Editing Board of Ordnance (section)

===Background===
[[File:A hot day in the batteries.jpg|300px|thumb|British artillery battery at Sebastopol by [[William Simpson (Scottish artist)|William Simpson]], 1855. A colonel commented that a contemporary illustration depicted them 'dressed as we ought to be, not as we are ... we've neither the huts, fur hats, boots or anything in the picture'.<ref>{{cite web |title=William Simpson: Sketches from the Crimean War |url=https://illustrationchronicles.com/William-Simpson-Sketches-from-the-Crimean-War |website=Illustration Chronicles |date=13 February 2018 |access-date=22 August 2020}}</ref>]]

The catalyst for the board's disestablishment was the [[Crimean War]].<ref name=cgraham>Graham C A L DSO psc, Brig Gen ''The Story of the Royal Regiment of Artillery'' RA Institution, Woolwich 1939</ref>{{rp|p 53}} 'Disastrous logistical difficulties' plagued the campaign, especially during the Russian winter of 1854.<ref name="Steer2005" /> These [[War correspondent|widely-reported]] failings led to the fall of [[Aberdeen ministry|the government]] in January 1855; [[First Palmerston ministry|its successor]], under [[Lord Palmerston]], wasted no time in embarking on a comprehensive reorganisation of military administration.

Well before Crimea, however, there had been moves afoot to reduce the board's sizeable influence and power.<ref name="arrows" /> In 1830, the number of Principal Officers of the Ordnance had been reduced to four by the abolition of the posts of Lieutenant-General and Clerk of the Deliveries; arguably, this exacerbated the problems that led to the board's demise.<ref>[http://www.royalarmouries.org/visit-us/tower-of-london/power-house/institutions-of-the-tower/ordnance-office/the-board-of-ordnance Royal Armouries: Board of Ordnance]</ref> Then, in 1833, a parliamentary Commission of Enquiry was set up to look into consolidating the civil departments of the Army and the Ordnance (another commission was set up with similar terms of reference two years later) but its recommendations were not carried through.<ref name="arrows" />

The causes of the logistical failings in Crimea were complex and remain the subject of some debate. Management of the British Army in the 1850s was chaotic, unwieldy and inefficient,<ref name="arrows" /> with several different officials and establishments claiming and exercising the Sovereign's authority in relation to military matters, and no means of co-ordinating their functions, orders and activities.<ref name="Harpin1976">{{cite book |last1=Harpin |first1=Paul H. |title=The British War Office: from the Crimean War to Cardwell, 1855-1868. |date=1976 |publisher=University of Massachusetts |location=Amherst |url=https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2728&context=theses |access-date=21 August 2020}}</ref> Furthermore, following forty years of relative peace, the army and its support services found themselves ill-prepared and ill-equipped for war: for example, responsibility for providing food, fuel and forage to troops overseas fell to the [[Commissariat#British Army|Commissariat]] (a branch of the [[HM Treasury|Treasury]] which, in the years since [[Battle of Waterloo|Waterloo]], had developed into an administrative division, unpractised in warfare); while the Army's land transport capability, the [[Royal Waggon Train]], had been abolished as a cost-cutting measure in 1832.<ref name="Steer2005" />

At the time, much of the blame for failure fell on Field Marshal [[FitzRoy Somerset, 1st Baron Raglan|Lord Raglan]], commander-in-chief of the British army in Crimea (who, ironically, died of dysentery there on 29 June 1855 at a time when his forces were afflicted with cholera and reeling from a disastrous series of military failures.):<ref name=martintheo>Martin T ''[https://archive.org/stream/martinsconsort03theorich/martinsconsort03theorich_djvu.txt The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort]'' Smith Elder & Co, London (1877) Vol III p 180 (Online version transcribed from copy in the University of California)</ref>{{rp|p 302}}<blockquote>(In 1855) . . .'' a loud outcry against Lord Raglan had begun in the press. He was charged with neglecting to see to the actual state of his troops, and to the necessary measures for their relief. Their condition was becoming more and more pitiable; their numbers dwindling rapidly from death and disease. The road between Balaclava and the camp had become a muddy quagmire, the few remaining horses of our cavalry were rapidly disappearing, every day the difficulty of getting up food and other necessaries from Balaclava was becoming more serious, and still no provision was being made for supplying an effective means of transport.''<ref name=martintheo/>{{rp|p 181}}</blockquote>

As well as commanding the army in Crimea, Lord Raglan also held the office of Master-General of the Ordnance at the time;<ref>[http://www.remuseum.org.uk/corpshistory/rem_corps_part8.htm Abolition of the Board of Ordnance,1855] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070118124520/http://www.remuseum.org.uk/corpshistory/rem_corps_part8.htm |date=2007-01-18 }} On website of Royal Engineers Museum</ref> his removal from the UK at the outbreak of war left a void in leadership at the head of the Board of Ordnance (which was compounded by the absence of the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, who also went to Crimea). The post of Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance was therefore belatedly revived to try to fill the gaps, but its duties were left ill-defined.

Nevertheless, the [[Commander-in-Chief of the Forces|Commander-in-Chief]] [[Henry Hardinge, 1st Viscount Hardinge|Lord Hardinge]] spoke positively of the board's contribution in his evidence to the 1855 Parliamentary Committee into the conduct of the Crimean War: <blockquote> ''The Board of Ordnance had met the military difficulties of the situation with determination and success. Starting with the advantage of a well-trained and excellent personnel and reliable and sufficient materiel, they had faced the terrible losses of the winter of 1854 with resource and energy, and had lost no time in correcting the blunder of the absence of siege transport. Men and horses were quickly obtained and sent to the front, and, though every mistake in war demands an inevitable penalty, the military organisation did not fail under the heavy strain placed upon it. Nothing could exceed the military arrangements of the Ordnance Department.''</blockquote>

Ultimately, the war in Crimea revealed failings across multiple departments compounded by confused structures of command and control; and the disestablishment of the Board of Ordnance became one of a series of wide-ranging military reforms which took place in the UK over the next half century.<ref name="Steer2005">{{cite book |last1=Steer |first1=Brigadier Frank |title=To The Warrior His Arms: The Story of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps |date=2005 |publisher=Pen & Sword Books Ltd |location=Barnsley, S. Yorks.}}</ref>