Editing Causality (section)

==== Aristotelian ====
{{Main|Four causes|Potentiality and actuality}}

[[Aristotle]] identified four kinds of answer or explanatory mode to various "Why?" questions. He thought that, for any given topic, all four kinds of explanatory mode were important, each in its own right. As a result of traditional specialized philosophical peculiarities of language, with translations between ancient Greek, Latin, and English, the word 'cause' is nowadays in specialized philosophical writings used to label Aristotle's four kinds.<ref name="Graham 1987">Graham, D.W. (1987). [http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780198243151.do ''Aristotle's Two Systems''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150701001238/http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780198243151.do |date=1 July 2015 }}, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, {{ISBN|0-19-824970-5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web | url=http://www.wisdomsupreme.com/dictionary/aristotles-four-causes.php | title=WISDOM SUPREME &#124; Aristotle's Four Causes | access-date=9 October 2012 | archive-date=15 August 2018 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180815072433/http://www.wisdomsupreme.com/dictionary/aristotles-four-causes.php | url-status=usurped }}</ref> In ordinary language, the word 'cause' has a variety of meanings, the most common of which refers to efficient causation, which is the topic of the present article.
* [[Material cause]], the material whence a thing has come or that which persists while it changes, as for example, one's mother or the bronze of a statue (see also [[substance theory]]).<ref name="Soccio2011">{{cite book |first=D.J. |last=Soccio |year=2011 |title=Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy, 8th Ed.: An Introduction to Philosophy |publisher=Wadsworth |isbn=9781111837792 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zxVH9h-HDXYC&pg=PA167 |page=167}}</ref>
* [[Formal cause]], whereby a thing's dynamic ''form'' or static ''shape'' determines the thing's properties and function, as a human differs from a statue of a human or as a statue differs from a lump of bronze.<ref name="sep-aristotle-causality">{{cite journal |first=Andrea |last=Falcon |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2012 |title=Aristotle on Causality |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Winter 2012 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/aristotle-causality/#FouCauSciNat |quote=In the ''Physics'', Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specific to the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four modes of explanation are called for in the study of natural phenomena, and that the job of "the student of nature is to bring the why-question back to them all in the way appropriate to the science of nature" (''Phys.'' 198 a 21–23). The best way to understand this methodological recommendation is the following: the science of nature is concerned with natural bodies insofar as they are subject to change, and the job of the student of nature is to provide the explanation of their natural change. The factors that are involved in the explanation of natural change turn out to be matter, form, that which produces the change, and the end of this change. Note that Aristotle does not say that all four explanatory factors are involved in the explanation of each and every instance of natural change. Rather, he says that an adequate explanation of natural change may involve a reference to all of them. Aristotle goes on by adding a specification on his doctrine of the four causes: the form and the end often coincide, and they are formally the same as that which produces the change (''Phys.'' 198 a 23–26).}}</ref>
* [[Efficient cause]], which imparts the first relevant ''movement'', as a human lifts a rock or raises a statue. This is the main topic of the present article.
* [[Final cause]], the criterion of completion, or the [[Telos (philosophy)|end]]; it may refer to an action or to an inanimate process. Examples: Socrates takes a walk after dinner for the sake of his health; earth falls to the lowest level because that is its nature.

Of Aristotle's four kinds or explanatory modes, only one, the 'efficient cause' is a cause as defined in the leading paragraph of this present article. The other three explanatory modes might be rendered material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of completion. The word that Aristotle used was {{math|αἰτία}}. For the present purpose, that Greek word would be better translated as "explanation" than as "cause" as those words are most often used in current English. Another translation of Aristotle is that he meant "the four Becauses" as four kinds of answer to "why" questions.<ref name="Graham 1987"/>

Aristotle assumed efficient causality as referring to a basic fact of experience, not explicable by, or reducible to, anything more fundamental or basic.

In some works of Aristotle, the four causes are listed as (1) the essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4) the final cause. In this listing, a statement of essential cause is a demonstration that an indicated object conforms to a definition of the word that refers to it. A statement of logical ground is an argument as to why an object statement is true. These are further examples of the idea that a "cause" in general in the context of Aristotle's usage is an "explanation".<ref name="Graham 1987"/>

The word "efficient" used here can also be translated from Aristotle as "moving" or "initiating".<ref name="Graham 1987"/>

Efficient causation was connected with [[Aristotelian physics]], which recognized the [[four classical elements|four elements]] (earth, air, fire, water), and added the [[Aether (classical element)|fifth element]] (aether). Water and earth by their intrinsic property ''gravitas'' or heaviness intrinsically fall toward, whereas air and fire by their intrinsic property ''levitas'' or lightness intrinsically rise away from, Earth's center—the motionless center of the universe—in a straight line while accelerating during the substance's approach to its natural place.

As air remained on Earth, however, and did not escape Earth while eventually achieving infinite speed—an absurdity—Aristotle inferred that the universe is finite in size and contains an invisible substance that holds planet Earth and its atmosphere, the [[sublunary sphere]], centered in the universe. And since celestial bodies exhibit perpetual, unaccelerated motion orbiting planet Earth in unchanging relations, Aristotle inferred that the fifth element, ''aither'', that fills space and composes celestial bodies intrinsically moves in perpetual circles, the only constant motion between two points. (An object traveling a straight line from point ''A'' to ''B'' and back must stop at either point before returning to the other.)

Left to itself, a thing exhibits ''natural motion'', but can—according to [[Aristotelian metaphysics]]—exhibit ''enforced motion'' imparted by an efficient cause. The form of plants endows plants with the processes nutrition and reproduction, the form of animals adds locomotion, and the form of humankind adds reason atop these. A rock normally exhibits ''natural motion''—explained by the rock's material cause of being composed of the element earth—but a living thing can lift the rock, an ''enforced motion'' diverting the rock from its natural place and natural motion. As a further kind of explanation, Aristotle identified the final cause, specifying a purpose or criterion of completion in light of which something should be understood.

Aristotle himself explained,

{{Blockquote|''Cause'' means

(a) in one sense, that as the result of whose presence something comes into being—e.g., the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and the classes which contain these [i.e., the '''material cause'''];

(b) in another sense, the form or pattern; that is, the essential formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general is the cause of the octave—and the parts of the formula [i.e., the '''formal cause'''].

(c) The source of the first beginning of change or rest; e.g. the man who plans is a cause, and the father is the cause of the child, and in general that which produces is the cause of that which is produced, and that which changes of that which is changed [i.e., the '''efficient cause'''].

(d) The same as "end"; i.e. the final cause; e.g., as the "end" of walking is health. For why does a man walk? "To be healthy", we say, and by saying this we consider that we have supplied the cause [the '''final cause'''].

(e) All those means towards the end which arise at the instigation of something else, as, e.g., fat-reducing, purging, drugs, and instruments are causes of health; for they all have the end as their object, although they differ from each other as being some instruments, others actions [i.e., necessary conditions].|Metaphysics, Book 5, section 1013a, translated by Hugh Tredennick<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1013a Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304035840/http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1013a |date=4 March 2021 }} (hosted at perseus.tufts.edu.)</ref>}}

Aristotle further discerned two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and accidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes, so that generic effects are assigned to generic causes, particular effects to particular causes, and actual effects to operating causes.

Averting [[infinite regress]], Aristotle inferred the first mover—an [[unmoved mover]]. The first mover's motion, too, must have been caused, but, being an unmoved mover, must have moved only toward a particular goal or desire.