Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

===Global workspace theory===
{{further|Global workspace theory}}

[[Global workspace theory]] (GWT) is a [[cognitive architecture]] and theory of consciousness proposed by the cognitive psychologist [[Bernard Baars]] in 1988.<ref name="baars-2005">{{cite book|doi=10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9|citeseerx=10.1.1.456.2829|chapter=Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience|title=The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology|series=Progress in Brain Research|year=2005|last1=Baars|first1=Bernard J.|volume=150|pages=45–53|pmid=16186014|isbn=9780444518514}}</ref> Baars explains the theory with the metaphor of a theatre, with conscious processes represented by an illuminated stage.<ref name="baars-2005"/> This theatre integrates inputs from a variety of unconscious and otherwise autonomous networks in the brain and then broadcasts them to unconscious networks (represented in the metaphor by a broad, unlit "audience").<ref name="baars-2005"/> The theory has since been expanded upon by other scientists including cognitive neuroscientist [[Stanislas Dehaene]].<ref name="dehaene-naccache">{{cite journal|last1=Dehaene|first1=Stanislas|last2=Naccache|first2=Lionel|title=Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework|journal=Cognition|date=2001|volume=79|issue=1–2|pages=1–37|url=http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs671/12f/12f-papers/dehaene-consciousness.pdf|access-date=5 April 2019|doi=10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2|pmid=11164022|s2cid=1762431}}</ref>

In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness.<ref name="Chalmers"/> In particular, he said GWT provided a promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that "now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered."<ref name="Chalmers"/> J. W. Dalton similarly criticised GWT on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive ''function'' of consciousness, and fails to explain its experiential aspect.<ref name="dalton-1997">{{cite journal|last1=Dalton|first1=J. W.|title=The unfinished theatre|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1997|volume=4|issue=4|pages=316–318}}</ref> By contrast, A. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."<ref name="elitzur-1997">{{cite journal|last1=Elitzur|first1=Avshalom C.|title=Why don't we know what Mary knows? Baars' reversing the problem of qualia|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|date=1997|volume=4|issue=4|pages=319–324}}</ref>

For his part, Baars writes (along with two colleagues) that there is no hard problem of explaining [[qualia]] over and above the problem of explaining causal functions, because qualia are entailed by neural activity and themselves causal.<ref name="dc-gw"/> Dehaene, in his 2014 book ''[[Consciousness and the Brain]]'', rejected the concept of qualia and argued that Chalmers' "easy problems" of consciousness are actually the hard problems.<ref name="Dehaene"/> He further stated that the "hard problem" is based only upon ill-defined intuitions that are continually shifting as understanding evolves:<ref name=Dehaene/>

<blockquote>Once our intuitions are educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers' hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental experience, detached from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like [[vitalism]]... [Just as science dispatched vitalism] the science of consciousness will keep eating away at the hard problem of consciousness until it vanishes.</blockquote>