don't see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X".<ref name="Trent Dougherty">{{cite web |last1=Dougherty |first1=Trent |title=Skeptical Theism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=skeptical-theism&archive=win2018 |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition) |publisher=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 February 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> One standard of sufficient reason for allowing evil is by asserting that God allows an evil in order to prevent a greater evil or cause a greater good.<ref name=wilks31>{{cite book|first=Ian |last=Wilks |editor=Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder|title=The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J0ScAgAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-118-60797-8 |chapter=Chapter 31, for context see Chapters 29 and 30}}</ref> ''Pointless evil'', then, is an evil that does not meet this standard; it is an evil God permitted where there is no outweighing good or greater evil.  The existence of such pointless evils would lead to the conclusion there is no benevolent god.<ref name="Rowe, William L.">{{cite journal |last1=Rowe |first1=William L. |title=Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=2006 |volume=59 |issue=2 |pages=79–92 |doi=10.1007/s11153-005-6178-6 |jstor=40023383 |s2cid=170120784 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40023383|url-access=subscription }}</ref>{{rp|79}}  The skeptical theist asserts that humans can't know that such a thing as pointless evil exists, that humans as limited beings are simply "in the dark" concerning the big picture on how all things work together. "The skeptical theist's skepticism affirms certain limitations to [human] knowledge with respect to the realms of value and modality" (method).<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009">{{cite journal |last1=Bergmann |first1=Michael |title=17. Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil |editor1-last=Flint |editor1-first=Thomas |editor2-last=Rea |editor2-first=Michael |journal=Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology|year=2009|pages=374–401 |url=https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199289202.003.0018 |isbn=9780199289202 }}</ref>{{rp|6, 8}} "Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most ''a posteriori'' arguments against the existence of God".<ref name="Trent Dougherty"/>

Skeptical theism questions the first premise of [[William L. Rowe|William Rowe's]] argument: "There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse"; how can that be known?<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|11–12}} [[J. L. Schellenberg|John Schellenberg's]] argument of divine hiddenness,<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|13–14}} and the first premise of [[Paul Draper (philosopher)|Paul Draper's]] Hypothesis of Indifference, which begins "Gratuitous evil exists", are also susceptible to questions of how these claimed concepts can be genuinely known.<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|15–18}}

===== Critique =====
Skeptical theism is criticized by [[Richard Swinburne]] on the basis that the appearance of some evils having no possible explanation is sufficient to agree there can be none, (which is also susceptible to the skeptic's response); and it is criticized on the basis that, accepting it leads to skepticism about morality itself.<ref name="Almeida and Oppy">{{cite journal |last1=Almeida |first1=Michael J. |last2=Oppy |first2=Graham |title=Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=2003 |volume=81 |issue=4 |page=496 |doi=10.1080/713659758 |s2cid=17867179 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659758}}</ref>

=====Hidden reasons=====
The hidden reasons defense asserts the logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil as not knowing the reason does not necessarily mean that the reason does not exist.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="IepEvidential" /> This argument has been challenged with the assertion that the hidden reasons premise is as plausible as the premise that God does not exist or is not "an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful". Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments, or that the hidden reasons may result in additional contradictions.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="Frances2013p110"/> As such, from an inductive viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.<ref name="Stanford" />

A sub-variant of the "hidden reasons" defense is called the "PHOG"{{snd}}profoundly hidden outweighing goods{{snd}}defense.<ref name="Frances2013p110"/> The PHOG defense, states Bryan Frances, not only leaves the co-existence of God and human suffering unanswered, but raises questions about why animals and other life forms have to suffer from natural evil, or from abuse (animal slaughter, animal cruelty) by some human beings, where hidden moral lessons, hidden social good, and other possible hidden reasons do not apply.<ref name="Frances2013p110">{{cite book|first=Bryan |last=Frances |title=Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ngeIkSJnh4kC&pg=PA110|date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-66295-6 |pages=110–123}}</ref>

====Soul-making or Irenaean theodicy====
{{Main|Irenaean theodicy}}

The soul-making (or Irenaean) theodicy is named after the 2nd-century Greek theologian [[Irenaeus]] whose ideas were adopted in Eastern Christianity.<ref name=johnhickp201/> It has been modified and advocated in the twenty-first century by [[John Hick]].<ref name=johnhickp201>{{cite book|first=John|last=Hick|title=Evil and the God of Love|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KMcYDAAAQBAJ |year=2016|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-1-349-18048-6 |pages=201–216}}</ref> Irenaen theodicy stands in sharp contrast to the Augustinian. For Augustine, humans were created perfect but fell, and thereafter continued to choose badly of their own freewill. In Irenaeus' view, humans were not created perfect, but instead, must strive continuously to move closer to it.<ref name="Lars Fr. H. Svendsen">{{cite book |last1=Svendsen |first1=Lars Fr. H. |title=A Philosophy of Evil |date=2010 |publisher=Dalkey Archive Press |isbn=9781564785718 |page=51}}</ref>

The key points of a soul-making theodicy begin with its metaphysical foundation: that "(1) The purpose of God in creating the world was soul-making for rational moral agents".<ref name="G. Stanley Kane">{{cite journal |last1=Kane |first1=G. Stanley |title=The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=1975 |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=1–22 |doi=10.1007/BF00136996 |jstor=40021034 |s2cid=170214854 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40021034}}</ref>  (2) Humans choose their responses to the soul-making process thereby developing moral character. (3) This requires that God remain hidden, otherwise freewill would be compromised. (4) This hiddenness is created, in part, by the presence of evil in the world. (5) The distance of God makes moral freedom possible, while the existence of obstacles makes meaningful struggle possible. (6) The result of beings who complete the soul-making process is "a good of such surpassing value" that it justifies the means. (7) Those who complete the process will be admitted to the kingdom of God where there will be no more evil.<ref name="G. Stanley Kane"/> Hick argues that, for suffering to have soul-making value, "human effort and development must be present at every stage of existence including the afterlife".<ref name="Anderson, A. K."/>{{rp|132, 138}}

[[C. S. Lewis]] developed a theodicy that began with freewill and then accounts for suffering caused by disease and natural disasters by developing a version of the soul-making theodicy. [[Nicholas Wolterstorff]] has raised challenges for Lewis's soul-making theodicy. Erik J. Wielenberg draws upon Lewis's broader corpus beyond ''The Problem of Pain'' but also, to a lesser extent, on the thought of two other contemporary proponents of the soul-making theodicy, John Hick and Trent Dougherty, in an attempt to make the case that Lewis's version of the soul-making theodicy has depth and resilience.<ref>{{cite journal|last =Wielenberg|first=Erik J. |title=In Defence of C.S. Lewis' Soul-Making Theodicy: A Reply to Wolterstorff|journal=Journal of Inklings Studies|year=2019 |volume=9|issue=2|pages=192–199 |doi=10.3366/ink.2019.0048 |s2cid=211937140 |url=https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/ink.2019.0048|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===== Critique =====
The Irenaean theodicy is challenged by the assertion that many evils do not promote spiritual growth, but can instead be destructive of the human spirit. Hick acknowledges that this process often fails in the actual world.<ref name="Hick and Evil">{{Cite book  | last = Hick  | first = John  | author-link = John Hick  | title = Evil and the God of Love  | publisher=Macmillan  | place = London  | year = 1966  | isbn = 978-0-06-063902-0  }}{{rp|325, 336}}</ref> Particularly egregious cases known as horrendous evils, which "[constitute] ''[[prima facie]]'' reason to doubt whether the participant's life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole," have been the focus of recent work in the problem of evil.<ref>[[Marilyn McCord Adams]], ''Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God'' (Cornell University, 2000), 203.</ref> Horrendous suffering often leads to dehumanization, and its victims become angry, bitter, vindictive, depressed and spiritually worse.<ref name=Creeganp185/>

Yet, life crises are a catalyst for change that is often positive.<ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Tedeschi |editor1-first=Richard G. |editor2-last=Park |editor2-first=Crystal L. |editor3-last=Calhoun |editor3-first=Lawrence G. |title=Posttraumatic Growth: Positive Changes in the Aftermath of Crisis |date=1998 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781135689803 |pages=99, 117}}</ref> Neurologists [[Bryan Kolb]] and [[Bruce Wexler]] indicate this has to do with the plasticity of the brain. The brain is highly plastic in childhood development, becoming less so by adulthood once development is completed. Thereafter, the brain resists change.<ref name="Bruce E. Wexler">{{cite book |last1=Wexler |first1=Bruce E.|title=Brain and Culture Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change |date=2008 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=9780262265140}}</ref>{{rp|5–9}} The neurons in the brain can only make permanent changes "when the conditions are right" because the brain's development is dependent upon the stimulation it receives.<ref name="Bryan Kolb">{{cite book |last1=Kolb |first1=Bryan |title=Brain Plasticity and Behavior |date=2013 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=9781134784141}}</ref>{{rp|7}} <ref name="Bruce E. Wexler"/>{{rp|13}} When the brain receives the powerful stimulus that experiences like bereavement, life-threatening illness, the trauma of war and other deeply painful experiences provide, a prolonged and difficult internal struggle, where the individual completely re-examines their self-concept and perceptions of reality, reshapes neurological structures.<ref name="Bruce E. Wexler"/>{{rp|6–7}}<ref name="Horowitz and Van Eeden">{{cite journal |last1=Horowitz |first1=D. S. |last2=Van Eeden |first2=R. |title=Exploring the learnings derived from catalytic experiences in a leadership context |journal=SA Journal of Human Resource Management/SA Tydskrif vir Menslikehulpbronbestuur |date=2015 |volume=13 |issue=1 |url=https://sajhrm.co.za/index.php/sajhrm/article/view/598/895}}</ref>{{rp|4}} The literature refers to ''turning points,''<ref name="McAdams">{{cite book |last1=McAdams |first1=Dan P. |title=The Redemptive Self: Stories Americans Live By |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199969760 |edition=Revised and Expanded}}</ref> ''defining moments,''<ref name="Badaracco">{{cite book |last1=Badaracco |first1=Joseph L. Jr. |title=Defining Moments When Managers Must Choose Between Right and Right |date=2016 |publisher=Harvard Business Review Press |isbn=9781633692404}}</ref> ''crucible moments,''<ref name="Bennis and Thomas">{{cite book |last1=Bennis |first1=Warren G. |last2=Thomas |first2=Robert J. |title=Geeks and Geezers: How Era, Values, and Defining Moments Shape Leaders – How Tough Times Shape Good Leaders |date=2002 |publisher=Harvard Business School Press}}</ref> and ''life-changing events.''<ref name="Boyatzis and McKee">{{cite book |last1=Boyatzis |first1=Richard E. |last2=McKee |first2=Annie |title=Resonant Leadership: Renewing Yourself and Connecting with Others Through Mindfulness, Hope, and Compassion |date=2005 |publisher=Harvard Business Press |isbn=9781591395638 |edition=illustrated}}</ref> These are experiences that form a catalyst in an individual's life so that the individual is personally transformed, often emerging with a sense of learning, strength and growth, that empowers them to pursue different paths than they otherwise would have.<ref name="Horowitz and Van Eeden"/>{{rp|2}}

Steve Gregg acknowledges that much human suffering produces no discernible good, and that the greater good does not fully address every case. "Nonetheless, the fact that sufferings are temporal, and are often justly punitive, corrective, sanctifying and ennobling stands as one of the important aspects of a biblical worldview that somewhat ameliorates the otherwise unanswerable problem of pain".<ref name="Steve Gregg">{{cite book |last1=Gregg |first1=Steve |title=All You Want to Know About Hell: Three Christian Views of God's Final Solution to the Problem of Sin |date=2013 |publisher=Thomas Nelson |isbn=9781401678319 |page=2}}</ref>

A second critique argues that, were it true that God permitted evil in order to facilitate spiritual growth, it might be reasonable to expect that evil would disproportionately befall those in poor spiritual health such as the decadent wealthy, who often seem to enjoy lives of luxury insulated from evil, whereas many of the pious are poor and well acquainted with worldly evils.<ref>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", James R. Beebe</ref> Using the example of [[Francis of Assisi]], [[G. K. Chesterton]] argues that, contrary "to the modern mind", wealth is condemned in Christian theology for the very reason that wealth insulates from evil and suffering, and the spiritual growth such experiences can produce. Chesterton explains that Francis pursued poverty "as men have dug madly for gold" because its concomitent suffering is a path to piety.<ref name="G. K. Chesterton">{{cite book |last1=Chesterton |first1=G. K. |title=Saint Francis of Assisi |date=2009 |publisher=Floating Press |isbn=9781775413776}}</ref>{{rp|32, 89–90}}

[[G. Stanley Kane]] asserts that human character can be developed directly in constructive and nurturing loving ways, and it is unclear why God would consider or allow evil and suffering to be necessary or the preferred way to spiritual growth.<ref name=johnhickp201/>{{rp|376–379}}  Hick asserts that suffering is necessary, not only for some specific virtues, but that "...one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation, and thus by rightly making [responsible] choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ''ab initio'' in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, which is that of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort."<ref name="Hick and Evil"/>{{rp|255}}

However, the virtues identified as the result of "soul-making" may only appear to be valuable in a world where evil and suffering already exist. A willingness to sacrifice oneself in order to save others from persecution, for example, is virtuous because persecution exists. Likewise, the willingness to donate one's meal to those who are starving is valuable because starvation exists. If persecution and starvation did not occur, there would be no reason to consider these acts virtuous. If the virtues developed through soul-making are only valuable where suffering exists, then it is not clear what would be lost if suffering did not exist.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rationalrealm.com/downloads/philosophy/ProblemOfEvil.pdf|website=Rational Realm|title=The Problem of Evil|first=Leslie|last=Allan|date=28 July 2015|access-date=12 September 2018}}</ref> [[C. Robert Mesle]] says that such a discussion presupposes that virtues are only instrumentally valuable instead of intrinsically valuable.<ref name="C. Robert Mesle">{{cite journal |last1=Mesle |first1=C. Robert |title=The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick's Theodicy |journal=The Journal of Religion |date=1986 |volume=66 |issue=4 |page=413 |doi=10.1086/487442 |jstor=1202728 |s2cid=170193070 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1202728|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The soul-making reconciliation of the problem of evil, states Creegan, fails to explain the need or rationale for evil inflicted on animals and resultant animal suffering, because "there is no evidence at all that suffering improves the character of animals, or is evidence of soul-making in them".<ref name=Creeganp185>{{cite book|author=Nicola Hoggard Creegan |title=Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jWSL-zZ5x4QC |year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-993184-2 |page=185 with footnote 3 }}</ref> Hick differentiates between animal and human suffering based on "our capacity imaginatively to anticipate the future".<ref name="Hick and Evil"/>{{rp|314}}

====Afterlife====
[[Thomas Aquinas]] suggested the [[afterlife]] theodicy to address the problem of evil and to justify the existence of evil.<ref name="stump2008p49">{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2wDHCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 | title=The Evidential Argument from Evil | publisher=Indiana University Press | first=Eleonore | last=Stump | editor-first=Daniel | editor-last=Howard-Snyder | year=2008 | pages=49–52 | isbn=978-0-253-11409-9}}</ref> The premise behind this theodicy is that the afterlife is unending, human life is short, and God allows evil and suffering in order to judge and grant everlasting heaven or hell based on human moral actions and human suffering.<ref name=stump2008p49/><ref name="Goetz2008p139"/><ref>{{cite book|first1=Benjamin W.|last1=McCraw|first2=Robert|last2=Arp|title=The Problem of Evil: New Philosophical Directions|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oUA1CwAAQBAJ |year=2015|publisher=Lexington|isbn=978-1-4985-1208-4 |pages=132–133 }}</ref> Aquinas says that the afterlife is the greater good that justifies the evil and suffering in current life.<ref name=stump2008p49/> Christian author [[Randy Alcorn]] argues that the joys of [[heaven]] will compensate for the sufferings on earth.<ref>If God Is Good: Faith in the Midst of Suffering and Evil, published by Random House of Canada, 2009, p. 294; Quote: Without this eternal perspective, we assume that people who die young, who have handicaps, who suffer poor health, who don't get married or have children, or who don't do this or that will miss out on the best life has to offer.  But the theology underlying these assumptions have a fatal flaw.  It presumes that our present Earth, bodies, culture, relationships and lives are all there is... [but] Heaven will bring far more than compensation for our present sufferings.</ref>

Stephen Maitzen has called this the "Heaven Swamps Everything" theodicy, and argues that it is false because it conflates compensation and justification.<ref name="Goetz2008p139">{{cite book|first=Stewart|last=Goetz|title=Freedom, Teleology, and Evil|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cZmvAwAAQBAJ |year=2008|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-4411-7183-2 |pages=139–147 }}</ref><ref>[http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_OMIA.pdf "Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism"], European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1:2 (2009), 107–126, Quote: "... may stem from imagining an ecstatic or forgiving state of mind on the part of the blissful: in heaven no one bears grudges, even the most horrific earthly suffering is as nothing compared to infinite bliss, all past wrongs are forgiven. But "are forgiven" doesn't mean "were justified"; the blissful person's disinclination to dwell on his or her earthly suffering doesn't imply that a perfect being was justified in permitting the suffering all along. By the same token, our ordinary moral practice recognizes a legitimate complaint about child abuse even if, as adults, its victims should happen to be on drugs that make them uninterested in complaining. Even if heaven swamps everything, it doesn't thereby justify everything."</ref> This theodical view is based on the principle that under a just God, "no innocent creature suffers misery that is not compensated by happiness at some later stage (e. g. an afterlife)" but in the traditional view, animals don't have an afterlife.<ref name=jolley2014p66>{{cite book|first=Nicholas|last=Jolley|editor=Larry M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands|title=New Essays on Leibniz's Theodicy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lNPQAgAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-966003-2 |pages=64–68 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first1=Andrew|last1=Chignell|first2=Terence|last2=Cuneo|first3=Matthew C.|last3=Halteman|title=Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rDCvCgAAQBAJ  |year=2015|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-57807-6|page=199}}</ref>

Maintzen's argument has been rejected by Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad based on the strong account of the compensation theodicy. Two accounts of compensation theodicy can be proposed. Based on the weak interpretation that only considers compensation in afterlife, this criticism would be acceptable, but based on the strong account which consider both the "compensation in afterlife" and "the primary benefits of evils" (even if they are not greater), the compensation theodicy can be defended.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mousavirad |first=Seyyed Jaaber |date=2022-07-02 |title=Theory of Compensation and the Problem of Evil; a New Defense |url=https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3357 |journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Religion |language=en |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=197–198 |doi=10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357 |s2cid=250298800 |issn=1689-8311}}</ref>

==== Exemplarist Theodicy ====
[[Joshua Sijuwade]] argues that God allows evil in the world in order to turn certain individuals into exemplars, thus letting them contribute towards goodness of our world:{{blockquote|text=God having allowed a certain class of individuals to suffer—namely, the exemplary sufferers—would be justified by them being presented with the opportunity to transform into exemplars, and thus make a great contribution to the world being a good world. However, God is also justified in having allowed the rest of the sentient creatures in existence—namely, the nonexemplary sufferers—that do not fall into the aforementioned class, to suffer (and thus their suffering experiences not being gratuitous), given that the fact of them having undergone these experiences provides them with the opportunity to be of use in enabling other individuals to undergo the process of transforming into exemplars—and thus they are indirectly involved in the process of making the world a good world.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sijuwade |first=Joshua R. |date=2023 |title=The Problem of Suffering: The Exemplarist Theodicy |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/SIJTPO |journal=Studies in Christian Ethics |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=497–550 |doi=10.1177/09539468231158473}}</ref>}}