Editing Democratic peace theory (section)

===Realist explanations===
Supporters of [[realism in international relations]] in general argue that not democracy or its absence, but considerations and evaluations of power, cause peace or war. Specifically, many realist critics claim that the effect ascribed to democratic, or liberal, peace, is in fact due to alliance ties between democratic states which in turn are caused, one way or another, by realist factors.

For example, Farber and Gowa find evidence for peace between democracies to be statistically significant only in the period from 1945 on, and consider such peace an artifact of the [[Cold War]], when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another.{{sfn|Farber|Gowa|1995}} Mearsheimer offers a similar analysis of the Anglo-American peace before 1945, caused by the German threat.{{sfn|Mearsheimer|1990}} Spiro finds several instances of wars between democracies, arguing that evidence in favor of the theory might be not so vast as other authors report, and claims that the remaining evidence consists of peace between allied states with shared objectives. He acknowledges that democratic states might have a somewhat greater tendency to ally with one another, and regards this as the only real effect of democratic peace.{{sfn|Spiro|1994}} Rosato argues that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance as part of ''[[Pax Americana]]''. One of the main points in Rosato's argument is that, although never engaged in open war with another liberal democracy during the Cold War, the United States intervened openly or covertly in the political affairs of democratic states several times, for example in the [[Chilean coup of 1973]], the [[Operation Ajax]] (1953 coup in Iran) and [[Operation PBSuccess]] (1954 coup in Guatemala); in Rosato's view, these interventions show the United States' determination to maintain an "imperial peace".{{sfn|Rosato|2003}}

The most direct counter arguments to such criticisms have been studies finding peace between democracies to be significant even when controlling for "common interests" as reflected in alliance ties.{{sfn|Gelpi|Griesdorf|2001}}{{sfn|Ray|2003}} Regarding specific issues, Ray objects that explanations based on the Cold War should predict that the Communist bloc would be at peace within itself also, but exceptions include the [[Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan]], the [[Cambodian-Vietnamese War]], and the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]]. Ray also argues that the external threat did not prevent conflicts in the Western bloc when at least one of the involved states was a non-democracy, such as the [[Turkish Invasion of Cyprus]] (against Greek Junta supported Cypriot Greeks), the [[Falklands War]], and the [[Football War]].{{sfn|Ray|1998}} Also, one study notes that the explanation "goes increasingly stale as the post-Cold War world accumulates an increasing number of peaceful dyad-years between democracies".{{sfn|Ravlo|Gleditsch|2000|p=2}} Rosato's argument about American dominance has also been criticized for not giving supporting statistical evidence.{{sfn|Slantchev|Alexandrova|Gartzke|2005}}

Some realist authors also criticize in detail the explanations first by supporters of democratic peace, pointing to supposed inconsistencies or weaknesses.

Rosato criticizes most explanations to how democracy might cause peace. Arguments based on normative constraints, he argues, are not consistent with the fact that democracies do go to war no less than other states, thus violating norms preventing war; for the same reason he refutes arguments based on the importance of public opinion. Regarding explanations based on greater accountability of leaders, he finds that historically autocratic leaders have been removed or punished more often than democratic leaders when they get involved in costly wars. Finally, he also criticizes the arguments that democracies treat each other with trust and respect even during crises; and that democracy might be slow to mobilize its composite and diverse groups and opinions, hindering the start of a war, drawing support from other authors.{{sfn|Rosato|2003}} Another realist, Layne, analyzes the crises and [[brinkmanship]] that took place between non-allied democratic great powers, during the relatively brief period when such existed. He finds no evidence either of institutional or cultural constraints against war; indeed, there was popular sentiment in favor of war on both sides. Instead, in all cases, one side concluded that it could not afford to risk that war at that time, and made the necessary concessions.{{sfn|Layne|1994}}

Rosato's objections have been criticized for claimed logical and methodological errors, and for being contradicted by existing statistical research.{{sfn|Kinsella|2005}} Russett replies to Layne by re-examining some of the crises studied in his article, and reaching different conclusions; Russett argues that perceptions of democracy prevented escalation, or played a major role in doing so.{{sfn|Russett|Layne|Spiro|Doyle|1995}} Also, a recent study finds that, while in general the outcome of international disputes is highly influenced by the contenders' relative military strength, this is not true if both contenders are democratic states; in this case the authors find the outcome of the crisis to be independent of the military capabilities of contenders, which is contrary to realist expectations.{{sfn|Gelpi|Griesdorf|2001}} Finally, both the realist criticisms here described ignore new possible explanations, like the game-theoretic one discussed below.{{sfn|Risse|n.d.}}